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“Denne boken er som nevnt ikke blitt slik den var tenkt. Likevel er den også blitt slik den 
var tenkt” (Kari Martinsen i Fra Marx til Løgstrup, 2003, s.13). 
Dedicated to my family. 
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Abstract 
This thesis stems from a wish to better understand human illness and patient care and the 
connection between them in medicine. A main assumption in the thesis is that the 
understanding of both patient and physician in medicine and medical ethics is too narrow to 
accomplish the goal of helping and taking care of the sick. In the thesis I carry out a 
theoretical study with the aim of investigating some of the preconditions for reaching this 
goal of caring for the sick in medicine, focusing on ill-being and care.  
The thesis consists of two parts, with the first part of the study focusing on the human being 
in need—the homo patiens—and the state of being ill, and the second part of the study 
focusing on the medical helper—the homo compatiens—highlighting a perspective that is 
seldom focused on in medicine and medical ethics: namely, the physician as carer.
First, I focus my attention on the illness dimension of human ailment, aiming to advance an 
understanding of illness as “a way of being human.” As a conceptual point of departure, I 
suggest the notion of “pathic existence” as developed by the German physician and 
philosopher Viktor von Weizsäcker (1886–1957). Through an analysis of his 
conceptualization of the pathic and of pathic categories, I demonstrate how this auxiliary 
typology may be of help in revealing different modes of ill-being. 
Second, to provide a richer account of what it means to conceive of the physician as helper 
and caregiver, I analyze care and the relevance of care ethics in medicine, arguing that care 
should be given a more central role in medical ethics than it has received to date. Care 
ethics challenges medicine’s “eye,” and being able to see patients with what Kari Martinsen 
calls a “perceiving eye” can help us take better care of the patient as well as improving our 
clinical “nose” and our diagnoses. I refer to the latter aspect as the epistemic potential of 
care. Further, I point to how an assumption of the self as being “autonomous and alone” 
combined with the underlying attitude of medicine to human ailment as something to get 
rid—of “weg damit”—may contribute to poor conditions for care in medicine, leading to 
situations where patients are harmed by the absence of care.  
In order to facilitate care in medicine and medical ethics, we need to realize the relational 
reality of the moral self and acknowledge the pathic mode of human existence. When a 
human ailment is considered not just as something to get rid of but also as basic and 
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constitutive for our existence, for our way of being human, both the illness dimension of an 
ailment as well as caring approaches to it may be given more room to develop in medicine. 

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Prologue 
As a graduate student of medicine I met a patient from Bosnia who was terminally ill with 
cancer with multiple metastases. While the civil war was raging at its worst in his 
homeland, he was waiting to die here in a foreign country. At his bedside our teacher taught 
us to interpret the CT scan of the patient’s abdomen, which showed a liver full of 
metastases. He taught us how to use percussion to demonstrate the presence of acites, and to 
recognize the liver stigmata he exhibited because of a liver destroyed by cancer cells. But he 
did not teach us to interpret the loneliness in the patient’s eyes. We did not even look for 
what his eyes may have held. As the other students hurried down the corridor trying to keep 
pace with the teacher, I looked into the patient’s room one more time, and saw him sitting 
by the window looking out. He seemed extremely lonely, and I felt ashamed of our 
behavior. I never forgot that patient, and I asked myself when I was standing in the corridor: 
What do we know about what it is to be an ill human being? What knowledge do we have 
of the ill person himself or herself? What does suffering from a serious disease or a disease 
that can be cured entail? We learn the details about the purely objective aspects of human 
disease: about pathogenesis, diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment. We learn to interpret CT 
scans and how to percuss the abdomen, but what do we learn about living with an illness?  

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1. Introduction 
My encounter with the Bosnian patient as a medical student represents in many ways the 
starting point for this thesis. Meeting patients for the first time I felt the medical perspective 
we were introduced to was too limited, in relation to patients, but also in relation to the task 
of being a physician. Even though the patients we examined often suffered from life-
threatening conditions, our clinical bedside education focused mainly on the patients’ 
physical diseases. Seldom, or never, did we discuss the more existential aspects of illness: 
patients’ anxiety, loneliness, and sufferings, and their fear of dying and death. Nor did we 
ever discuss or have occasion to reflect upon our own reactions to the patient’s situation. 
Based on my experiences I started to explore this problem further, pointing to the 
importance of being touched emotionally in meeting with patients’ suffering as a medical 
student (Martinsen, E. H., 2000), as well as searching for a more “holistic” understanding of 
both patient and professional (Martinsen, E. H., 2004). I yearned for such a more “holistic” 
view of patients. And I asked for a different view of myself and my fellow colleagues, as 
physicians-to-be: Was it part of our job to focus also on the patient’s loneliness and fear of 
death? And what about our own reactions to some of the situations we encountered? For me 
there was a discrepancy between our dealing with the Bosnian patient’s physical signs of 
malignant disease and our appreciation of his existential situation, that of a refugee in a 
foreign country about to die. I felt we did not treat him well enough, even though he got the 
best quality of medical care. We were not interested in his situation beyond his purely 
medical condition. We never looked for what his eyes may have held. And, even more 
important, this was not considered by our teachers something we as medical students should 
learn and think about.  
This medical encounter and my attempt to give emotional and normative expression to it 
(Martinsen, E. H., 2000, 2004) forms the starting point of this doctoral thesis. This “basic 
experience” triggered a reflection from which my two basic problems originated: 1) What 
was it like to be the Bosnian patient? Or, more generally: What is it like to be a patient, to 
be ill? And 2) What was it like to be me in the actual situation, as a physician-to-be, 
sandwiched between colleagues and a teacher, hurrying down the corridor—and my own 
feelings and thoughts regarding the patient? Or more generally: How do we understand and 
deal with the inherent tension in physicians’ work between the objective and intellectual 
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approach to the sick human being, and the personal and emotional responses to this human 
being’s suffering?  
This dissertation stems, then, from a wish to better understand human illness and patient 
care, and the connection between them in medicine. A main assumption of the project is 
that the understanding of both patient and physician in modern medicine is too narrowly 
defined to accomplish its goal of helping and taking care of the sick (Cassell, 1976). In this 
project I carry out a theoretical study to investigate some of the preconditions for reaching 
the goal of caring for the sick in medicine. The principal objective of the dissertation has 
been to develop theoretical insight in medicine in order to contribute to a better normative 
understanding of what care for the ill person entails.
Despite a growing health bureaucracy and advances in medical technology, the basic unit in 
medical work is still the relationship between the doctor and the patient: two individuals 
who meet, one applying for help and the other one there to offer help. We can formulate this 
as a basic phenomenon (“Urphänomen”) or a basic structure for medical activity: “The ill 
human being, who is in need [Not], who needs help, and, who therefore contacts the 
physician” (von Weizsäcker, 1987a, p. 13).1 This basic phenomenon is constituted by two 
dimensions of need and of help: the human being in need, the homo patiens, and the human 
being providing help, the homo compatiens (Schipperges, 1984). My focus of interest is on 
this dyad of patient and physician, and in this thesis I work with questions regarding the 
human being in need, the homo patiens, as well as with the human being as providing help, 
the homo compatiens. These two dimensions of need and help correspond with my two 
initial questions of what it involves to be ill—to be a person in need—and what it involves 
to be a physician—to be the person who provides help.2, 3
Hence, instead of analyzing the situation with the Bosnian patient in light of the usual 
medical ethical concepts like “lack of dignity,” “lack of integrity,” “lack of respect for 

1 “ … der kranke Mensch, der eine Not hat, der Hilfe bedarf und dafür den Arzt ruft” (von Weizsäcker, 1987a, 
p. 13). 
2 I translate the German expression “kranke Mensch” as “ill human being.” In the text, however, I use the 
expressions “ill human being” and “ill person” interchangeably.  
3 The works of Viktor von Weizsäcker are not translated into English. For this reason, the translations from 
German into English in this thesis are my own, in cooperation with my supervisor Jan Helge Solbakk, except 
for one instance when I use a translation provided by Monica Greco (Greco, 2009,  pp. 36-37). When I quote 
directly from a text I offer the original text in its original language in parentheses or a footnote. 
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persons,” and “lack of empathy,” I try to fill what I perceive as an epistemological gap in 
medical education: a failure in relation to the homo patiens, as well as in relation to the 
medical profession and the medical helper, the homo compatiens. The dissertation thus 
belongs to the subject area of philosophy of medicine and medical ethics. The starting point 
of the thesis is more or less situated within the philosophy of medicine proper, but it 
evolves subsequently into medical ethics, discussing among other things the concept of care 
and the tradition of an ethics of care in relation to medicine.  
1.1 Exploring the basic phenomenon 
1.1.1 The human being in need: The homo patiens 
The first part of my study focuses on homo patiens, the human being who is ill. Medicine 
possesses a comprehensive conceptual and theoretical framework for coping with the 
organic aspects of human disease. However, caring for the ill is more than curing the 
disease. This suggests that medicine is in need of theoretical perspectives that exceed the 
traditional areas of pathogenesis, diagnosis, and treatment. In this study I search for a 
philosophical approach to illness, asking what it is like to suffer from imbalanced 
neurotransmitters, infected sinuses, mutated gene sequences, or structural pathology. What 
is it like to experience illness? 
This question was raised by the German physician and philosopher Viktor von Weizsäcker 
(1886–1957) at the beginning of the last century. In his essay “Der Arzt und der Kranke” 
(the physician and the ill), he points to the fact that “medicine has no theory of its own 
about the ill human being. It teaches us about appearances of illness, about differentiation of 
causes, about outcomes [of disease], about different types of medical treatment, but it does 
not teach us about the ill human being” (von Weizsäcker, 1987a, p.12).4 Von Weizsäcker is 
a central theoretician in the tradition of anthropological medicine within the philosophy of 
medicine. This tradition was popular, particularly in Germany and the Netherlands, from 
approximately 1920 until 1960, but has fallen out of favor over the last four decades. The 

4 “Es ist eine erstaunliche, aber nicht zu leugnende Tatsache, daß die gegenwärtige Medizin eine eigene Lehre 
vom kranken Menschen nicht besitzt. Sie lehrt Erscheinungen des Krankseins, Unterscheidung von Ursachen, 
Folgen, Heilmitteln der Krankheiten, aber sie lehrt nicht den kranken Menschen” (von Weizsäcker, 1987a, p. 
12). 
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main interest of this tradition was to redefine and reinterpret medicine as a science of the 
human person (ten Have, 1995).  
In my thesis I offer an analysis of some of the works of von Weizsäcker with the aim of 
identifying in them a perspective on the ill human being. I focus my attention on the illness 
dimension of human ailment. In the literature of philosophy of medicine there is an 
established conceptual distinction between “disease,” “illness,” and “sickness,” referring to 
the medical, personal, and social aspects of human ailment respectively (Hofmann, 2002a). 
The concept of “disease” denotes the scientifically defined aspect of being sick, whereas 
“illness” denotes its experiential, subjective counterpart. “Disease processes are ‘located’ in 
tissues and organs. Illness strikes towards human beings—towards their aspirations, their 
plans and hopes and desires. The ways individuals react when ill are almost endlessly varied 
and deeply affect how they want to, may, and ought to be treated” (Ahlzèn, 2011, p. 325). 
Illness can be described as a condition, something that happens to a person—but also as 
mode of being, that is, as a way of relating to, of being in, the world (Elstad, 1987). In this 
thesis I understand illness as being, as a way of relating to the world, and I take the notion 
of pathic existence, as elaborated by Viktor von Weizsäcker, as my point of departure. 
Through an analysis of von Weizsäcker’s conceptualization of the pathic and of pathic 
categories, I point to how his understanding of pathic existence may be relevant to illness 
and the illness experience. I argue that the pathic categories of “wollen,” “können,” 
“müssen,” “dürfen,” and “sollen” may reflect different modes of ill-being, of “Kranksein.” 
By so doing, I interpret Viktor von Weizsäcker within a phenomenological frame of 
reference. Within medical philosophy and nursing science, phenomenological perspectives 
on the experience of illness are common, and much research has been done using 
phenomenology as a theoretical ground (Kaufman, 1988; Toombs, 2001; Nortvedt, 1996, 
2008a; Svenaeus, 2000, 2009, 2011; Carel, 2008, 2011; Ratcliffe, 2008; Elstad & Torjuul, 
2009; Zeiler, 2010). In light of this, I argue that it might be interesting and fruitful to 
emphasize a less well known position within medical philosophy that deals with many of 
the same problems.  
Though von Weizsäcker is not widely considered to be part of the phenomenological 
movement, his works on the pathic and pathic existence may be usefully so interpreted. In 
calling for a perspective on the ill person that also involves the person’s ill-being 
(“Kranksein”), as well as by elaborating on pathic categories or modes of being, von 
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Weizsacker presents a description of lived experience that is very much in the spirit of the 
phenomenological approach to philosophy.  
1.1.2 The human being as helper: The homo compatiens 
The second part of the study focuses on the medical helper, homo compatiens, invoking a 
theoretical perspective seldom focused on in medicine and medical ethics: the physician as 
carer. Whereas physicians’ behaviors are often analyzed in terms of their communication 
skills or their empathic capacities, care or the act of caring is rarely discussed within 
medicine.  
Although seldom reflected upon in medicine, care is a thoroughly elaborated concept in 
nursing science. Similarly, an ethics of care has exerted an influence in the areas of health 
care ethics related to nursing, but has not had the same influence on the theoretical 
frameworks on which physicians mainly rely for their ethical reflection. This is the case 
even though the concept of care has a long historical tradition within medicine (Reich, 
1995a). In medicine, care is traditionally seen as a cluster of altruistic virtues (Reich, 
1995b). Sympathy and compassion have had a special influence within the profession by 
informing the sensitivities of medical practitioners as well as by representing ethical ideals 
formulated in medical codes and oaths. “Cure sometimes, treat often, comfort always” is a 
well-known aphorism in medicine, ascribed to Hippocrates. The sentence is often regarded 
as a definition of medical activity, and conceives of comfort as always obligatory on the 
part of the physician. We find similar sentiments in the first article of the ethical guidelines 
of Norwegian physicians, which states that the doctor shall cure, treat, and comfort. The 
second article admonishes, among other things, that “The doctor must attend to the 
individual patient’s interests and integrity. The patient shall be treated with compassion, 
care and respect” (Code of Ethics for Physicians, 2002). There is also a legal requirement to 
provide “diligent care”: the Norwegian Health Personnel Act in its fourth paragraph states 
that: “Health personnel shall conduct their work in accordance with the requirements of 
professional responsibility and diligent care that can be expected based on their 
qualifications, the nature of their work and the situation in general” (The Health Personnel 
Act, § 4).5 Thus we see that in addition to being expected to provide medically sound help, 
physicians, as health care personnel, are also required to provide “diligent care.” The 

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The Norwegian expression used in the law text is “omsorgsfull hjelp” (The Health Personnel Act, §4). 
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Norwegian Board of Supervision issues written warnings to health care personnel who fail 
to provide it. As I see it, this legal requirement to provide caring help points to a demand for 
greater consciousness with regard to care in medicine with respect to both medical practice 
and medical ethics. This thesis is a contribution to this end.  
Working within the fields of medical philosophy and medical ethics, I have often been 
puzzled by the theoretical discrepancy between nursing and medicine in this regard. 
Whereas care features extensively in the literature of nursing ethics, it is still situated at the 
margins of much of the ethical thinking in medicine. Why so? Do not doctors and nurses 
work in the same field, and with the same patients? Some recent work (Carse, 1991; 
Branch, 2000; Branch et al., 2001; Cluff & Binstock, 2001; Cates & Lauritzen, 2001; 
Weiner & Auster, 2007; McCabe, 2008; Kleinman & Van der Geest, 2009; Jacobson et al., 
2009; Kohlen, 2009; Marcum, 2011; Paulsen, 2011; Sommer et al., 2011; Hamington, 2012; 
Langley & Egan, 2012) seems to be more open to the feasibility of an ethics of care in 
medicine and medical ethics, and this study aims to facilitate this transition. Thus, the 
second part of my project focuses on the concept of care in medicine, and attempts to 
illuminate possible practical and ethical implications of emphasizing it. How may these 
perspectives help me in resolving, or at least better understanding, what was at stake in my 
encounter with the Bosnian patient? 
The Norwegian nursing scientist and philosopher Kari Martinsen’s scholarly works on care, 
nursing, and medicine represent the starting point for this part of my investigation 
(Martinsen, 1991, 2000, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2006). I introduce her theoretical framework 
on care, arguing, with her, that medicine needs to encourage practitioners to develop what 
she calls a “perceiving eye.” The fostering of such a gaze may facilitate care in each 
medical encounter, I argue, as well as refining clinical proficiency. Kari Martinsen’s work 
has influenced the current understanding of care in nursing in Scandinavian countries, and 
she belongs to a different theoretical tradition than the Anglo-American tradition of an 
ethics of care. Investigating Martinsen in the context of medicine will be interesting; it may 
help us bridge the gap between related research traditions in medicine and nursing. 
I continue my investigation of care in medicine by turning to the Anglo-American ethic of 
care as developed by scholars like Carol Gilligan (1982), Virginia Held (2006), Joan Tronto 
(1993), Eva Feder Kittay (1999), and Tove Pettersen (2008). The starting point of this 
ethical tradition may be traced to the work In a Different Voice by Carol Gilligan (1982). In 
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this book, Gilligan studies the moral development of school children. Interviewing 
schoolgirls, she identifies a specific moral voice, one where caring for others in 
interpersonal relationships is the main moral concern, a concern that according to Gilligan 
may be captured in the moral demand to “not turn away from someone in need.” Gilligan 
describes a resistance among the girls she interviews toward the dominant culture, in which 
autonomy and rationality are considered markers of moral maturity. Through her work, 
Gilligan recognizes an ethical voice that has been “held in silence”: “It was like shifting the 
frequency and suddenly hearing a station that had been jammed” (2011, pp. 5–6).  
May my own reaction in the case of the Bosnian patient be ascribed to a resistance like that 
Gilligan points to? In meeting the patient with my fellow students and teacher, I too 
experienced a reaction against the way we acted in that situation, leaving the patient without 
considering anything but his physical deviations. So, standing in the corridor, hesitating, 
torn between having to catch up with the “white coats” at the end of the corridor and 
wanting to approach “the loneliness in the patient’s eyes,” I started looking for a “different 
voice” in medicine in the context of the medical encounter, a quest that has led me into the 
anthropological tradition of medicine, nursing perspectives, and feminist ethics of care.  
1.2 Objectives of the study  
Principal objective  
To develop theoretical insight in medicine in order to contribute to a better normative 
understanding of what care for the ill person entails.
Intermediate objectives 
1. With the aid of a theoretical study, to illuminate what is involved in being perceived as, 
and existing in the world as, an ill person, thus contributing to a theoretical perspective on 
ill-being; in von Weizsäcker’s words, developing and making visible a “pathosophy” in 
medicine. 
2. To explore how the conceptual vocabulary of an ethics of care might contribute to 
illuminating ill-being and the ill person–medical helper relation. 
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3. To make visible some consequences of introducing the concepts and perspectives 
developed in this thesis for today’s medical practice. 
I approach the principal objective of the thesis from different angles. First, I try to 
illuminate theoretically important aspects of the experience of being ill, thus exploring the
homo patiens. Through a focused reading of von Weizsäcker, I try to grasp important 
elements of ill-being. Further, I argue that von Weizsäcker’s medical anthropology not only 
embeds elements necessary for an understanding of the pathic subject in medicine, the 
patient, but that his approach has relevance beyond this context, as a general perspective on 
man. Second, I turn to homo compatiens, analyzing conditions for physicians that make 
them able to “see and express the [patient’s] appeal for help, in order to strengthen the 
[patient’s] life courage in the suffering” (Martinsen 1993, p. 9),6 arguing that the 
development of a sensuous and perceiving gaze is important in order to facilitate care and 
refine clinical proficiency. Third, I “join the resistance” (Gilligan, 2011) of care ethics, 
arguing that the dominant ideals of detachment and non-interference in medicine need to be 
challenged, and that medicine and medical ethics may profit from implementing the 
“relational ontology” of an ethics of care, working for an understanding of physician and 
patient as related selves. The fourth and last part of the thesis will consist of an overarching 
discussion of the different theoretical perspectives addressed in the previous chapters. 
Ethical analysis runs as a thread through the project, illuminating the ethical implications of 
von Weizsäcker’s medical anthropology, and justifying the introduction of a more content-
rich care perspective in medicine.  
There is thus an internal connection among the three theoretical perspectives of the thesis, 
which originates in the phenomenon of ill-being and the “plea for help” formulated by 
Viktor von Weizsäcker. With these basic phenomena as his points of departure, von 
Weizsäcker highlights the need (“Not”) of the patient as the main task for medicine and the 
medical helper to address (von Weizsäcker, 1987a). Similarly, highlighting the importance 
of health care practitioners to “be able to see and express the [patient’s] appeal for help,” 
Kari Martinsen points to the patient’s need, expressed as a cry or an appeal for help 
(Martinsen, 1993, p. 9). Through her elaboration of what she calls a perceiving gaze and a 
recording gaze, Martinsen points to the importance of the medical helper noticing the need 

6 “Vi må både kunne se og kunne uttrykke appellen om hjelp for å kunne styrke livsmotet i lidelsen” 
(Martinsen, 1993, p. 9). 
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to care. Martinsen’s main focus is a relational one, highlighting the relation between the 
human being in need and the human being as helper. We also find this relational focus in 
the Anglo-American tradition of an ethics of care, representing the third theoretical 
perspective that I rely on in this thesis. In our third theoretical perspective, an ethics of care 
highlights the ethical importance of relationships, and through this provides us with some 
interesting concepts to deal with the ethical challenges inherent in the basic phenomenon as 
elaborated by von Weizsäcker. Hence, both the understanding of the moral self as related 
and the ethical ideal of not turning away from someone in need may contribute to an 
improved understanding of the homo patiens, the homo compatiens, and the relation 
between them. By revisiting the model of the moral agent in medicine and medical ethics, 
relying on the relational ontology of an ethics of care, I further a central ambition of the 
tradition of medical anthropology, which is to clarify and interpret “the images of persons 
that underlie ethical perplexities” (ten Have, 1995, p. 3). The trajectory of this thesis from 
an anthropologically oriented perspective into an ethical discussion of the relevance of an 
ethics of care in relation to medicine reflects the connection between the anthropological 
tradition of medicine and the subsequent development of the academic field of medical 
ethics.7  
The thesis consists of five chapters, including the introduction and the conclusion. In 
Chapter 2 I present my three theoretical perspectives through a more thoroughgoing account 
than is provided in the three earlier papers in which I have presented portions of this work. 
In Chapter 3 I provide a synopsis and a reassembling of the three papers, as well as an 
account of the new insights gained from this work. The three papers are:  
• Paper 1: “Care for nurses only? Medicine and the perceiving eye” (Martinsen, E. H., 
2011a). 
• Paper 2: “Harm in the absence of care: Towards a medical ethics that cares” 
(Martinsen, E. H., 2011b). 

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Henk ten Have highlights this connection in his article “The anthropological tradition in the philosophy of 
medicine” (ten Have, 1995) pointing to how anthropological medicine has paved the way for the subsequent 
interest in ethical issues in health care by concentrating on the subjectivity of the patient: “The tradition of 
anthropological medicine made visible and laid open, so to speak, the moral dimension of medicine. It did so 
by criticizing the presuppositions of the dominant conception of medicine as natural science, and by 
incorporating medical science’s analytical methods and mechanistic image of a human being in a broader 
framework of an authentic science of humans” (ten Have, 1995, p. 11).
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• Paper 3: “Illness as a condition of our existence in the world: On illness and pathic 
existence” (Martinsen, E. H. & Solbakk , 2012).  
In the fourth chapter I enlarge on central themes from the previous analyses. I offer a 
reflection on what it may imply for medicine to understand illness as a “way of being 
human,” contrasting it with the attitude of “weg damit” (away with it) characteristic of 
today’s medicine. In addition, I enlarge upon and discuss the different ways of seeing in 
medicine, as well as revisiting the model of the moral agent inherent in medicine and 
medical ethics. I investigate the prevailing understanding of care in medicine, trying to 
address more thoroughly the question of why medicine seems to remain ambivalent about 
care. I try to respond to some of the critiques of care in medicine, and reflect on some of the 
didactical challenges related to the task of facilitating care in medicine. Finally, I indicate 
some areas for further research. 
1.3 Methodological considerations 
The research process led me from the anthropological perspective of von Weizsäcker to 
contemporary discussions of an ethics of care. From an interest in the person who is ill, I 
became curious about the homo compatiens, the medical helper. Initially this project was 
entitled “From divided objects to whole subjects: Holistic philosophy in medicine.” One of 
my original goals was “to contribute to a clearer and a more productive understanding of the 
concept of holism in medicine.” However, while searching for a feasible holistic approach 
in medicine, my focus changed, and I became increasingly interested, instead, in the 
concept of care. This process of change was catalyzed by my reading of nursing literature 
on holistic care.8 In addition to studying international literature on holism in nursing, I also 
began to read Norwegian literature within this field (Hummelvoll, 2004; Nortvedt & 
Grimen, 2004). To orient me in this theoretical landscape, which was unfamiliar to me as a 
physician, one specific name stood out and was repeatedly referred to in the different texts: 
the name of Kari Martinsen. I became curious about her work and her philosophy of care, 
asking myself why such an influential Norwegian theoretician on care in nursing was 

8 See for instance Myra E. Levine (1971), Geertje Boschma (1994), and Simon Woods (1998). 
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completely unknown to me as a physician. In reading her works I subsequently questioned 
whether my search for a more “holistic approach” in medicine was possibly a search for a 
“caring approach” toward patients. I found the care philosophy of Martinsen fruitful for a 
better understanding of patient, physician, and the relationship between them. This led me 
to further explore the field of care ethics, expanding my reading from the Nordic tradition of 
Kari Martinsen, Per Nortvedt, and others to the Anglo-American tradition of an ethics of 
care rooted in feminist ethics and feminist philosophy.  
This project entails in-depth studies of primary and secondary literature within all three 
areas. The method employed is philosophical analysis. Working with the texts, I dissect, 
discuss, and look for concepts and theoretical connections. The adaptation of the literature 
will follow the common principles of philosophical analysis: clarification of concepts, 
examination of definitions, and comparison of different positions. Since the questions 
considered are conceptual rather than empirical, requiring a discursive approach, I utilize 
some case stories as well to reflect on these issues. I make use of different kinds of stories 
from different sources, including a real case from my own experience as a physician as well 
as cases from medical journals, from magazines, and from books, both texts and novels. In 
Chapter 4 I also make use of some scenes from the movie Wit, which is based on a play by 
Margaret Edson.9 These different cases do not represent an attempt to “mirror” reality, as 
they include fictional cases as well as cases from real life. Their function is rather to act as a 
substrate for the theoretical discussion, illuminating crucial aspects of the analysis, as well 
as clarifying important points. 
The analysis and discussion of the literature will be framed within a hermeneutical context. 
Here I am inspired by Kari Martinsen, who describes this hermeneutical process as one of 
“thinking with” the actual theoreticians in the field we aim to examine (Martinsen, 2003b, 
2003c). My interpretations or ways of “thinking with” are conditioned by my own horizons, 
of course. This means that others might interpret the texts differently. This constitutes the 
pre-understanding with which I enter into the project. The pre-understanding is the 
“rucksack that we carry with us into the research project before the project starts. The 
content of this rucksack influences all the ways we gather and read our data. ... This 
baggage consists of experiences, hypotheses, professional perspectives, and of the 
theoretical frame of reference that we have by the opening of the project” (Malterud, 2003, 

9 Wit is a 2001 American television movie directed by Mike Nichols based on the Margaret Edson play. 
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pp. 46–47).10 As a trained physician, I might read the texts differently than if I were a 
trained philosopher or a nurse. Hence, the starting point for this project is my own 
experience as a medical student and a physician, calling for a more “holistic” patient 
perspective and a “caring approach” in our medical training. This pre-understanding 
constitutes an important motivation for carrying out this project. However, it is important to 
be aware of my pro-caring attitude, lest it predetermine the results of my investigation. So I 
must be careful to revisit anti-caring arguments thoroughly in the analysis, while at the 
same time being open to modifying, or even rejecting, some of my earlier pro-caring 
assumptions in case the arguments should not hold. In Chapter 2, where I present the 
perspectives of Viktor von Weizsäcker, Kari Martinsen, and the tradition of an ethics of 
care, I end each section with a scrutiny of possible criticisms. Likewise, I try to critically 
evaluate my idea of introducing care in medicine in the final discussion in Chapter 4. 
1.4 Indicating some results
This thesis will contribute to a further development of the field of philosophy of medicine 
and medical ethics, bringing to light theoretical traditions that are seldom touched upon in 
these contexts. It points to ethical and epistemological challenges rarely discussed in 
today’s medicine and medical ethics, and illuminates how the anthropological activity of 
clarifying and interpreting “the images of persons that underlie ethical perplexities” (ten 
Have, 1995) may be necessary for the proper resolution of moral problems in medical 
ethics. It questions the underlying idea that the moral self in medical ethics is a separate and 
emotionally detached self that always strives for the healthy, the finished, and the complete. 
The thesis points to how an assumption of the self as “autonomous and alone,” combined 
with the underlying attitude of medicine that human ailments are something to be 
eliminated (of “weg damit”), may contribute to poor conditions for care in medicine. It 
argues that medicine, in order to facilitate care, needs to realize the relational reality of the 
moral self, as well as to acknowledge the pathic mode of human existence. That is, when 
human ailment is considered not only as something to get rid of but as something basic and 

10 “Forforståelsen er den ryggsekk vi bringer med oss inn i forskningsprosjektet, før prosjektet starter. 
Innholdet i denne ryggsekken påvirker hele veien måten vi samler og leser våre data. … Denne bagasjen 
består av erfaringer, hypoteser, faglig perspektiv, og av den teoretiske referanseramme som vi har ved 
prosjektets innledning” (Malterud, 2003, pp. 46-47). 
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constitutive of our existence—for our way of being human—the illness dimension of 
ailment, as well as caring approaches to it, may be given more room to develop in medicine. 
By bringing care discourse from nursing philosophy and feminist ethics into the “father-
house” of medicine, I also believe that the thesis will help to promote more 
interdisciplinarity, not only in the theoretical disciplines of medical ethics and philosophy of 
medicine, but also in the clinical field, where physicians and nurses work side by side with 
the same patients. This work thus hopes to initiate the development of common inquiry in 
the area of what is often considered a tension between medicine on the one hand and 
nursing on the other: between curing and caring. Perpetuating a dichotomy between care 
and cure does a disservice to both. By discussing care and an ethics of care in relation to 
medicine and medical ethics, the thesis offers a way of combining insights about the basic 
phenomena of ill-being and need from medical anthropology with the perspectives of care 
offered by nursing and feminist ethics so as to contribute to the building of a more 
sustainable theoretical and normative framework for handling ill-being and pleas for help in 
medicine.  
2. Theoretical background: From medical anthropology to an ethics of care
2.1 Viktor von Weizsäcker and the pathic modes of illness
2.1.1 The tradition
Viktor von Weizsäcker is one of the main contributors to the anthropological tradition in 
philosophy of medicine. The tradition is not well known outside Germany and the 
Netherlands, and most of the scholarly works pertaining to this tradition, including the 
works of von Weizsäcker himself, have not been translated into English. In Germany this 
movement is labeled “Medizinische Anthropologie” or “Anthropologische Medizin” (von 
Weizsäcker, 1987b; Seidler, 1984; Christian, 1989). The Dutch term is “medische 
anthropologie.”  
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This tradition, the German-Continental tradition of medical anthropology, should not be 
confused with the Anglo-American tradition of medical anthropology, which is a subfield of 
anthropology that draws upon social, cultural, biological, and linguistic anthropology in 
order to better understand factors that influence health and well being (Scotch, 1963). That 
tradition may be said to be situated in the intersection between anthropology and (social) 
medicine, and derives its methodological and theoretical foundations from social 
anthropology and its thematic areas from medicine (Ingstad, 2007). In contrast, the German-
Continental tradition of anthropological medicine draws on philosophy and the humanities 
(“the Geisteswissenschaften” to use the German word) in its theoretical inquiries about 
health and disease. The terms “medical anthropology” and “anthropological medicine,” 
used interchangeably throughout this text, refer to this latter tradition.11
Many scholars representing the tradition of anthropological medicine were practicing 
physicians with a broad interest in the humanities. Main contributors to this tradition, in 
addition to Viktor von Weizsäcker, include Ludolph Krehl, Richard Siebeck, F.J.J. 
Buytendijk, Viktor Emil von Gebsattel, Herbert Plügge, and Paul Christian. In their practice 
of “philosophically rethinking medical activities” (ten Have, 1995, p. 8) they were inspired 
by phenomenology, existentialism, and philosophical anthropology, and by such thinkers as 
Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Max Scheler (ten Have, 
1995; Spiegelberg, 1972), as well as by Sigmund Freud (Rorarius, 1991; Verwey, 1990).  
Drawing on different theories and perspectives, von Weizsäcker and the other 
representatives of this tradition do not present a clear-cut theory. Rather, they represent a 
“family of ideas” focusing on basic problems within philosophy of medicine, including the 
rejection of Cartesian dualism, the model of medicine as science of the human person, and 
the necessity of a comprehensive understanding of disease (ten Have, 1995). The critique of 
a dualistic and reductive approach to the human being and to the human body is central to 
this anthropological tradition. One of their main interests was to redefine and reinterpret 
medicine as a science of man, arguing for a more humanistic foundation of medicine: 
“Anyone who suffers from a disease, who recovers or dies, is a human being, i.e. a natural 
creature and at the same time a person,” the Spanish medical historian and proponent of 


Another term that is also used in connection with this field of inquiry is the term “Theoretische Pathologie” 
or theoretical pathology. As I understand it, theoretical pathology coincides with the tradition of 
anthropological medicine, reflecting the similar field of inquiry. This is also emphasized by Eduard Seidler 
and Wilhelm Doerr (Seidler, 1984) and Paul Christian (Christian, 1989). 
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anthropological medicine Pedro Laín Entralgo writes in an essay treating the “structure and 
content” of a medical anthropology (Entralgo, 1984, p. 92).12 This has further implications 
for the choice of methods, and entails that the methods of the natural sciences are not fully 
adequate. “To examine the living being, we should participate in life, and focus upon the 
purposeful coherence and interrelationships, the significance of experience and conduct,” 
ten Have (1995, p. 10) writes, thus paraphrasing the well-known statement of von 
Weizsäcker that “in order to explore the living, one must engage oneself with life” (“Um 
Lebendes zu erforschen, muß man sich am Leben beteiligen”) (von Weizsäcker, 1997, p. 
83). This illuminates another central aspect of anthropological medicine: its focus on the 
patient’s individual biography. By focusing on the patient’s narrative and biography, and by 
employing philosophical and hermeneutical, as well as historical, approaches, the 
methodological repertoire of this tradition differs from the methodologies typically 
employed in biomedicine.  
The starting point for my engagement with von Weizsäcker is his essay “Der Arzt und der 
Kranke” (von Weizsäcker, 1987a; Solbakk, 1995, pp. 78–80). In this essay he formulates a 
basic starting point or “Urphänomen” for the theory and practice of medicine. This 
“Urphänomen,” “the ill human being, who is in need [Not], who needs help, and, who 
therefore contacts the physician” (von Weizsäcker, 1987a, p. 13), represents in many ways 
the hub from which my reading and working with von Weizsäcker’s texts emanates. His 
demand for a “metaphysics” of the ill and for a medicine that also “teaches the ill human 
being” (von Weizsäcker, 1987a) represents important pegs that have helped to structure my 
reading of his texts. Says von Weizsäcker: 
 The physics (and psychology = the physics of the soul) of the ill is not his 
 metaphysics, his appearance is not yet his essence. Where is it comprehensible? It 
 is so close that the distanced microscopic or macroscopic look overlooks it; the 
 objective look strains the eye when it comes to the sense of hearing: it resounds in 
 the plea for help. (Von Weizsäcker, 1987a, p. 13)13     

12 “Wer an einer Krankheit leidet, wer gesundet oder stirbt, ist ein Mensch, d.h. ein natürliches Wesen und 
zugleich Person” (Entralgo, 1984, p. 92). 
13 “Die Physik (und Psychologie = Physik der Seele) des Kranken ist nicht seine Metaphysik, seine 
Erscheinung ist noch nicht sein Wesen. Wo ist es fassbar? Es liegt so nah, dass die mikroskopisch oder 
makroskopisch zu ferne Optik es übersehen lässt, dass die objektive Optik das Auge anstrengt, wo es auf das 
Gehör ankommt: es tönt in der Bitte um Hilfe” (von Weizsäcker, 1987a, p. 13). 
	

As I understand his use of the term “metaphysics” here, it is more a metaphor than a 
reference to the philosophical branch of metaphysics. Asking for a perspective on the ill 
human being that reaches beyond the purely physical aspects of disease, he uses the term 
“metaphysics” to denote this “beyondness,” alluding to the illness dimension of medicine 
and more specifically to the ill-being (“das Kranksein”) of the patient. His quest for a 
metaphysics of the ill also involves, as I understand it, an ethical demand for physicians to 
be able to capture the patient’s need that manifests itself as “a plea for help” (von 
Weizsäcker, 1987a, p. 13). So I have chosen to focus my reading on the pathic and on 
pathic existence, with less attention to the other main parts of his works, such as his 
emphasis on biography and the biographical method, or his contributions in 
psychosomatics. For this reason I will not pursue any of the Freudian influences on his 
work. I also abstain from an in-depth analysis of his conceptualization of the “Gestaltkreis,” 
considered to be one of his main theoretical contributions to psychosomatic theory (von 
Weizsäcker, 1997).  
2.1.2 Toward a metaphysics of the ill: Pathic existence and “Kranksein” 
Viktor von Weizsäcker is not considered part of the phenomenological movement. But his 
works may be interpreted within a phenomenological frame of reference. Calling for a 
metaphysics of the ill, he puts emphasis on the ill-being of the patient, and his 
conceptualization of pathic existence may be interpreted in terms of phenomenology, 
providing a description of lived experience. His understanding of the pathic may also be 
read as an expression of the general phenomenological idea that existence becomes apparent 
through a break with what is ordinary and taken for granted in our existence. He points to a 
certain similarity between his own expression of “pathische Umgang” (pathic dealings) and 
Heidegger’s “existentials.” He finds Heidegger’s concept of “being cast out in time” 
(“Geworfensein des Daseins in die Zeit”) restricted, and instead prefers his own 
conceptualization of “pathische Umgang” (von Weizsäcker, 1988b, pp. 555–556). His 
understanding of the pathic modes of the human being converges with phenomenological 
ideas related to the biological phenomenological approach of F.J.J. Buytendijk, who also 
specifies various human modes of being in his Prolegomena to an Anthropological 
Physiology (Buytendijk, 1967). In paper 3 I also point to the resemblance between the 
“pathic landscape” of von Weizsäcker and the existentialism of Jean Paul Sartre and Søren 
Kierkegaard (Martinsen, E. H. & Solbakk, 2012). 
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Von Weizsäcker’s most elaborate treatment of the pathic is in his last work, Pathosophie 
(von Weizsäcker, 1967). The term “pathosophie” may be intended to express the “wisdom 
of suffering” (“Weisheit des Leidens”) (Rorarius, 1991). By introducing the concept of the 
pathic, von Weizsäcker aims to turn medical anthropology into a “pathic anthropology” 
(von Weizsäcker, 1967, p. 62), illustrating how human life distinguishes itself through its 
pathic mode of existence. The Greek term pathos incorporates suffering, but also has 
embedded in it implications of passion as conceived of by the Stoics. The Stoics regarded 
the movements of the mind—that is, the passions—as ailments disturbing the balance of the 
soul (Eriksson, 2008). This duality between suffering and passion is also characteristic of 
the concept of the pathic. In this conceptual vocabulary, “pathic” is contrasted with “ontic.” 
The pathic does not denote the given, that is, being; rather, it expresses the part of biological 
existence that does not present itself as something already settled, but as something that is 
not, and which comes to expression through modal verbs such as “will,” “can,” “may,” 
“shall,” and “must.” For this reason, the pathic is “non-ontic.” Thus, for instance, when we 
say that we will something, this implies that that which is willed, is not yet (von 
Weizsäcker, 1967, 1987c). Our interactions with the world and with each other are 
characterized by a striving, a drive for that which is not; a feeling of being incomplete rather 
than complete, undetermined rather than determined, temporal rather than eternal. Von 
Weizsäcker also uses expressions like “pathic fluctuation” (“pathische Fluktuation”) and 
“the floating layer of the pathic man” (“die Schwebelage des pathischen Menschen”) to 
express this dynamic (von Weizsäcker, 1967, pp. 58 and 63). He also uses the image of a 
landscape through which we travel to denote the pathic, an image that presents the pathic as 
a forward directedness, a striving for that which is not (yet) (von Weizsäcker, 1967, p. 57).
This way of conceiving of human existence von Weizsäcker expresses as an “antilogic of 
life” (von Weizsäcker, 1987c). According to von Weizsäcker, life is antilogical in the sense 
that it is  
 a significant contradiction … whereby something neither is nor is not, but rather 
more precisely, loses being and simultaneously receives one. … An antilogical state 
of affairs is … such that both an assertion and its negation are true. … If, for 
instance, I say “I am becoming,” and at the same time I say “little by little I am 
dying,” both things are true. … The living is always something permanent that 
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changes—like the human being.” (von Weizsäcker, 1987c, p. 50, translated by 
Greco, 2009, pp. 36–37)14
In the German language, the modal verbs of “dürfen,” “müssen,” “sollen,” “können,” and 
“wollen” reveal the ambiguities and unsettledness that life, thus understood, displays 
(Greco, 2009). The pathic categories are terms that indicate existence not so much as it is 
given, but as it is undergone (“erlitten”), pointing to a reality of possibilities beyond the 
actual, beyond what is objectively the case at any given moment: “If I say ‘I want,’ the 
implication is that what I want is not already there; if I say ‘I can,’ I similarly imply that 
what I can do may not come to pass.” (von Weizsäcker, 1987c, translated by Greco, 2009, 
p. 37)15  
In paper 3 I investigate illness by making use of these five verbs as they are elaborated upon 
by von Weizsäcker. The modal verbs are used to indicate modality; they give information 
about the function of the main verb to which the modal verb is related, and are used to 
express such ideas as possibility, obligation, and necessity. Mode means “way,” understood 
as the way something is, or the state one finds oneself in. We may talk about ways of being, 
ways of acting, ways of experiencing, ways of thinking. F.J.J. Buytendijk writes of 
“exemplary modes of being man” in his Prolegomena (Buytendijk, 1967). He understands 
modes or moods as “ways of being,” and he writes of his “exemplary modes” include being-
awake, and of being-sleep, of being-tired, -hungry, -thirsty, -labile, and -emotional. 
However, while Buytendijk elaborates physiological ways of being, von Weizsäcker is 
preoccupied with “pathological” ways of being, that is, with ill-being (“Kranksein”). For 
this reason I suggest using the pathic categories of von Weizsäcker to reflect different 
modes of ill-being. These categories mirror the pathic existence—the pathos of life—to 
which experiences of pleasure and suffering (“Lust und Leid”), and of joy and pain, belong 
(Wiehl, 1990). The categories are described as “passions (‘Passionen’), emotions 
(‘Affekte’) or desires (‘Leidenschaften’) that one has held on to in the flight and which are 

14 “Überhaupt ist das Leben ein sinnvoller Widerspruch. … …in der etwas weder ist noch etwas nicht ist, 
sondern ein Sein gerade eben verliert und zugleich ein Sein gerade bekommt. … Ein antilogischer Sachverhalt 
ist aber ein solcher, in welchem sowohl eine Aussage wie ihre Verneinung wahr sind, … Wenn ich z.B. sage 
‘ich werde…’ und zugleich sage ‘ich vergehe…’, dann ist beides wahr. … Immer ist das Lebendige ein 
veränderliches Gleichbleibendes – wie der Mensch” (von Weizsäcker, 1987c, p. 50). 
15 “Wenn ich sage, dass ich etwas will, so enthält dies geradezu die Konstatierung, dass das Gewollte nicht ist. 
Wenn ich sage: ich kann, dann ist ebenfalls darin enthalten, dass das, was ich kann, nicht ist” (von 
Weizsäcker, 1987c, p. 49). 
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forced into a concealed grammatical form” (von Weizsäcker, 1967, p. 61). Thus, the pathic 
is on the one hand connected to passions, emotions, and desires, and on the other hand, it is 
connected to suffering and illness. I will not go into each of the categories here since this 
will be done in paper 3. However, to complement the understanding of the pathic in relation 
to illness and ill-being, I provide a further example that I take from Oliver Sacks’s book A 
Leg to Stand On (Sacks, 1991). 
2.1.3 The pathic mode of suffering from a ruptured quadriceps femoris muscle 
In this autobiographical book, Sacks describes his own experience of not being able to use 
one leg after having suffered a rupture of the left quadriceps femoris muscle while hiking in 
the Norwegian mountains. Says Sacks: 
There, it seemed to me, I willed—and nothing happened: so that I was forced into a 
singular doubt, and kept asking myself “Did I will? Have I will? What has happened 
to my will?” … An accident of physiology, an injury, had deprived me of will—
specifically and solely in relation to the injured limb.” (Sacks, 1991, p. 97) 
Here, Sacks vividly describes the mode of wanting something that is not possible, as he tries 
to use his injured leg. Wanting to stand on the leg is not enough. Thus, he “willed, and 
nothing happened” (Sacks, 1991, p. 97). Sacks’s mode of wanting to be something that he is 
not, that is, healthy, thus reflects the pathic striving of his situation. Says von Weizsäcker:  
The ill says by appearance and by words “I want to get well.” He is not what he 
wants to be. The wish, hope and intention that the one who is ill experiences by not 
being what he wants to be (i.e healthy), reflects the pathic situation of our existence. 
(Von Weizsäcker, 1988b, p. 554)16
Sacks’s wanting-to (“wollen”), however, is restricted by his not being able-to (“können”); 
he wants to walk, but he cannot because of his injury. “The ‘will’ was unstrung, precisely as 
the nerve-muscle” (Sacks, 1991, p. 96). This illustrates how the categories or modes are 
interrelated, and how they influence and interact with each other.  
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“Der Kranke sagt es schon durch sein Erscheinen, oder sogar ausdrücklich mit Worten: ‘Ich möchte gesund 
werden.’ Er ist also das nicht, was er werden möchte. Das ist die pathische Situation unseres Daseins, die hier 
der Kranke als Wunsch, Hoffnung, Absicht erfährt: er möchte nicht sein, was er ist, sofern er krank ist” (von 
Weizsäcker, 1988b, p. 554). 
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At the hospital, Sacks is encouraged by his physiotherapist to try to walk on the leg that was 
operated on. He knows it is possible, because he had used the leg before the accident. And 
being a physician himself, he also knows that it is possible to use the leg after an injury like 
this, given the right treatment. However, in this situation Sacks gives expression to the 
feeling that he cannot; that this possibility is (at present) impossible for him:  
How could I stand, without a leg to stand on? How could I walk, when I lacked legs 
to walk with? How could I act, when the instrument of action had been reduced to an 
inert, immobile, lifeless, white thing? …. How could I walk, how could I stand on, 
let alone move, a ghostly lump of jelly, a nothing, which hung loosely from my hip? 
And even if, supported by its carapace of chalk, this preposterous appendage could 
support me, how then would I “walk” when I had forgotten how to walk? (Sacks, 
1991, pp. 99 and 103)
The mode of “können” or, more accurately, of “nicht können,” reflects the hypothetically 
conceivable, this that could be, but is not yet, as is clearly reflected in this case where Oliver 
Sacks is unable to do what he previously was able to: namely, to walk on his leg. Eduard 
Seidler points in his work to the situation of “cannot anymore” (“nicht-mehr-können”) as a 
primary experience of illness (Seidler, 1978; Elstad, 1987). The “nicht-mehr-können” is 
constituted by our relation to our own body and bodily experience, and is often marked by 
helplessness and frailty (“hinfälligkeit”). Drawing on Seidler, Ingunn Elstad further 
differentiates between two different aspects of the helplessness and frailty of the “nicht-
mehr-können”: First, she points to the exertion and the striving of the ill trying to deal with 
or overcome the “nicht-können.” Second, she points to the surrender characterized by a “I 
cannot anymore,” by which the ill draws him- or herself back from the surroundings 
(Elstad, 1987). Similarly, Virginia Woolf (2002) writes in her essay On Being Ill  about 
how those who are ill often prefer solitude. “Here we go alone, and like it better so,” she 
writes (p. 12). Those who are ill become part of the world of the recumbent, lying flat in 
solitude in the sick room: 
Directly the bed is called for, or, sunk deep among pillows in one chair, we raise our 
feet even an inch above the ground on another, we cease to be soldiers in the army 
of the upright; we become deserters. (Woolf, 2002, p.12) 
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In the withdrawal and surrender there is no clear boundary between the “nicht-können” and 
the “nicht-wollen” (Elstad, 1987). In “nicht-können” we are not able to do anything, and we 
do not want to do anything, either, because we do not have the strength. Here we see how 
“nicht-können” and “nicht-wollen” intertwine: Our “wollen” is influenced by our “nicht-
können” in such a way that we may not want what we are not able to do. However, this may 
also go the other way around, as we saw in the example of Oliver Sacks, where “wollen” is 
highly important in the process of rehabilitation. That is, Sacks’ wanting to use his leg again 
may be decisive for his ability to being able to (“können”), in order to make the impossible 
possible.  
We see from this how “wollen” and “können” influence each other in what von Weizsäcker 
denotes as the pathic pentagramme (Von Weizsäcker, 1988a; Rimpau, 2011). The pathic 
pentagram represents the mutual relationship and interaction among the five pathic 
categories, where they modify and color each other. In another example, “müssen” may be 
modified by “wollen” in that it may be different if we want to do what we have to do, rather 
than if we do not want what we are obliged to do. This may be the case, for instance, when 
a patient is told by the physician that he has to (“müssen”) stop smoking in order to avoid 
serious deterioration of his health, and where the patient’s having to is highly dependent on 
whether he wants to (“wollen”) quit smoking or not. These different nuances inflect the 
patient’s ill-being, and may furthermore inflect the therapeutic possibilities. Fichter (2007) 
points out how psychotherapeutical work often is about helping patients move from 
“müssen” to “wollen.” The therapist must try to give the patients the confidence to believe 
that they can and that they shall endure and make use of their own resources, as well as 
remembering what they already could, and earlier have, accomplished (Fichter, 2007). 
However, to move between the patient’s “müssen” and his or her “wollen” is always the 
patient’s own decision, and it is through this decision that “wollen” may grow from 
“müssen” (Fichter, 2007). 
Through this meditation on the interrelation of modal verbs I have tried to illustrate that von 
Weizsäcker’s understanding of the pathic and of pathic existence may illuminate important 
aspects of ill-being. In this way he fulfills to a certain extent his ambition of arriving at a 
conception of medicine that also deals with the human being in need, the homo patiens. 
However, von Weizsäcker’s conceptualization of the pathic implies more than an 
understanding of the pathic subject as ill, as a patient; it also has implications for an 
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understanding of the human being and of human existence as such, by the inclusion of 
illness in his understanding of the human being qua human (“als eine Weise des 
Menschseins”). His understanding of illness as “a way of being human” is thus related to 
his understanding of the pathic, the “antilogical” way of understanding our existence, in 
which life and death are intrinsically linked (von Weizsäcker, 1988b): 
Always, death is not only an opponent of life but a part of life itself, and without it 
life would not be life. …. If being ill is a way of being human, then it has a full share 
in the real identity of life and death, and in the intertwining of downfall and ascent. 
(Von Weizsäcker, 1988b, pp. 612, 615)17    
This general “positive” attitude toward both ailment and death in relation to our lives further 
reflects a key theme in his pathosophical project: namely, the understanding of human 
ailment and the inevitable outcome of death as being deeply embedded in the human 
condition. Our lives and our existence in general are comprised more of ailment than of 
health. Says von Weizsäcker: 
Which bodies are spotless? … Which family is free from hereditary damage? Which 
biography is undisturbed by disease? Which mental life is free from neuroses or 
pathological conditions or characteristics? … He who regards himself as completely 
fit and healthy is just blind to that which is pathological. (von Weizsäcker, 1967, pp. 
8–9)18  
Ailment is thus given existential primacy over health. Von Weizsäcker’s understanding of 
our existence as an interaction or “Umgang” with death and illness differs from much of the 
phenomenological literature dealing with illness, such as the works of illness 
phenomenologists including Fredrik Svenaeus (2000, 2009, 2011), Kay Toombs (1988), 
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17 “Immer ist der Tod nicht nur ein Gegenspieler des Lebens, sondern ein Teil des Lebens selbst, ohne den 
Leben nicht Leben wäre. … Wenn Kranksein eine Weise des Menschseins ist, dann hat es vollen Anteil an der 
wirklichen Identität von Leben und Tod, Anteil auch an der Verschlungenheit von Untergang und Aufgang” 
(Von Weizsäcker, 1988b, pp. 612, 615). 
18
“Welcher Körper wäre makellos gebildet? … Welche Familie ist frei von erblichen Schäden? Welche 
Biographie ungestört durch greifbare Erkrankung? Welches Seelenleben frei von Neurose oder pathologischen 
Zuständen oder Zügen? … Wer sich für völlig gesund hält, der ist nur blind für das Pathologische” (von 
Weizsäcker, 1967, pp. 8–9). 
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Drew Leder (1990), and Havi Carel (2008, 2011). Those authors explicate illness as a form 
of alienated or unhomelike being, as a “disruption” or a “dys-appearance,” in contrast to 
von Weizsäcker’s emphasis on the reciprocity of illness and death in our existence.  
This is an interesting discussion, which I pursue in paper 3. However, to go further into this 
here would be beyond the scope of this thesis. Therefore, I will refrain from a more 
comprehensive discussion of the illness perspective of von Weizsäcker, and instead will 
move on, having indicated the basic phenomenon as my point of departure. Instead I 
continue to explore the homo compatiens in terms of care rather than pursuing further the 
phenomenology of illness. Nevertheless, a further exploration of the illness perspective of 
von Weizsäcker in relation to similar perspectives within the field of the phenomenology of 
illness represents an interesting area for further research that emanates from this thesis. 
2.1.4 Critical remarks
The scientific value of the Heidelberg variant of psychosomatics, first and foremost the 
contribution of Viktor von Weizsäcker, has been assessed differently. Without mentioning 
names, Gerlof Verwey comments on an “uncritical acceptance and admiration” that 
pervades much of the literature on von Weizsäcker (Verwey, 1990, p. 147)—an admiration 
that he does not share. On the other hand, von Weizsäcker’s works have also been perceived 
as both unscientific and speculative, and as representing a “retrograde step to the level of 
pseudo-science” (Verwey, 1990, p. 148). There has been a severe critique of the Heidelberg 
variant of psychosomatics from the field of psychiatry. The criticism was primarily directed 
against the biographical-historical (meaning) perspective on disease, and an uninhibited 
tendency to psychologize, interpreting mental disorders, both neuroses and psychoses, as 
expressions of life crises (H.J. Weitbrecht, referred to in Verwey, 1990, pp. 148–149).  
Karl Jaspers, psychiatrist, philosopher, and contemporary of von Weizsäcker, was critical of 
medical anthropology in general, and the pathosophy of von Weizsäcker in particular. As I 
point out in paper 3, Jaspers rejected medical anthropology as such, pointing to its 
concurrence with philosophical anthropology (Martinsen, E. H. & Solbakk, 2012). He was 
also very critical of von Weizsäcker’s use of medical cases, and of his method of using 
biographical explorations of psychosomatic diseases, thus apparently looking for the 
“explanation” in the patient’s biography (Jaspers, 1997). “His case-histories can be read 
with some wonder; it seems that anything is possible, but in the end we know as little as 
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when we started,” Jaspers writes (1997, p. 246). Jaspers is not only critical of the cases that 
von Weizsäcker uses, but also of the way he interprets cases of physical disease, for 
instance, tonsillitis or micturition dysfunction, in psychoanalytic terms (Bormuth, 2008). 
Since these aspects of von Weizsäcker’s work are not relevant to my thesis, this critique 
may not be particularly relevant here. However, in my view, as a reader of von Weizsäcker 
today, there is little point in reading him so concretely and literally. This certainly applies 
when it comes to his interpretation of tonsillitis as a reaction to an erotic conflict. I thus 
agree with Jaspers that von Weizsäcker’s understanding of how the patient’s biography may 
be said to work on a cellular level is both highly unrealistic and speculative. What I do find 
valuable in what von Weizsäcker writes about biography, about the biographical method, 
and about the meaning of diseases, however, is his emphasis on considering more than pure 
pathophysiology in the attempt to understand human disease. This is what I find innovative 
in his emphasis on biography, which he published 20 years before the American psychiatrist 
George L. Engel launched his biopsychosocial model (Engel, 1977, 1981). 
The tradition of medical anthropology has also been criticized for showing a tendency 
towards paternalism.19 This criticism may also apply to some of the works of von 
Weizsäcker, where his emphasis upon pathic subjectivity, with its connotation of passivity, 
may be said to be out of tune with the development of medicine, particularly since the 
1960s, when there has been an increased focus on “activity, intervention, control, and 
manipulation” (ten Have, 1995, p. 12) as well as on patient autonomy and patients’ rights. I 
address this critique in paper 3, asking whether it is at all relevant to talk about modals like 
“dürfen” and “sollen” in modern health care. In that paper I point to the importance of these 
modes of ill-being in today’s medicine despite its current focus on patient autonomy and 
patient participation (Martinsen, E. H. & Solbakk, 2012). By not acknowledging the aspect 
of permission (“dürfen”) inherent in ill-being, we may get an unrealistic picture of illness 
and of the state of being ill, I argue. Illness does not consist only of conditions that we may 
be “empowered” from, or make autonomous choices in relation to. This is illustrated in 
paper 3 by the situation of Nicole, who is going through bone-marrow transplantation. For 
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19 The notion of paternalism is often referred to as the interference of a state or an individual with another 
person, against their will, and defended or motivated by a claim that the person interfered with will be better 
off or protected from harm. In a medical context the issue of paternalism arises, for instance, by the 
withholding of relevant information concerning a patient’s condition by physicians, or by physicians doing 
what they think may benefit the patient without asking for the patient’s consent (“Paternalism,” Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Bioethics). 
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this treatment to be successful she has to (“müssen”) follow the physicians’ advice exactly, 
and not leave the isolation ward before she is allowed to (“dürfen”). In this situation Nicole 
does not have any choice but to follow the medical prescriptions and do as she is told, 
unless she wants to diminish her own chances of survival. Accordingly, “being allowed” in 
this situation reflects a central dimension of Nicole’s being at this time, and does not 
necessarily count as an expression of medical paternalism. 
Being part of the pathic pentagram, “dürfen” is colored by the other categories. For 
instance, there is a connection between what we are allowed or not allowed to do and what 
we have to do (“müssen”). That is, there may also be a hidden command in a permission 
that is granted. We see this element of hidden command, for instance, in the newly post-
surgical patient who is “allowed” to get out of bed, meaning she has to (“müssen”) get up in 
order to prevent the development of postoperative thromboembolic disease. Here we see the 
ambiguity of being allowed: Being a patient, we are subordinate to the medical experts, and 
if we are “good patients” we behave only as we are allowed to. The medical experts, on the 
other hand, expect us to do as we are allowed, and in this expectation there is also an 
element of hidden command. This ambiguity of being allowed and of being commanded 
represents thus an interesting and important aspect of ill-being, which I believe may be 
underestimated in today’s medicine and medical ethics. Taking the elements of “dürfen” 
and “müssen” into consideration in relation to illness and ill-being may contribute to a more 
nuanced discussion of patient autonomy in modern health care. Even though we emphasize 
patient autonomy and patients’ rights, the elements of permission and command are still 
inherent in the patient’s act, being in a vulnerable state, of seeking help from an expert, 
whose advice she ought to follow in order to get well.  
Was von Weizsäcker’s understanding and elaboration of the pathic existence influenced by 
his historical moment? May his understanding of illness and suffering as ways of being 
human have been conditioned by the time in which he lived, characterized by the terrible 
events of war? 20 I have tried to relate his thinking regarding the pathic to the 
phenomenological tradition, pointing to how his understanding of pathic existence may be 
understood more as an expression of the general phenomenological idea that existence 
becomes apparent through a break with what is ordinary and taken for granted in our 
existence. In paper 3 I also point to a resemblance between the “pathic landscape” of von 
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I thank Jens Erik Paulsen for asking me this question. 
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Weizsäcker and the existentialism of Jean Paul Sartre and Søren Kierkegaard. In these 
works as well, human existence may be perceived from the vantage point of negative 
phenomena such as illness, anxiety, despair (Kierkegaard, 1980, 2004), and deficiency, 
lack, absence, and nothingness (Sartre, 1956). By contextualizing his works within the 
intellectual movements of his time, I think we may argue that von Weizsäcker, rather than 
reacting only to the actual life circumstances of his time, was also inspired by and possibly 
influenced by the intellectual currents of his time.   
To sum up, I have tried to clarify how von Weizsäcker’s understanding of pathic existence 
and of pathic subjectivity may illuminate important aspects of ill-being. I have approached 
the principal objective of the thesis from the angle of the ill human being, the homo patiens, 
by pointing out theoretically important aspects related to the experience of being ill. I have 
taken von Weizsäcker’s understanding of the pathic as my point of departure, ill-being 
conceived of as pathic being, and expressed through the pathic modals of will, may, shall, 
can, and must.  
I continue my exploration of this basic phenomenon by analyzing the physician as a medical 
helper (homo compatiens), following von Weizsäcker’s conception of medical 
anthropology, which demands a perspective on the medical helper as well as on the human 
being in need (von Weizsäcker, 1987a). I expand on this to involve the perspective of care 
in medicine, thus situating the medical helper within the framework of care philosophy and 
care ethics. The exploration starts by crossing the border into the field of nursing and the 
care philosophy of Kari Martinsen. 
2.2 Thinking with Kari Martinsen in medicine 
My point of departure for my exploration of care is the philosophy of care developed by the 
Norwegian nursing scientist and philosopher Kari Martinsen. Martinsen (2003a, 2003b, 
2003c, 2006) develops her concept of care as a way to comprehend the relationship between 
the patient’s illness experience and the nurse or health care professional who is there to 
help. She elaborates on the claim that the patient’s subjective condition of disease lays on us 
as health care professionals. In this, we see a resemblance to the perspective of von 
Weizsäcker, with his emphasis on the basic phenomena of the person in need and the person 
as helper. Both von Weizsäcker and Martinsen are concerned with the patient’s suffering or 
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need (“Not”), and how this suffering acts on the physician or nurse to elicit some kind of 
response.  
In what follows I elaborate on Martinsen’s contribution to understanding the fundamental 
relationship between a human being in need and a human being as helper. I focus on her 
phenomenological analysis of care, and her understanding of perception and its relevance 
and importance for the medical encounter; discuss her conceptions of “perceiving” and 
“recording”; and present some objections to and criticisms of her theoretical position. First, 
however, I consider Martinsen’s concept of care, focusing on her three dimensions of care.  
2.2.1 The three dimensions of care  
In her early analyses of care, Martinsen introduces three dimensions of care: the relational, 
the moral, and the practical (Martinsen, 2003a). “Care has to do with relations and morality, 
and it expresses itself through practical action,” she writes (1989, p. 208).21 In her early 
attempts to grasp the essence of caring, Martinsen relies on Martin Heidegger and his 
understanding of “Sorge.” Later, however, she comes to reappraise Heidegger, pointing to 
the difficulty of combining his thinking with a philosophy of care due to the influence on 
him of National Socialistic ideology during World War II (Martinsen, 2003a). To fill the 
theoretical void left by her rejection of Heidegger, Martinsen turns her attention to the 
phenomenological writings of Knud E. Løgstrup. As she moves from Heidegger to 
Løgstrup, the moral aspects of care become more important for Martinsen. She also deepens 
the analysis of care phenomenologically, focusing on the lived experience of care and 
concern, and the role of moral sensibility in it.  
Martinsen emphasizes a relational dimension of care: As human beings we are 
fundamentally social and dependent on other people. Her position is thus opposed to an 
individualistic view that would picture human beings as primarily independent and self-
sufficient. Here Martinsen relies on the Danish philosopher Uffe Juul Jensen and his 
formulation of the moral principle of responsibility for the weak (Martinsen, 2003a).22 Both 
Juul Jensen and Løgstrup consider human beings to be dependent upon fellowship with 
others for human growth and flourishing. This reflects the relational dimension of care. 
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“Omsorg har å gjøre med relasjoner og moral, og den ytrer seg i praktisk handling” (Martinsen, 1989, p. 
208).  

“Det moralske prinsipp om ansvaret for de svake” (Martinsen, 2003a). 
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Caring is also moral, and has to do with how we are in relation to other people through our 
practical work. The moral dimension of care is tightly connected to the relational and 
practical dimensions: Caring is what happens “in between” human beings: “Care is to 
interconnect, to be part of relations” (Martinsen, 1989, p. 183).23 Furthermore, care is 
carried out by practical action: “we enter morality by practical action” (Martinsen, 1989, p. 
187). That care is practical means that care involves practical, immediate, and other-
oriented actions in concrete circumstances. Care is exercised, trained, and learned through 
its practices of concern for other persons (Alvsvåg, 2006). These three dimensions of 
human care have remained central to Martinsen’s position ever since she first posed them. 
Even though she has occasionally relied on different philosophers and traditions in 
analyzing care, and her argumentation has developed over time, that does not mean that her 
arguments are not consistent (Gjengedal, 2000). 
2.2.2 A phenomenological approach to care  
In relying on the Danish philosopher and theologian Knud E. Løgstrup, Martinsen anchors 
her phenomenological analysis of care in the tradition of “phenomenology of creation” 
(“skapelsesfenomenologien” in Norwegian) (Martinsen, 2003c). This tradition has its roots 
in a Jewish-Christian view of human life and creation. According to Jewish-Christian 
anthropology, there is a created meaningful structure and architecture in life itself; life has 
an intrinsic significance, which shows itself in human relationships. The basic conditions of 
life are given to us, and are not a result of any of our human efforts and achievements. To 
understand life as created implies a radical change of perspective on the relation of myself 
to the other, Martinsen (1991) says. It allows for an attitude of holding oneself in reserve, 
and of “receiving the other as a gift” (Martinsen, 1991, p. 9). By this we allow the other to 
emerge in his or her own right, without “conquering” him or her. This reserve and 
receptivity Martinsen understands as part of what she means by our perception. Within a 
phenomenological frame of reference, Martinsen’s use of the term “perception” is related to 
the general idea of phenomenology as “open to the world.”  
A word may be necessary about her use of the terms “perception” and “perceiving.” 
Martinsen mainly writes in Norwegian. However, the essay “Seeing with the Heart’s Eye,” 
which I rely on in this thesis, is published in English as well (Martinsen, 2006). In this essay 
Martinsen distinguishes between the processes of perceiving and recording. If we compare 
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23 “Omsorg er å knytte bånd, å inngå i relasjoner” (Martinsen, 1989, p. 183). 
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the English version of the essay with the Norwegian version, we see that the English word 
“perceive” corresponds to the Norwegian word “sanse,” and “the perceiving eye” 
corresponds to the Norwegian expression “det sansende øye” (Martinsen, 2000). The word 
“sansning” is thus translated as “perception.” It is important not to confuse this way of 
understanding the term “perception” with the way it is used, for instance, in the field of 
psychology, where it refers to how we organize the sensory world into a coherent scene 
consisting of real objects, not just sensory impressions (Gleitman, 1992). 
According to Martinsen, perception is characterized by an openness toward the world in 
which sensation and emotions are working together. It represents a “fundamental openness 
towards the world, significant and precultural” (Martinsen, 2006, p. 86). This understanding 
of perception clearly shows the influence of philosophical phenomenology on her thinking 
about care. In Edmund Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, and also in his theory of 
time-consciousness, a central theme is how consciousness is constantly modulated by 
impressions; the claim is that we have a pre-theoretical affective access to the world that is 
conditioned by receptivity and passivity. Husserl claims to have an “axiological intuition” 
of the existence of this mode of perceptual function (Drabinski, 2001). Consciousness and 
sensibility do not constantly interpret and reflect on data, but in a state of passivity can be 
receptive to data given by impressions—a function that phenomenologists call the 
“impressional sense.” Martinsen bases her ethics of care on illustrating this kind of 
receptivity and openness to impressions in the physical and mental encounter between a 
nurse and a patient.24   
2.2.3 Perceiving and recording
This openness and receptivity constitute a central part of Martinsen’s understanding of 
perception, and characterize what she calls “the perceiving eye” (Martinsen, 2006). The 
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I would like to thank Per Nortvedt for help with clarifying this point. Drawing on the work of Emmanuel 
Levinas, Edmund Husserl, and John E. Drabinski, as referred to above, Nortvedt describes a state of 
“sensibility,” which he understands as “the basic state of pre-intentional consciousness characterized by 
passivity and receptivity” (Nortvedt, 2008a, p. 211). Sensibility may be understood as a presence in the world 
through our senses, where not only our interpretation of impressions but also the impression in itself is 
important, moving both our senses and emotions. As I interpret Nortvedt here, I find his understanding of 
sensibility similar to Kari Martinsen’s understanding of perception and what she denotes as “the perceiving 
eye” (Martinsen, 2006). Even though they build on the work of different theoreticians, they both aim to grasp 
an openness to affective cues in the clinical encounter, an openness allowing for the vulnerability of the 
human other, which  is necessary for competent medical treatment and care. Nortvedt argues in this regard that 
the affective part of moral sensitivity has significance for health care workers’ moral motivation, as well as for 
their clinical understanding. 
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perceiving eye opens for “a seeing emotion,” in which we are touched and emotionally 
involved even before we rationally understand the needs of the other (Martinsen, 2006). A 
central feature of the care philosophy of Martinsen is thus her emphasis on the importance 
of perception in all our interaction with others, including in clinical situations. According to 
Martinsen, professional care also relies on this basic understanding of care, emphasizing 
human openness and receptivity. However, in order to actually help the patient, these basic 
elements of care need to be supplemented by professional knowledge as an essential part of 
clinical judgment. According to Martinsen, then, clinical judgment consists of the basic 
quality of care as an open and spontaneous receptivity, as well as professional 
considerations: “Clinical judgment in nursing is an interpretive activity, by which 
professional knowledge and natural perception work together” (Martinsen, 2003b, p. 145).25
It is tempting to emphasize only one of the two elements, she warns us; however, without 
professional knowledge, consideration for the patient may turn into sentimental care. 
Sentimental care, according to Martinsen, is care in which the caregiver’s participation in 
the other’s suffering is limited to the caregiver’s own sentimentality, to his or her own 
feelings. When the caregiver confines him or herself to pitying the patient and refrains from 
helping the patient in a professional manner, the care becomes sentimental. When care turns 
sentimental, we stop at “feeling sorry for.” “In sentimental care the other also disappears. I 
go emotionally ‘up’ into the other. The situation disappears. Our own feelings become the 
center of attention; they become void of content, they become ‘pure affectivity.’ … This 
pure affectivity easily leads us to indifference,” writes Martinsen (1989, p. 202).26
Sentimental care represents what Martinsen calls “the degeneration of care” (“omsorgens 
utartinger”) (Martinsen, 1989, p. 191). 
In her essay “Seeing with the Heart’s Eye,” Martinsen explores different dimensions of the 
clinician’s gaze, drawing a distinction between the process of perception and the process of 
recording; between a perceiving eye and a recording eye (Martinsen, 2006). She relates 
these two different ways of seeing to the biblical story of the Good Samaritan, with which 
she illustrates how the perceiving eye can facilitate care in the clinical encounter. She 
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25 “Skjønnet i sykepleien er et tydningsarbeid hvor fagkunnskap og naturlig sansing arbeider sammen” 
(Martinsen, 2003b, p. 145). 
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I den sentimentale omsorgen blir også den andre borte. Jeg går følelsesmessig ‘opp’ i den andre. 
Situasjonen blir borte. Egne følelser settes i sentrum. Følelsene blir innholdsløse, de blir ‘ren affektivitet.’ … 
Denne rene affektivitet fører lett over i likegyldighet” (Martinsen, 1989, p. 202). 
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contrasts that with the recording eye, the eye of the disinterested observer, in which the 
other as a person may become indifferent to us (Martinsen, 2006). Recording is when we 
put ourselves in an outside position, classifying, systematizing, and differentiating, working 
within the frameworks of an already existing conceptual system (Martinsen, 2006). The 
recording eye is reductionistic and neutral, and may reduce living characteristics, such as a 
laughing face, to clinical signs, characteristics, and marks. Says Martinsen:  
For the disinterested, observing gaze is busy classifying and overlooks and does not 
hear the demand—to take responsibility for that [part] of the life of the other which 
we have in our gaze. The classification overlooks the demand. The concepts and 
their internal logical order block the way, so that we do not see the other as a living 
person. (Martinsen, 2006, p. 105)  
Here Martinsen reiterates Løgstrup’s well-known saying that we always hold some of other 
persons’ lives in our hands, referring to the “life of the other which we have in our gaze.”27
Martinsen’s description of the recording eye is inspired by Løgstrup’s conception of the 
“eye of the epoch,” which constitutes part of his critique of modernity (Løgstrup, 2008). 
She echoes as well the medical historical works of Michel Foucault and his analyses of “the 
medical gaze” (Foucault, 1994, 1995). Foucault coins the term “medical gaze” to refer to 
the dehumanizing way in which the medical profession has come to separate the body from 
the person. He argues that the emergence of clinical pathology in France in the late 18th and 
early 19th centuries marked the demise of humoral, Galenic, and empirical medicine. Its 
replacement, the developing medical gaze, focuses its attention on the object of the disease, 
rather than on the subject that suffers from it. The objects of disease consist primarily of the 
pathology of anatomical structures, and in this period dissection enjoyed something of a 
revival (Faber, 1930). Likewise, the rise of bacteriology in the second half of the 19th 
century undoubtedly fuels the synthesis of this gaze in medicine. Foucault analyzes the 
changes that occur in the way physicians see from the last half of the 18th century and into 
the beginning of the 19th century, and notes that this reflects a break in the thinking pattern 
and usual way of working of physicians. From having focused on overt symptoms and their 
classification, physicians start looking instead for processes of disease in the body of the 
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27 In The Ethical Demand Løgstrup says: “Each individual has never to do with another human being without 
holding something of the other’s life in his or her hand” (“den enkelte har aldrig med et andet menneske at 
gøre uden at han holder noget af dets liv i sin hånd”) (Løgstrup, 1956, p. 25). 
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patient, and the gaze of physicians turns out to be “empirical classifying” as well as a 
“theoretical depth gaze” (Martinsen, 2008). Foucault describes the creation of a field of 
knowledge of the body, and clarifies how the material and intellectual structures that make 
possible the analysis of the body are admixed with power interests: In entering the field of 
knowledge, the human body also enters the field of power, becoming a possible target for 
manipulation. This new knowledge is then used in the political project of sorting the useful 
bodies from the useless, the productive from the non-productive, the sick from the healthy. 
Discipline, or the “art of distributions” (Foucault, 1995), becomes an important element in 
this knowledge paradigm, and is expressed in the formal examination of the patient. Central 
to this examination is the systematic observation of the patient, throughout which the 
professional is withdrawn in relation to the patient. This reflects an important implication of 
the medical gaze for medical practice: the tendency of the medical gaze to create or 
entrench distance between the physician and the patient, because the physician is now using 
a medical or clinical gaze to observe the patient’s symptoms and search for causes. The 
medical gaze thus literally objectifies a characteristic of the scientific method in the 
therapeutic dyad.   
This element of professional distance and the striving for objectivity is part of what 
Martinsen calls the recording gaze: “The professional does not present himself as a person 
in relation to the patient. ... He gives nothing of himself in the relation. There is great power 
in this closedness” (Martinsen, 2006, p. 108). The recording eye is a way of seeing in which 
what Martinsen calls perception is lost, and through which objectivity and distance is 
sought. This gaze does something to both the professional and the patient, Martinsen 
argues: “It hinders both parties in presenting themselves and letting themselves be known as 
living and perceiving human beings” (Martinsen, 2006, p. 109).  
I will return to these two ways of seeing later in the text, discussing them in more detail in 
relation to medicine and to the basic phenomena of the person in need and the person as 
helper, asking: What gaze is at work in medicine today?  
2.2.4 Critical remarks 
Kari Martinsen’s perspective is not uncontroversial. Since early in her career she has been 
subjected to serious criticism and disagreement. She was critical of the influence of 
American theories of nursing in Norway, especially the work of the American nursing 
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scientist Dorothea Orem, with her emphasis on “self-care” (Orem, Renpenning, & Taylor, 
2003). Her criticisms of this approach were not well received by the Norwegian Nursing 
Association, which called on its members to boycott Martinsen’s work. Martinsen was 
asked at one point to leave the Norwegian Nursing Association—a request she refused. 
Martinsen has been criticized for inheriting what one critic calls “an uncritical 
understanding of emotions as a professional competency in nursing” (Heggen, 2000). Even 
though we aim to be empathic and sensitive as nurses, we do not automatically act morally, 
Kristin Heggen claims in her article “Romanticizing Nursing” (Heggen, 2000). Emotions 
are not automatically a source of “truth and right.” As important as the positive effects of 
emotion is the need to deal with our negative feelings for patients as health care 
professionals. Heggen raises questions about the relation between our emotions and our 
moral conduct, as well as calling attention to the possible presence of darker emotions in 
our encounters with patients. How can we be certain that our open spontaneous feelings, our 
“seeing emotions,” actually lead to positive action? And what if we get angry or irritated 
with the patient, instead of feeling compassion? What if no spontaneous emotional response 
shows up in our meeting with a patient, and we just feel indifference? Is it always the case 
that we are struck, or hit in the guts, by being within “the perceiving range of life”?   
Martinsen does not address the possible “dark sides” of emotions in her work, and she does 
not question whether we can be certain that our “seeing emotions” always see the other in a 
compassionate way. These objections certainly represent limitations of Martinsen’s theory. 
However, Martinsen is not a pure “sentimentalist,” highlighting only emotions. She also 
points to the importance of the reflectivity of our understanding, working in a “friendly 
interaction” with our perception. It is difficult to split this friendly interaction between 
perception and understanding; they are “tightly interwoven” (Martinsen, 2006, p. 87). In 
this, Martinsen is in line with most other care ethicists in acknowledging the cognitive as 
well as the affective dimensions of care, and she places herself within an influential 
movement in moral philosophy highlighting the importance of human emotions (Blum, 
1994; Nussbaum, 1990; Vetlesen, 1994; Slote, 2007).  
Heggen considers Kari Martinsen a “guide” to romanticizing practice within nursing: 
Nursing as a discipline “may be in danger of turning into a discipline of manners, by which 
the practitioners first and foremost are characterized by a ‘particularly well-developed sort 
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of humaness.’ That makes no sense” (Heggen, 2000, p. 48).28 Instead, Heggen calls for an 
increased focus on professional skills and knowledge in nursing. 
There is some justice in some of Heggen’s criticism, and it may well be the case that 
nursing in Norway and Scandinavia has focused too much on the experiential side of 
nursing. However, I question whether Heggen’s critique addresses Martinsen’s actual 
position, or whether it is the interpretation of Martinsen’s perspective within academic 
nursing that Heggen criticizes. As I read Martinsen, I find an emphasis on care as a 
practical activity as she points to how care expresses itself in practical action (Martinsen, 
1989). She introduces us to the practical dimension of care in her works prior to her focus 
on Løgstrup, but this dimension is also evident in the work inspired by Løgstrup 
(Gjengedal, 2000; Martinsen, 1989). Following Løgstrup, she points out that we enter 
morality by practical action (Martinsen, 1989). “The thought descends” into the concrete 
and actual situation, being processed by the practical judgment. The challenge of care is to 
“descend” into the field of practice, and to be involved and present in the situation. Here 
Martinsen points to the importance of clinical judgment, so that the caring engagement will 
not “tip over” into sentimentality. Thus, clinical judgment is in a key position 
(“vippeposisjon” in Norwegian), Martinsen claims. It is always directed toward the concrete 
situation and engaged in situational analysis (Martinsen, 1989).  
However, even though Martinsen emphasizes the practical aspects of care, she seldom or 
never says anything about the more morally problematic situations faced by clinicians, and 
she rarely treats situations where there is not just one moral appeal to respond to, but several 
appeals, or where relevant ethical values may conflict (Nortvedt, 2001). She does talk a lot 
about the basis of ethical choices in care, but says little or nothing about what the nurse 
actually should do to choose in the case of moral conflict. In such cases she simply refers us 
back to the moral and clinical judgment of the clinician. So Martinsen’s perspective does 
not offer any kind of action guidance in relation to difficult ethical situations. This is a 
criticism that has also been raised about the usefulness of Løgstrup’s philosophy in health 
care ethics (Holm, 2001). 
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velutviklet menneskelighet.’ Det gir ikke mening” (Heggen, 2000, p. 48).  
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Martinsen has also been criticized as promoting an altruistic motive for care (Hem, 2008; 
Pettersen 2008, 2011b). Altruistic care may imply self-sacrifice on behalf of the carer, Tove 
Pettersen argues, since such care is activated by the needs of the other (Pettersen, 2008). I 
agree that Martinsen’s understanding of care in asymmetric relations has altruistic elements. 
Martinsen herself reminds us of who the main person in this relation is by referring to the 
story of the Good Samaritan: The main person is not the Samaritan, she argues, but the 
wounded man (Martinsen, 2010). Thus, care in an asymmetric relationship, where one party 
is a professional and the other party is in need of help and service from the professional, is 
altruistic insofar as the care of the professional is motivated and activated by the needs of 
the other.29 Thus far, I agree with Pettersen. However, I do not agree that Martinsen’s care 
perspective is altruistic in the sense that it necessarily implies self-sacrifice. In making this 
claim, Pettersen does not take into consideration the consciousness of limit inherent in the 
professional reflection that Martinsen emphasizes in relation to practical care work. As I see 
it, Martinsen’s emphasis on professional reflection represents a way of drawing the line 
against boundless care in professional care work. A physician or nurse who devotes herself 
to one patient without considering the situation of other patients or the rest of the care 
personnel does not act professionally, and does not exhibit proper clinical judgment. 
Inherent in professional reflection, thus, is a consciousness of limit: We come to work and 
leave work at scheduled times, turning our responsibilities over to others. Even in the story 
of the Good Samaritan, we find that the Samaritan eventually leaves the wounded man in 
the care of the hostel’s host.   
Pettersen also criticizes Martinsen’s understanding of “spontaneous care.” Martinsen 
defines “spontaneous care” as “taking time to help people one meets by coincidence, people 
“carrying a heavy burden” (Martinsen, 2003a, p. 74). “Spontaneous care” can be understood 
as Samaritan behavior, Pettersen (2008) argues. By “Samaritan behavior,” Pettersen 
understands “acts based on the ideal of providing unconstrained help to those in need 
regardless of the circumstances and without expecting reward or recognition” (Pettersen, 
2008, p. 136). The story of the Good Samaritan should not be considered as a foundational 
story for an ethics of care, Pettersen argues, since a spontaneous distribution of care for the 
needy raises the problem of discriminating against those who happened not to be first in 
line. By devoting ourselves to the first needy individual to appear, we might neglect others 
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who are suffering more, as well as squandering all our resources on the first in line. 
Spontaneous care may thus inflict the “harm of discrimination” by discriminating against 
people who for various reasons are not first in line (P. Ariansen, referred to in Pettersen, 
2008, p. 137). “Is it the most needy, poorest or sickest who are first in line? Or is it the most 
self-asserting, cynical and affluent? ... The distribution principle behind Samaritanism is 
‘first come, first served,’ a principle that encourages neither care nor love of one’s 
neighbors” (Pettersen, 2008, p. 137).  
As I noted above, Pettersen defines Samaritanism as “acts based on the ideal of providing 
unconstrained help to those in need regardless of the circumstances and without expecting 
reward or recognition” (Pettersen, 2008, p. 136). But by connecting this definition to 
Martinsen’s conception of spontaneous care, she to some extent misrepresents Martinsen’s 
understanding of the concept, as I see it. Spontaneous care, according to Martinsen, is 
“taking time to help another person that I meet by coincidence—be it a friend or a 
neighbor—and whom I see carrying a heavy burden” (Martinsen, 2003a, p. 74). However, 
taking time to help someone carrying a heavy burden does not necessarily imply the offer of 
“unconstrained help,” as Pettersen suggests. It is more important, according to Martinsen, to 
offer unconditional care to those who carry heavy burdens. However, unconditional care is 
not equivalent to unconstrained help. Unconditional care requires an immediate response to 
the suffering of the other, but it does not imply that we then devote ourselves fully to this 
person irrespective of the circumstances. Pettersen further suggests that “Samaritanism” 
treats those not “first in line” unfairly. However, how is it appropriate to speak of those 
“first in line” when it comes to people one meets by coincidence? Does this make any 
sense? Was the wounded man in the story of the Good Samaritan first in line? First in line 
among whom? Who came after him? Whether a more needy person would come after him, 
the Samaritan could not know, and such considerations should not influence the Samaritan’s 
immediate response to the needs of the patient, as I see it. However, considerations like 
these might well come into play after having dealt with the acute situation.  
My interpretation of Samaritanism in medicine focuses on the ability to see and recognize 
patients who suffer, and to connect with them in the form of practical action. This is what 
Martinsen’s interpretation of the story of the Good Samaritan is about. It is not about 
offering unlimited, boundless care on behalf of the other who is suffering, but to recognize
suffering when it is present, and to not pass by like the Priest and the Levite. Being able to 
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see what is at stake in situations like these represents, as I understand it, one of the main 
points in Martinsen’s essay “Seeing with the Heart’s Eye,” and reflects a way to understand 
Samaritanism in health care today. If we take a medical setting as our point of departure, 
most of the patients a physician deals with during the day require no more than ordinary 
care. However, some patients “carry heavy burdens,” and it may not always be possible to 
predict who these patients are in advance. Therefore, it is essential that health care 
personnel are able to recognize the need of these patients, and to act accordingly. These 
situations may appear unexpectedly and by coincidence, and require a spontaneous care 
response in order not to harm the other. This was the situation for the patient seeking a 
doctor because of earwax, where the consultation ended up in something quite different (see 
paper 1). This came unexpectedly for the doctor, and to handle the situation properly 
required a spontaneous act of care. It makes little sense to talk about distributive justice or a 
principle of “first come, first served” in this regard.  
To sum up, in this part of the chapter I have tried to integrate perspectives of care in 
medicine by drawing on a theory of care from nursing. In working with Kari Martinsen’s 
philosophy of caring I find her perspective relevant and applicable for medicine and 
medical ethics also. Her phenomenological analysis of care, in which she mainly relies on 
the phenomenological insights of Løgstrup, reveals an important aspect of human existence: 
that we as human beings are mutually interconnected and dependent. It offers as well 
important insights into the nature of care, emphasizing care as “concrete and present in a 
relationship” as well as “a movement away from ourselves and towards the other” 
(Martinsen, 1991, p. 11). We may thus find a “relational ontology” in the works of 
Martinsen. Furthermore, I have focused on the moral-epistemological implications of 
Martinsen’s perspective, highlighting her emphasis on perception. This way of relating to 
others, and in our particular setting, of relating to patients, differs from the way we 
traditionally approach patients in medicine, and may be important to our ability to exercise 
care in the medical encounter, as well as in relation to our diagnostic and clinical abilities. 
The third theoretical perspective I rely on in this thesis is the ethics of care, and in the 
following I will present some central theoretical insights of this tradition, relating them to 
the medical context. I will revisit some critical remarks, as well. First, however, I will 
further elaborate the concept of care. 
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2.3 An ethics of care
Within the field of care ethics, there is no clear-cut definition of the term “care”; nor is there 
any close agreement on what we should take its meaning to be (Held, 2006). Care may, for 
instance, be conceived of as an attitude, an ideal or value, a moral virtue, a way of acting 
and responding toward another, or as a relational competence and activity. Virginia Held 
considers care to be both value and practice: “The concept of care has the advantage of not 
losing sight of the work involved in caring for people and of not lending itself to the 
interpretation of morality as ideal but impractical to which advocates of the ethics of care 
often object. Care is both value and practice,” writes Held (2006, p. 9). “Care seems the 
most basic moral value. As a practice, we know that without care we cannot have anything 
else, since life requires it” (Held, 2006, p. 71). As we have seen, Kari Martinsen likewise 
highlights the practical dimension of care, and she points as well to an ethical dimension 
and a relational dimension of care (Martinsen, 2003a). According to Martinsen, care is 
concrete and practical, being present in a relationship: “Care is to be concrete and present in 
a relationship by our senses and our bodies. It is always to be in a movement away from 
ourselves and towards the other” (Martinsen, 1991, p. 11). This movement from ourselves 
toward the other is also reflected in Joan Tronto’s understanding of care: “First, care implies 
a reaching out to something other than the self” (Tronto, 1993, p. 102). She continues: 
“Second, care implicitly suggests that it will lead to some type of action” (Tronto, 1993, p. 
102). Here too we see the practical aspect of care highlighted. This practical aspect is also 
important in the definition of care that Tronto, together with Berenice Fisher, formulates, 
suggesting that 
caring be viewed as a species activity that includes everything that we do to 
maintain, continue, and repair our “world” so that we can live in it as well as 
possible. That world includes our bodies, our selves, and our environment, all of 
which we seek to interweave in a complex, life-sustaining web. (Tronto, 1993, p. 
103) 
The practical aspect of care is also evident in four phases of caring that Tronto and Fisher 
identify, first and foremost in the third phase of caring. Their first phase, the caring about, 
involves the recognition that care is necessary. The second phase, the taking care of, 
involves assuming some responsibility for the identified need and a determination of how to 
respond to it. The third phase, the care-giving, involves the direct meeting of needs for care, 
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that is, the direct action or actual physical work that is involved in the caring response 
(Tronto, 1993). The fourth and last phase of care Tronto and Fisher denote as care-
receiving. This phase of caring recognizes that the object of care will respond to the care it 
receives and acknowledges the interrelation and interaction of the homo patiens and the 
homo compatiens.  
In relation to medicine and health care, it may be useful to distinguish between “taking care 
of” and “caring for,” where “taking care of” refers to physicians’ delivery of technical care, 
and “caring for” includes an empathic or emotional engagement (Reich,1995b; Marcum, 
2008). Care in medicine, in the sense of caring for patients, is often recognized as a virtue 
(Peabody, 1927; Pellegrino & Thomasma, 1993), while at the same time it may be equated 
with the principle of beneficence (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009). In my analysis of care 
and care ethics in medicine I do not restrict myself to considering care as a virtue, but rather 
aim to include an understanding of care as a relational activity or competence, thus 
emphasizing the relational dimension of care.  
2.3.1 The tradition  
Carol Gilligan’s study In a Different Voice (Gilligan, 1982), often considered the origin of 
the development of care ethics, was originally a critique of her older colleague and teacher 
Lawrence Kohlberg’s stage theory of moral development (Kohlberg, 1981). When Kohlberg 
applied his stage theory to both girls and boys, it turned out that the girls’ solutions to the 
hypothetical moral dilemmas of the test differed from those of the boys. The girls tended to 
value responsiveness and connectedness with others, as well as the prevention of harm and 
maintenance of relationships, while the boys, on the other hand, tended to emphasize 
independence, justice, and abstract reasoning. The girls’ responses were given a lower score 
in the test; they seldom reached what Kohlberg denominated the highest level of moral 
reasoning, “the post-conventional stage,” where morality is characterized by an ability for 
moral abstraction and impartial reasoning based on universal ethical principles. 
Consequently, these results led to the conclusion that the girls were less morally developed 
than boys, a conclusion that Gilligan refused to accept. She suspected instead that this result 
was due to an inherent sex-bias in Kohlberg’s theory, and started to trace this anomaly by 
doing her own research. Through studying girls’ moral reasoning, Gilligan hears another 
moral voice, where caring for others in interpersonal relationships is the main moral 
concern. Care and consideration for others expressed through care for the particular other 
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has a moral significance that is not captured by Kohlberg’s stage theory and the theoretical 
tradition he represented. Based on her empirical findings, Gilligan articulates a moral 
perspective that challenges traditional moral psychology, which failed to include care as a 
part of moral deliberation. She names the two different perspectives she identifies a care 
perspective and a justice perspective. Gilligan writes:  
To understand how the tension between responsibilities and rights sustains the 
dialectic of human development is to see the integrity of two disparate models of 
experience that are in the end connected. While an ethic of justice proceeds from the 
premise of equality—that everyone should be treated the same—an ethic of care 
rests on the premise of nonviolence—that no one should be hurt. (Gilligan, 1982, p. 
174) 
Thus, whereas the care perspective emphasizes care and consideration for others in a 
particular relationship, the justice perspective values impartiality and fairness, equality and 
reciprocity. However, even though Gilligan identifies a care perspective among the girls she 
interviews, she emphasizes that this gender difference in moral reasoning is not an absolute 
one. The differences in moral reasoning ought to be understood as a distinction between two 
different modes of moral reasoning. Thus, the care perspective represents a different moral 
voice, not necessarily a woman’s voice. The care perspective is “neither biologically 
determined nor unique to women” (Gilligan cited in Pettersen, 2008, p. 9).  
Even though Gilligan is considered the initiator of the ethics of care tradition, we may trace 
its beginnings even further back to the essay of philosopher Sara Ruddick, “Maternal 
Thinking” (Ruddick, 1980). As well as these works of Carol Gilligan and Sara Ruddick, Nel 
Noddings’ (2003) phenomenological inquiry into what caring involves forms a part of the 
primary foundation of a feminist-based ethics of care. Eva Feder Kittay (1999), Virginia 
Held (2006), and Joan Tronto (1993) are all central theoreticians within the Anglo-
American tradition of care ethics. We may also differentiate between different traditions of 
the ethics of care. Gilligan’s Anglo-American tradition, connected to feminist ethics, may 
be differentiated from care ethics contributions related to theology (Gastmans, 1999; 
Vanlaere & Gastmans, 2011) and to phenomenological accounts such as the philosophy of 
Emmanuel Levinas (Nortvedt, 1996) and Knud E. Løgstrup (Martinsen, 2003b, 2003c, 
2006). There are also sentimentalist versions of an ethics of care, relying exclusively on the 
human capacity for empathy (Slote, 2007).  
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Whereas care and care ethics occupy a central place in much of the literature on nursing 
ethics (Leininger, 1980, 1988; Bradshaw, 1996; Benner, 1997; Nortvedt, 2008b; Gallagher, 
2012), it is still situated at the margins of much of the ethical thinking in medicine, where 
the principle-based approach of Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress still dominate. 
Beauchamp and Childress’s work Principles of Biomedical Ethics (2009), centered around 
the four principles of autonomy, justice, beneficence, and non-maleficence, is considered 
among the most influential works in medical ethics, and has provided the conception of 
medical ethics that currently dominates the practical context in ethics committees, clinical 
case-discussions, and ethics courses (ten Have, 2005; Kohlen, 2009).  
2.3.2 Central insights 
The main concern of an ethics of care is the harm caused in relationships owing to a lack of 
care (Gilligan,1982; Pettersen, 2008). This is a concern that is not treated sufficiently in 
dominant ethical theories, even though empirical research shows that a lack of relational 
care and consideration may cause pain, sorrow, and suffering for the people involved 
(Pettersen, 2006).30 Care ethics provides us with a novel reading of human relations, where 
caring in relationships is considered to be of moral importance. That is, how we meet the 
other and how we take care of the other in a relationship become ethically significant, 
because by not caring, we may hurt the other. As a consequence, an ethics of care is more 
concerned about the dangers of abandonment than the dangers of interference (Quill & 
Cassel, 1995; Verkerk, 2001), a concern that is reflected in the injunction “not to turn away 
from someone in need” (Gilligan, 1995). This injunction serves to highlight the focus of 
care ethics: namely, relational harm. That is, instead of focusing on the danger of 
interference in terms of violating a person’s autonomy, an ethics of care puts the emphasis 
on the harm caused by abandonment and a lack of care in a relationship. 
Further, it is characteristic of an ethics of care to view persons as relational and as 
interdependent. Persons are conceptualized as “deeply affected by, and involved in, 
relations with others (Held, 2006, p. 46). Such an understanding of the moral agent as a 
related self is a specific normative feature of an ethics of care: 
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Gilligan and Sullivan (1995); Opjordsmoen, Vaglum & Bloch Thoresen (2005). 
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One characteristic feature of the ethics of care, and also a reason for its swift growth 
and applicability, is its relational ontology. The ethics of care depicts the moral 
agent not primarily in terms of independence, equality of power and influence, 
enjoying almost unrestricted freedom to enter and dissolve contracts. Rather, it 
conceives agents as mutually interconnected, vulnerable and dependent, often in 
asymmetric ways. (Pettersen, 2011a, p. 52) 
Tove Pettersen finds such an ontological starting point in the works of Gilligan and in her 
understanding of interdependence as a common human experience. No child can survive 
without being in a relationship, and as children grow up, they continue to exist in a web of 
relationships (Gilligan, 1982; Pettersen, 2008). By outlining the moral self as a related self, 
an ethics of care also relies on the critique of feminist philosophers of the model of the 
moral self inherent in universalistic moral theories (Baier, 1986; Benhabib, 1992; 
Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000; Donchin, 2001). Seyla Benhabib, for instance, points to how 
contractarian theories from Hobbes to Rawls inherit a conception of the moral self as 
“disembedded” and “disembodied” (Benhabib, 1992), a model emanating from the 
metaphor of the state of nature, the message of which is that “in the beginning man was 
alone” (Benhabib, 1992, p. 156). Benhabib cites Hobbes’s understanding of men as 
“mushrooms, come to full maturity without any kind of engagement to each other” (Hobbes 
cited in Behabib, 1992, p. 156). Such an understanding of the self frees the ego from its 
most natural and basic bonds of dependency—that we have all been borne of and dependent 
upon another human being. From such an atomistic understanding of the moral self, social 
interactions are framed in terms of a social contract, where individuals are to be considered 
mutually disinterested.  
We see from this how the different ways of conceiving of the self influence our perception 
of human relationships. Where a contractarian sees social interactions in terms of a contract 
of indifferent equals, a care ethicist conceives of the relationship as a relation characterized 
by vulnerability, interdependency, and connectedness. To put it in the words of Gilligan, a 
separate self tends to regard all relationships as an interaction between separate and equal 
autonomous individuals. The related self tends to perceive all relationships as an interaction 
between connected and interdependent persons (Gilligan, 1982; Pettersen, 2008). A 
consequence of the relational ontology of an ethics of care is that it accentuates different 
features than do other ethical theories, as, for instance, featuring the harm caused by lack of 
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care, as well as highlighting the possibility of agents’ vulnerability and dependency. Within 
the analytical concepts and categories of an ethics of care, what is considered relevant 
within a care perspective is not identical with what is given emphasis in other theories.  
The moral epistemology of an ethics of care stresses sensitivity to the different relevant 
considerations in particular contexts, and it promotes a dialogue that corrects and enriches 
the perspective of any one individual (Held, 2006). It includes “taking experiences into 
account, exercising self-reflections and sensitive judgments where contextual differences 
are attended to” (Pettersen, 2011a, p. 55). Joan Tronto points to the importance of 
attentiveness in an ethics of care: “Since care requires the recognition of a need and that 
there is a need that be cared about, the first moral aspect of caring is attentiveness” (Tronto, 
1993, p. 127). This kind of attention, or moral perception, constitutes an important 
epistemological aspect of care and an ethics of care, and is discussed by different care 
ethicists, among them Kari Martinsen, who highlights the importance of seeing with a 
perceiving eye (Martinsen, 2006). Likewise, Per Nortvedt explicates the concept of 
sensibility, defining it as “receptiveness for and a sensitive understanding of the subjective 
situation of other people” (Nortvedt & Grimen, 2004, p. 37).  
2.3.3 Critical remarks  
Many cautions have been raised about an ethics of care, and since its beginnings in the 
1980s it has been subject to various criticism. By reflecting upon and emphasizing the work 
of caretaking that women traditionally have been confined to, we may ask whether the 
ethics of care contributes to prolonging such an inequality (Held, 2006). We may also ask, 
like Virginia Held, whether an ethics of care mistakes “a merely historical fact—that 
women have done most of this labor—for a claim about women’s outlook on moral issues” 
(Held, 2006, pp. 61–62). There may also be a risk that the ethics of care draws attention 
away from other oppressive social structures, by focusing on particular others in particular 
relationships; that we as care ethicists are “fiddling while Rome burns” (Purdy, 2001). Does 
care ethics locate its work in an ivory tower, tending to shy away from the most morally 
urgent issues? For instance, in health care, showing that patients need more human contact 
and care seems rather meaningless at a time when nursing staffs have been cut to the bone 
because of broader political agendas (Purdy, 2001). This worry, about focusing on the dyad 
of the doctor or nurse and patient without taking into account the overall political and 
organizational structure and the setting within which this dyad functions, is a timely one, 
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and also poses a challenge to my perspective in this thesis, focusing as it does on the basic 
dyadic relation in medical practice. Does it matter how we see the patient, if there is no time 
to care? However, as I see it, this critique affects our scope of investigation as medical 
ethicists more than it affects the overall relevance of an ethics of care, since an ethics of 
care focuses not only on dyadic care and proximity. It aims to reach beyond the dual unit of 
caretaker and caregiver, thus encompassing both political and global issues (Tronto, 1993, 
2010; Held, 2002; Cockburn, 2005; Holland, 2010; Mahon & Robinson, 2011; Robinson, 
2011; Skirbekk & Nortvedt, 2011; Nordhaug & Nortvedt, 2011).  
Some critics find the notion of care itself problematic (Allmark, 1995; Holm, 1997; Curzer, 
2002). Peter Allmark argues in his article “Can There be an Ethics of Care?” that the term 
“care” has no meaning; that it has no normative or descriptive content, but merely denotes 
what is important to us: “Caring is not good in itself, but only when it is for the right things 
and expressed in the right way” (Allmark, 1995, p. 19), and draws the further conclusion 
that “‘Caring’ ethics assumes wrongly that caring is good, thus it can tell us neither what 
constitutes those right things, nor what constitutes the right way” (Allmark, 1995, p. 19). In 
her reply to Allmark, Ann Bradshaw argues that by cutting off the concept from its roots, as 
Allmark does in his article, and analyzing it separately from the long tradition of care in 
nursing, “the very concept of ‘care’ cut off from its roots becomes a meaningless term 
without either normative or descriptive content” (Bradshaw, 1996, p. 8). Hence, what 
Allmark shows in his analysis, Bradshaw argues, is that care shorn of its original meaning 
and context becomes meaningless. By drawing such an inference Allmark is not right in 
assuming that there can be no ethics of care, Bradshaw argues, pointing to the moral 
tradition of care within nursing, stretching back through the ages: “The moral basis and thus 
the content and direction of care have been our nursing heritage, a foundational assumption, 
however little articulated” (Bradshaw, 1996, pp. 11–12). Even though both Allmark and 
Bradshaw are teachers of nurses, and the reply of Bradshaw refers specifically to the 
tradition of care within nursing, this exchange is also representative of a similar 
incongruence between critics approaching the concept of care with an analytical approach 
(Holm, 1997; Curzer, 2002), isolating it from the ethical life of caring practices, and thereby 
also from its focus on experiences and relationships traditionally associated with women 
and their care work. 
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Another frequent criticism of an ethics of care is that this position has nothing to say about 
certain forms of injustice (Nelson, 1992). This worry may be representative of the liberal 
critique of care ethics, which assumes that there is a conflict between care and justice, and 
that justice must always have priority (Held, 2006). Care ethicists deny such a divide 
between care and justice, calling it a “false dichotomy” (Tronto, 1993). Instead they argue 
for an integration of justice and care orientations, retaining their respective strengths 
through rehabilitated notions of the terms of both justice and care (Carse, 1991).  
A further worry about care ethics, one related to the question discussed above, is that it 
offers little guidance with regard to issues like prioritization and fairness in health care 
systems (Nordhaug & Nortvedt, 2011; Skirbekk & Nortvedt, 2011). Will physicians be 
inclined to favor their patients over other physicians’ patients or other needs of the 
community? Nordhaug and Nortvedt discuss what they see as an ethical conflict between 
different conceptions of moral responsibility related to care and justice. They question the 
conflicting normative claims of partiality, providing for the caring needs of the particular 
patient, and the impartial claims of treating all patients with a relevant need equally 
(Nordhaug & Nortvedt, 2011). Discussing this problem within a health care setting, they 
analyze how partial concerns might be balanced against claims of distributive justice within 
the framework of the formal principle of justice, and they conclude that this problem cannot 
be resolved on an individual and clinical level, but needs to be addressed by organizational 
structures and priority decisions at a macro level. However, as I see it, even though the 
authors acknowledge the importance of partiality and particularity in relation to care, they 
tend to discuss it from the premise of a theory of justice, instead of also trying to discuss 
dilemmas of distribution of health care resources starting from the premise of an ethics of 
care. Instead of discussing care in relation to justice, an explorative discussion of the 
potential of care to deal with questions of distribution would have contributed to challenge 
the perspective of care in its own right, instead of opposing it to the idea of justice. 
According to Held, it is a misunderstanding that an ethics of care is particularistic in the 
sense that it is limited to the narrow contexts of caring relationships: “The care that is 
valued by the ethics of care can—and to be justifiable must—include caring for distant 
others in an interdependent world, and caring that the rights of all are respected and their 
needs met” (Held, 2006, p. 66). An interesting question in this respect would be in what 
way physicians and nurses may care for distant others in an interdependent world. 
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Linked to this critique of an ethics of care is the question of its relation to moral principles 
(Rudnick, 2001). Some protagonists of care, such as Noddings, are critical of principles, and 
principlism in ethics is usually seen as in opposition to care ethics (Noddings, 2003). 
However, this is not a universal view, as there are scholars who also aim to contribute to the 
development of principles or ideas within an ethics of care. In her earlier works Kari 
Martinsen discusses whether there is an overall principle or model for an ethics of care that 
prevents it from turning into relativism (Martinsen, 2003a). Drawing on the works of the 
Danish philosopher Uffe Juul-Jensen, she recognizes such a principle or idea, one that she 
calls “the principle of responsibility for the weak” (Martinsen, 2003a):  
Through historical-empirical studies of human actions arguments are provided that 
the principle of responsibility for the weak is such an overall or comprehensive 
value, principle or ideal. It applies for different cultures at different times. The 
principle can not be proved, but it can be justified by historical studies. (Martinsen, 
2003a, p. 15)31  
Martinsen sees in this principle that we all are responsible for each other: “We may all come 
into a situation where we need help from others. Therefore we should act in such a way that 
everyone gets a similar opportunity to live the best life they are capable of” (Martinsen, 
2003a, p. 15).32 In her further discussion of this principle, Martinsen refers to a discussion 
between Nel Noddings and Jean Grimshaw regarding principles in ethics. While Noddings 
rejects principles (Noddings, 2003), Grimshaw recognizes the importance of principles for 
moral reflection and moral action (Grimshaw, 1986), and she formulates a principle that 
involves actions of care: “Consider whether your behavior will stand in the way of 
maintaining care and relationships” (Grimshaw, 1986, p. 209). In her elaboration of 
Gilligan’s ethics of care, Tove Pettersen recognizes the idea of not hurting as having 
primacy, encompassing how we meet the other, and how we take care of the other in a 
relationship in order not to hurt the other (Pettersen, 2008). This idea serves to highlight and 
preserve the two normative core values of care ethics: the condemnation of exploitation and 
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“Gjennom historisk-empiriske studier av menneskelige handlinger gis det argumenter for at prinsippet om 
ansvaret for svake er et slikt overordnet eller omfattende verdiprinsipp eller forbilde. Det gjelder for ulike 
kulturer til ulike tider. Prinsippet kan ikke bevises, men det kan begrunnes ut fra historiske studier” (Martinsen 
2003a, p. 15). 
32 “Vi kan alle komme i den situasjon at vi vil komme til å ha bruk for hjelp fra andre. Vi bør derfor handle 
slik at alle kan få samme muligheter til å leve det beste liv de er i stand til” (Martinsen, 2003a, p. 15). 
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harm and the commitment to human flourishing (Pettersen, 2011a). Pettersen formulates 
this as a principle related to the principle of non-maleficence, but it is expanded to also 
include active beneficent behavior, that is, caring behavior (Pettersen, 2008). 
I will not go into a further discussion of care ethics and principles here. But by highlighting 
these attempts to formulate care ethical ideas or principles, I suggest that there may be an 
alternative to total contextual sensitivity on the one hand and an unconditional principlism 
on the other, which includes “a sincere readiness to recognize that principles as well as 
judgments and intuitions can be revised” (Pettersen, 2008, p. 75). This standpoint I share 
with Pettersen, and by analyzing care and an ethics of care in relation to medicine and 
medical ethics, my aim is not to entirely reject principlism in medical ethics in favor of care, 
but rather to constructively inform the principles as they are understood today.   
To this point I have expanded upon the three theoretical perspectives that I rely upon in this 
thesis, in order to provide a more thorough account than is provided in each of the three 
articles. Even though the theoretical background is somewhat diverse, reaching from an 
anthropological tradition within the philosophy of medicine, via a contribution from 
philosophy of nursing and nursing ethics, to the tradition of an ethics of care influenced by 
feminist philosophy and feminist ethics, the thesis nonetheless follows an underlying 
analytical thread, one related to our understanding of the patient, the health care 
professional (physician) and the relation between them. In the following chapter I will 
present the content of my three published papers relevant to the dissertation, and try to 
reassemble the insights from each of the papers in relation to the objectives of this thesis. 
3. Synopsis of the papers
The present PhD dissertation is built around three research papers published in peer 
reviewed journals. I am the sole author of two papers (papers 1 and 2), and the first author 
of paper 3. In this section I present the three papers in relation to each other and to my 
research questions. The main question of the section is how the papers address one or more 
of the objectives of the thesis. As is conventional, the papers have been numbered according 
to the date of their final publication, but in accordance with the structure of the thesis, paper 
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3, where I introduce the medical anthropology of von Weizsäcker, is presented first. 
Although this paper was published last, it nonetheless represents the material starting point 
of the thesis. It was this work on ill-being from which my further interest in care and care 
ethics evolved, eventuating in the two other publications.   
3.1 Paper 3: Illness as a condition of our existence in the world: On illness and pathic 
existence (2012) 
This paper evolves from my engagement with the writings of Viktor von Weizsäcker. 
Starting from von Weizsäcker’s plea for a “metaphysics” of the ill, the paper addresses the 
first intermediate objective of the thesis: To illuminate what it means to be perceived as and 
to exist in the world as an ill person. His work represents a theoretical perspective on ill-
being; in von Weizsäcker’s words, it develops and makes visible a “pathosophy” for 
medicine. 
In the paper I outline von Weizsäcker’s idea of illness as “a way of being human,” which 
involves analyzing his view of the pathic subject and of pathic existence. Central to this 
project is his use of what he calls the pathic categories: the modal verbs can (“können”), 
will (“wollen”), may (“dürfen”), must (“müssen”), and shall (“sollen”). By applying these 
pathic categories, these modes of ill-being, to the case story of Nicole, a woman suffering 
from lymphatic cancer, I illustrate how these categories illuminate important aspects of ill-
being. I describe how the situation of not being able to, of “nicht-können,” is expressed in 
Nicole’s inability to do simple, everyday tasks because of the adverse effects of her cancer 
treatment. The situation of wanting to do something that is in theory possible, but not 
realizable because of the pressing realities of the disease or its treatment (“wollen”), points 
to something essential in the experience of illness. I also invoke Virginia Woolf’s self-
description in a similar situation. She expressed a desire (“wollen”) to write, but was unable 
to do so during periods of severe illness. I show how the category of must (“müssen”) is 
relevant to the ill-being of a person enduring a disease, like Nicole, undergoing difficult 
treatment regimes, or to persons living with a chronic disease, or to those who have to face 
death. The mode of “dürfen,” on the other hand, reflects the element common to the 
therapeutic context of being given permission or being-allowed-to as a patient, while the 
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mode of “sollen” reflects the resistance that these imperatives may generate in one who is 
ill.  
For von Weizsäcker, human ailment is central for our understanding of human existence as 
pathic existence. Accepting his claim that illness too is “a way of being human,” a greater 
understanding of the pathic not only illuminates important aspects of the illness experience, 
but also points to central features of human existence as such. As I interpret von 
Weizsäcker, illness may be said to play a paradigmatic role in calling attention to an often 
ignored or neglected part of what it is to be human. 
This is a claim that has some interesting epistemic and ethical implications, both with 
regard to a theoretical understanding of ill-being, and for the normative handling of it. In the 
last part of the paper I address these implications, and discuss how von Weizsäcker’s 
position differs from other contributions in the field, especially some phenomenological 
literature that also deals with the experience of illness. I refer in particular to the works of 
Fredrik Svenaeus, Kay Toombs, Drew Leder, and Havi Carel, all of whom tend to 
understand illness as something foreign and unwelcome in our lives, that is, as a “gradual 
process of alienation” and “unhomelikeness” (Svenaeus, 2000, 2009), as a “disruption” 
(Toombs, 1988), as a “dys-appearance” (Leder, 1990) or as a “dis-ability” (Carel, 2008). 
These perspectives differ from von Weizsäcker’s understanding of the human being as a 
suffering creature. That is, suffering and illness are not something that we can get away 
from. They are always looking for new paths, and as such are constitutive of our basic way 
of existing. In the last part of the paper I discuss this basic way of understanding human life 
in the context of the prevailing drive in modern medicine of constantly striving to get away 
from ailment, to get rid of it—an attitude in medicine that von Weizsäcker denotes as a 
“weg damit” attitude of physicians. In the concluding part I suggest that acknowledging 
“illness as a way of being human” may address an important normative anomaly in modern 
health care: its failure to accept mortality.  
3.2 Paper 1: Care for nurses only? Medicine and the perceiving eye (2011) 
This paper is the starting point of my exploration of care in medicine, and addresses the 
second intermediate objective of this thesis: To explore how the conceptual vocabulary of 
an ethics of care might contribute to illuminating ill-being and the ill person/medical helper 
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relation. Here I take the works of Kari Martinsen as my point of departure, discussing her 
philosophy of caring in relation to medicine. Even though Martinsen is an influential 
theoretician and philosopher within the field of nursing in Nordic countries, her works have 
rarely been referred to in the fields of medicine and medical ethics. This made me curious: 
What might her perspective contribute to medicine and medical ethics?  
In the paper I focus mainly on the moral-epistemological implications of her work, her 
analysis of the different clinical gazes in health care. I discuss Martinsen’s distinction 
between “the perceiving eye” and “the recording eye,” and relate these two to the way we 
see in medicine, concluding that the main gaze of medicine is what she terms a recording 
gaze. This way of seeing patients, I argue, excludes “seeing emotions” in our encounter 
with the patient, and may lead to an objectification of the other. To illustrate an important 
ethical side-effect of the recording eye in medicine I make use of a personal account written 
by author Kristin Ribe, a patient suffering from a psychiatric condition that involved self-
mutilation. The perceiving eye, I argue, may contribute to protecting patient integrity, and 
may contribute as well to strengthening the ability of the patient to face life with courage. I 
aim too in this paper to demonstrate the epistemological relevance of care in the clinical 
encounter. By being more aware of our own “seeing emotions” in meeting with patients, we 
may be able to capture important information regarding the patient’s clinical situation. 
Thus, a perceiving eye may also contribute to refining our clinical abilities.  
For a physician to cross the border to nursing philosophy and care ethics may not be 
uncontroversial. In the last part of the paper I discuss possible drawbacks of highlighting a 
care perspective in medicine, discussing whether care may inhibit medical practice and lead 
to difficulties for the physician, hampering our ability to subject patients to necessary 
therapeutic pains, or with regard to breaking bad news. I address the worry that certain well-
established conventions relating to partiality, favoritism, and injustice may fall outside the 
reach of medicine if an ethics of care were more fully integrated into medical practice. 
Finally, I discuss the presumption that an increased focus on care and caring relationships in 
medicine would lead to more burnout among physicians. In conclusion, I argue that 
medicine needs to expand its way of seeing patients in the clinical setting, and to be more 
open to involving the physician’s own affectedness in the clinical evaluation of patients.  
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3.3 Paper 2: Harm in the absence of care: toward a medical ethics that cares (2011) 
This paper also relates to the second intermediate objective of the dissertation, exploring 
how the conceptual vocabulary of an ethics of care might contribute to illuminating ill-
being and the relation between the ill person and the medical helper. Whereas paper 2 
focuses on the clinician’s way of seeing, challenging the traditional way of seeing in 
medicine, this paper focuses on inherent assumptions about the nature of the moral self in 
medicine and medical ethics. Paper 2 deals with the moral/epistemological features of an 
ethics of care in medicine, while paper 3 deals with the moral/ontological features of an 
ethics of care. In my discussion I draw, among others, on the works of Carol Gilligan, Tove 
Pettersen, and Virginia Held, all representatives of the Anglo-American tradition of care 
ethics, a tradition that stands in contrast to the care tradition deriving from nursing and 
phenomenology, of which Martinsen is a representative.  
I focus attention on an ethical challenge that is seldom discussed in medical ethics: the harm 
to which patients may be exposed due to a lack of care in the clinical encounter. I address 
this challenge of “harm in the absence of care” from the vantage point of Gilligan’s 
admonition “not to turn away from someone in need.” I focus on the ontological features of 
an ethics of care, taking a relational ontology as my point of departure. An ethics of care 
depicts the moral agent not primarily in terms of independence, equality of power and 
influence, but rather conceives of agents as mutually interconnected, vulnerable, and 
interdependent. I then discuss this important dimension of an ethics of care in relation to 
what we may see as the modern ideal of detachment and non-interference in medicine, and I 
point to how this model of the moral agent as detached and independent may be traced in 
the dominant discourse on empathy and autonomy in medicine and medical ethics, as well 
as in the prevailing medical understanding of care as a principle of beneficence and a virtue 
of compassion. I then argue that this ideal of detachment and separatedness may present an 
obstacle to making sense of care in medicine, and that medicine, in order to avoid situations 
in which patients are “harmed in the absence of care,” needs to acknowledge the relational 
reality of care, and to work for an understanding of physicians and patients as related selves.
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3.4 Reassembling the three research papers
In what way do these three papers contribute to the overarching objectives of this thesis? In 
the previous paragraphs I have explained how the three papers relate to the first two 
intermediate objectives. The third intermediate objective, making visible some 
consequences of introducing the set of concepts and perspectives developed in the thesis for 
today’s medical practice, will be addressed in this last part of the thesis. 
My experience with the Bosnian patient induced in me a wish to expand the theoretical 
framework dealing with patients in medicine. I started to look for a more “holistic view,” 
which led me to return to the basic phenomenon as formulated by von Weizsäcker—a need 
that manifests itself as a plea for help—and thence to an exploration of both the patient as 
pathic subject and the physician as carer.  
An important result of this encounter is my claim that medicine needs to cultivate another 
way of seeing patients, to develop a perceiving eye, in addition to its usual way of observing 
and clinically evaluating patients. As I see it, von Weizsäcker’s quest for a “metaphysics” of 
the ill represents both an epistemological plea—the need for a more comprehensive theory 
of the patient that includes the existential aspects of being ill—and an ethical plea—that 
physicians be able to capture the patient’s state of being in need. In the words of von 
Weizsäcker, “the real essence of ill-being is a need that manifests itself as a plea for help” 
(von Weizsäcker, 1987a, p. 13).33 It is clear that von Weizsäcker also aims to operate within 
the “perceiving range of life.” To be able to grasp the metaphysics of the ill, we must not 
only see the patient with a recording eye, studying the patient’s tissue or cells in a 
microscope, or observing him or her with a purely clinical gaze; we must also be able to 
capture his or her emotional needs, and see the patient with a perceiving eye.Here we see a 
family resemblance between von Weizsäcker’s and Kari Martinsen’s understanding of care 
as being able “to see and express the [patient’s] appeal for help” (Martinsen, 1993, p. 9). 
Although von Weizsäcker does not write explicitly about care, he does point to an important 
prerequisite for care in clinical practice, the clinician’s ability to see (and hear) not only the 
patient’s physical needs, but also more experiential and existential needs. This ability to 
capture the patient’s state of being in need also comports well with Gilligan’s ethical idea of 
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33 “Das wirkliche Wesen des Krankseins ist eine Not and äussert sich als eine Bitte um Hilfe” (von 
Weizsäcker, 1987a, p. 13). 
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not turn[ing] away from someone in need. By seeing the patient with only a recording eye, 
focusing on his or her physical attributes and expressions in order to make a proper 
diagnosis, we may come to turn away from this patient in need. The emotional and mental 
harm that a lack of care in the doctor-patient relationship may cause to patients represents 
an ethical challenge that is seldom discussed in medicine.  
I argue that medicine’s ontological point of departure may have an impact on how 
physicians perceive and interpret their relationship to patients, and how they handle 
situations in clinical practice. Martinsen’s phenomenological analysis of care points to how 
we are mutually interconnected and interdependent as human beings, and how this mutual 
relatedness provides important insights in relation to the nature of care, highlighting care in 
the sense of being present in a relationship as “a movement away from ourselves and 
towards the other” (Martinsen, 1991, p. 11). We may thus trace a “relational ontology” in 
the work of Martinsen, which we also find in the tradition of an ethics of care. That is, the 
understanding of the moral agent as a related self represents a specific normative feature of 
an ethics of care, which, together with the moral injunction of not turning away from 
someone in need, serves to highlight the focus of care ethics on relational harm.  
From this I argue that a greater emphasis on care in the ethical discourse of medicine may 
deepen our understanding of the interaction between physician and patient. Seriously 
engaging with the moral epistemological and moral ontological implications of an ethics of 
care within a medical context, be it the Nordic tradition of an ethics of care in nursing 
represented by Martinsen or the Anglo-American tradition initiated by Gilligan, contributes 
to improving the interactions between physician and patient by challenging medicine’s way 
of perceiving patients and highlighting human interdependency and connectedness. 
By questioning the underlying idea of the moral self in medicine and medical ethics, as well 
as by elaborating on the pathic nature of human existence, the papers also take part in the 
anthropological activity of clarifying in what way the images of persons may inflect our 
perception of ethical challenges in clinical practice: The papers illustrate how the 
understanding of the self may influence how people understand and act in the world—
including how physicians both perceive and interpret their relationships to patients and how 
they deal with human ailment in medicine. I will further enlarge on this theme in the 
following chapter. 
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4. Lessons of care and pathosophy
So, what are further implications of the work to this point? What insights have emerged, 
and what additional areas need to be addressed? If there are critical objections, they need to 
be addressed, and there are as well interesting tracks for further investigation. In order to 
come to terms with the main objective of this thesis, to develop theoretical insight in 
medicine in order to contribute to a better normative understanding of what care for the ill 
person entails,I suggest we need to concentrate on the following four areas:
1. Understanding illness as a “way of being human”: What may that imply for 
medicine and medical ethics? 
2. The way of seeing in medicine. 
3. The model of the moral agent in medicine and medical ethics. 
4. The prevailing understanding of care in medicine. 
In this chapter I will follow up on these four areas, with the aim of illuminating the third 
intermediate objective of this thesis: making visible some consequences of the set of 
concepts and perspectives developed here for today’s medical practice. Despite the ancient 
call to physicians to be “always comforting,” it is not uncontroversial to argue in favor of 
implementing care and care ethics to a greater degree in medicine. Some might find it 
inappropriate, conceiving of care in medicine as an “oxymoron” (Mackenzie, 1997), or 
claiming it to be potentially dangerous for the physician’s own health (Sweet, 2003). Others 
might find it unnecessary, arguing that medicine already deals with these aspects of care, 
but under different descriptions (Brekke, 1998; Short, 1998). A further aim of this chapter is 
therefore to clarify and discuss some of the possible reasons for this ambivalence related to 
care in medicine. Finally, I reflect on some of the didactic challenges of facilitating care in 
medicine, and indicate some areas for further research. 
4.1 Lessons of pathosophy (and the implications for care)
I will now look more closely at some of the normative implications of the pathosophic 
project of von Weizsäcker, relating it to the field of care. Even though von Weizsäcker did 
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not thematize care, some of the underlying assumptions in his project may be concordant 
with some of the assumptions of care ethics.34
In paper 3 I aim to advance an illness perspective in medicine. Conceiving of illness as “a 
way of being human,” I elaborate on ill-being in terms of the pathic modes of will, shall, 
can, must, and may. I point out that it may be important for the medical helper to hold such 
a perspective on the ill person in order to be able to deal with the “metaphysics” of the ill. 
That is, being curious about the patient’s ill-being as a medical helper may contribute to 
expanding our understanding of the patient, which makes us better able to capture the 
patient’s needs. For instance, if my fellow students and I had been encouraged to also 
reflect about the patient’s ill-being in meeting with the Bosnian patient, we may have come 
to treat him differently than just leaving the room after finishing his physical examination.  
Being able to hold an illness perspective in medicine not only requires of us that we be able 
to reflect about ill-being, but also that we be able to see the patient differently than just by 
the process of recording. An illness perspective also requires a perceiving gaze. That is, to 
capture ill-being we must also be able to see, or in the words of von Weizsäcker, hear, the 
patient’s need. In this way the perspectives of von Weizsäcker and Martinsen unite in the 
basic phenomenon of medical practice. By pointing to the importance of hearing the 
patient’s “plea for help,” von Weizsäcker expresses an important insight: that an illness 
perspective that aims to embrace the metaphysics of the ill also requires a perceiving eye. 
That is, this way of seeing patients in medicine is important for capturing the patient’s ill-
being, and it represents an important prerequisite for care. 
4.1.1 Weg damit (away with it)
Elaborating on the pathic categories, von Weizsäcker points to the resistance that the 
imperative of “sollen” may generate in the one who is ill. He cites examples of “obstinate” 

34 In contrast, the concept of care in relation to German medicine during the Nazi era is characterized by the 
ideals and practice of “Vorsorge,” understood as “preventive care that respects emerging needs of the entire 
society” (Reich, 2001, p. 64). That approach justified, for instance, a massive execution of children as part of 
the Nazi euthanasia program. Warren T. Reich shows how there was a shift in the medical ethos in Germany 
prior to and during the Nazi era, where commitments to care of individual sick persons (“Fürsorge”) had to 
give way to a preventive care that respected emerging needs of the entire society (“Vorsorge”) (Reich, 2001). 
Reich thus formulates the development of the “National Socialist ethic of care” in the following way: “They 
took the Sorge (the deeper, worried care) out of the Fürsorge (caring for) that is oriented to the individual 
patient and relocated it to a dangerous extent in Vorsorge (global caring for a holistic need); i.e., a preventive 
care in the interests of the German Volk” (Reich, 2001, p. 69). 
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patients, who do not do as they are told in order to get well, whether undergoing an 
operation, stopping smoking, or staying in bed (von Weizsäcker, 1967). This protest or 
resistance may be directed toward the state of being commanded, “you should,” but it may 
as well be directed toward the demand on the part of the medical establishment that we 
should constantly strive to be healthy and to get well. Thus, within medicine “sollen” has 
special importance because healthiness is regarded as the “Sollzustand” (the condition that 
shall be) and disease is regarded as the opposite (Fichter, 2007).  
Von Weizsäcker raises a criticism against the attitude in medicine and health care that “a 
human being shall be healthy, not ill” (von Weizsäcker, 1967, p. 80).35 However, “there is 
no naïve, vulgar reason to assume that ‘shall’ in Dasein’s compass needle is always pointing 
toward that which is good, beautiful, truthful, healthy, and complete” (von Weizsäcker, 
1967, p. 82).36 This criticism is in accordance with his pathosophical project, emphasizing 
the precedence of disease over health, as earlier outlined. He further points to the tendency 
of medicine to always approach disease with an “away with it” attitude (“weg damit”) (von 
Weizsäcker, 1988b, p. 318). According to von Weizsäcker, such an inherent “weg damit” 
attitude to human ailment in medicine may also be interpreted as an expression of a general 
attitude toward life that is characterized by a continuous striving for happiness (von 
Weizsäcker, 1988b): Away with that which is uncomfortable, “weg damit”! We may relate 
this attitude of “weg damit” to the imperatives in medicine of possibility and action 
(Hofmann, 2002b). 
The imperative of possibility refers to an attitude among health care practitioners that all 
“that which is possible to do has to be done” and that “we have to try (everything possible)” 
(Hofmann, 2002b, p. 676). Since we may sustain life by advanced treatment, we ought to 
provide it. Some authors have said of this tendency among physicians to try everything 
possible that they are “held hostage” by the possibilities provided by advances in 
technology (Muraskas, Marshall, Tomich, et al., 1999, cited in Hofmann, 2002b, p. 676). 
Hofmann also points to an imperative of action. This imperative consists of the attitude that 
passivity is a vice. We often encounter this imperative in the form: “Don’t just stand there—
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“Ein Mensch soll gesund, er soll nicht krank sein” (von Weizsäcker, 1967, p. 80).

“Dass im übrigen die Kompassnadel des Soll im Dasein immer auf Gutes, Schönes, Wahres, Gesundes und 
Vollkommenes, also auf eine Art Eubiosie gerichtet sei, dies naiv-vulgär anzunehmen besteht kein Grund” 
(von Weizsäcker, 1967, p. 82).
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do something!” or “We do not want to be accused of not having tried, do we?” There seems 
to be an imperative toward active response, and technology has become the paradigm of 
effective action. In particular, there is a wish to respond positively in situations where 
patients are critically ill, have distressing symptoms, or have a dreaded diagnosis. Human 
ailment is something to be acted on and preferably gotten rid of, and even though the patient 
is almost dying, the drive to “do something” may be stronger than the more sensible course 
of not doing.  
This drive for active doing in order to come to terms with ailment contrasts with von 
Weizsäcker’s emphasis on realizing the pathic nature of our everyday lives. Operating 
within the context of medical anthropology, he points to how illness and ill-being may tell 
us something about human existence as such, whether we are ill or well. Such a view, I 
think, may positively influence our attitudes toward ailment in general and toward the ill 
human being in particular. We may come to accept ailments as a part of our lives to a 
greater extent than is the case today—instead of constantly trying to get away from ailment, 
to get rid of it—and by so doing we might also become better able to deal with it.  
If we further relate this perspective to the field of medical ethics it may illuminate an 
important normative anomaly in modern health care: its failure to accept mortality. We may 
trace this failure in the drive for action and intervention in modern medicine, and we may 
find it as well in ethical dilemmas concerning the termination of life-prolonging treatments 
of terminally ill patients. Studies indicate that a substantial percentage of cancer care 
spending, for instance, occurs in the last weeks and months of life, and that in a large 
percentage of cases, such care is not only futile, but might have been contrary to the goals 
and preferences of many patients and families if they had been adequately informed of their 
options (Sullivan et al., 2011). This reflects the enduring potency of the “weg damit” 
attitude in medicine, as I see it, where physicians, instead of realizing the mortal reality of a 
deadly disease in its final stages, still try to deal with it, “weg damit,” in a more or less 
hopeless way.  
4.1.2 Ja, aber nicht so (yes, but not like this)
In contrast to the attitude of “weg damit,” von Weizsäcker encourages his students to adopt 
an attitude of “yes, but not like this.” “Until recently the attitude to disease has been: ‘Weg 
damit.’ However, I tell [the students]: Your attitude to disease should be: ‘Yes, but not like 
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this’” (von Weizsäcker, 1988b, pp. 318–319).37 Such an attitude implies an element of 
reserve, as noted by Kari Martinsen, and holds the potential for caring. That is, in the “yes” 
there is an acceptance of the whole patient: Yes (we see you and recognize you), but not like 
this (while at the same time we want to help you to achieve recovery and healing). Von 
Weizsäcker thus pursues a medicine that aims to house and contain the diseased and 
pathological, while at the same time it aims to heal and soothe. This point reflects an 
important normative implication of von Weizsäcker’s pathosophy: By accepting ailment in 
the medical field to a greater extent, we may encourage a greater emphasis on care and 
consideration for the patient, instead of constantly focusing on curing the disease alone. 
This negative effect of a “weg damit” attitude in medicine is clearly illustrated in the movie 
Wit, where we meet Dr. Vivian Bearing, a professor of Old English literature, who has been 
diagnosed with metastatic ovarian cancer.38 The movie contains several scenes dealing with 
interactions between the patient, Vivian, and two physicians, Dr. Posner and Dr. Kelekian. 
There is an element of caricature in the portrayal of the physicians, but many of the scenes 
nevertheless sharply illuminate some of the points that I am trying to make in this thesis, 
and so provide a vivid and accessible illustration of the tendency I wish to address.39 Vivian 
Bearing is undergoing a very demanding treatment. However, as a consequence of the 
physicians’ persistent encouragement to “keep pushing fluids”—that is, to continue 
receiving the high dosages of cytostatics they prescribe—Vivian is not treated as an “end” 
in her own right, but only a “means” to fulfill the physicians’ prescriptions. For her, there is 
little time for reflection on the disease and its possible outcome, and she gets little 
opportunity to prepare for death under her doctors’ reiterated urgings to go for “the full 
dose.” 
The physicians do not manage to relate to her ill-being; they do not relate to the way she 
faces the necessities of her disease (“müssen”) nor to how she may live through the modes 
of “können” or “nicht können” as she suffers from nausea and pain, loss of appetite, and 
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37 “Bisher war die Einstellung zum Krankhaften: ‘Weg damit’. Ich aber sage: Eure Einstellung zum 
Krankhaften soll sein: ‘Ja, aber nicht so’” (von Weizsäcker, 1988b, p. 318-319). 
38 I thank Jan Helge Solbakk for introducing me to this movie. 

James Marcum also utilizes the play “Wit” and especially the character Jason Posner to discuss the role of 
care and competence in contemporary medical practice, “confronting” Posner with the writings of Francis 
Peabody about the importance of caring for the patient in medicine (Marcum, 2011). 
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loss of energy. As a highly recognized professor of Old English literature, specializing in 
the metaphysical poetry of John Donne, the mode of “nicht-können” is accentuated by her 
inability under these circumstances to engage in the work that constitutes the main part of 
her identity and self-satisfaction. In the movie we see from Vivian’s reactions how the lack 
of recognition of these parts of her situation add weight to the burden of her disease. 
In von Weizsäcker’s emphasis on meeting patients with “yes, but not like this,” rather than 
with “away with it,” there is also a request to take the illness dimension into account when 
dealing with a patient. It reflects a desire to explore the disease in a biographical sense, 
tracing possible conditions in the patient’s biography that may be connected to the patient’s 
disease (von Weizsäcker,1987d, 1988b). We are thus led to recognize and accept possible 
underlying processes of the disease, and so arises the “yes” by which his formula begins. 
Von Weizsäcker says: “However, the emphasis is on the Yes to the disease, which was not 
previously visible” (von Weizsäcker, 1987d, p. 355).40 This request of von Weizsäcker to 
explore the patient’s biography in relation to understanding the disease and its possible 
“underlying” meaning suggests a possible relation to Freud and psychoanalysis. This is a 
path that I have chosen not to follow here in my reading of von Weizsäcker. Nevertheless, 
his encouragement to say Yes to the patient’s history also involves a Yes to the illness 
dimension of the patient, as an understanding of the patient’s ill-being also involves 
knowledge of the patient’s history. In the case of Vivian Bearing, knowledge of her work, 
her passion for literature and the sonnets of John Donne, her teaching experiences, and the 
fact that she has no family all give us insight into what this particular illness means to this 
particular individual human being. 
In my view, meeting patients with “yes, but not like this” rather than with “away with it” 
represents an important prerequisite for care of the sort I am recommending. Here I argue in 
agreement with Martinsen and her suggestion that we approach patients in an attitude of 
reserve and receptivity. By this, we may come to see the patient with “perceiving eyes,” she 
argues, thus making us better able to recognize and to care for the patient’s needs, rather 
than “conquering”41 the patient by seeing her only as a neutral receptacle of our active 
interventions. It is not always necessary to initiate some practical action in meeting with the 
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40“Aber der Nachdruck liegt auf dem Ja gegenüber der Krankheit, welches vorher nicht sichtbar war” (von 
Weizsäcker, 1987d, p. 355). 
41 In Norwegian: “Erobre.” 
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patient; sometimes the consultation may profit from an attitude of reserve on the doctor’s 
part, withholding medications, referrals to specialists, or sick leaves. We are trained to act, 
to initiate some kind of action, but in many situations such interventions may instead add 
insult to injury, both with respect to the risks connected to some procedures and tests, and to 
possible side effects of medications.42
The underlying and pervasive attitude of “weg damit” in medicine thus represents an 
attitude that leaves little room for caring. To counter this attitude we need to reflect on the 
way we see patients in medicine, since seeing the patient with a purely recording gaze may 
enhance or facilitate a “weg damit” attitude in medicine, insofar as it focuses on reaching a 
diagnosis and looking for “solutions,” that is, what is to be done next for the patient. In the 
following section I try to deepen my reflection on the different gazes in medicine, further 
substantiating my claim that medicine’s dominant eye is a recording eye. 
4.2 Seeing in medicine  
4.2.1 The recording eye  
Even though the conditions in modern hospitals have changed since “the birth of the clinic” 
as described by Foucault, today’s health care professionals, and first and foremost 
physicians, still build much of their knowledge on the “voyeur method of the human 
observatory—seeing without being seen” (Martinsen, 2006, p. 109). Patients are being 
observed from the outside, put in specific rooms for examination, with the aim of the 
examination to enable the physician to classify—“divide, sort, categorize, record”—to reach 
a diagnosis. As suggested in paper 1, this perspective is evident if we go to a recently 
updated textbook in clinical examination for medical students, where the authors point to 
how the examination really begins from “the moments you set eyes on the patient” (Epstein 
et al., 2008, p. 20). “As the patient approaches you in the consulting or examination room, 
observe the posture, gait and character of the stride,” and when making your initial 
acquaintance with the patient, “the grip of the handshake usually provides some useful 
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42  Of course, there is no antagonism between action and care; they are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and 
in many situations action is absolutely needed, including in situations involving care. Care can include 
practical action, and in palliative care in particular the practical and more “action oriented” aspects of care are 
inevitable.  
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information” (Epstein et al., 2008, pp. 20–21). The patient’s physique may indicate different 
conditions, reflecting a “constitutional shortness, a distinct genetic syndrome or the 
consequence of intrauterine, childhood or adolescent growth retardation”; the patient’s 
posture may also provide helpful information, with peritonitis indicated in a patient lying 
motionless, or pancreatitis in a patient lying with knees drawn toward the chest (Epstein et 
al., 2008, p. 21).  
The further process of interviewing and examining the patient operates within a fixed 
framework, and even though physicians are encouraged to ask open-ended questions, the 
medical interview follows a standard pattern, investigating the patient’s social history, 
medical history, education, employment, medicines, drug and tobacco use, alcohol 
consumption, foreign travel, home circumstances, family history, and a review of the 
different organ systems, as well as the history of the present complaint(s). After the initial 
introduction and history taking, the physician inspects the patient’s body systems, looking 
for specific signs and stigmata, before she continues with palpation and auscultation of the 
heart and lungs. After finishing the general examination, the physician continues with a 
more specific, problem-oriented examination that is related to the particular problem(s) of 
the patient. 
Perception or sensation plays a role in the medical examination, but this use of the senses 
differs from the perception Martinsen suggests. Here perception is used to search for 
specific signs that fit into a diagnostic scheme. For instance, the physician may palpate the 
abdomen or the thyroid gland, using her tactile sense to search for tumors; she auscultates 
the heart, listening for murmurs; she inspects the skin, looking for characteristic rashes; or 
she smells for characteristic odors, such as, for instance, acetone in the case of ketoacidosis. 
We may also add the sense of taste. A diagnostic indicator of cystic fibrosis is a salty-
tasting skin, due to an abnormal high salt concentration in the sweat, a sign that is now 
accepted as almost pathognomonic for this fatal genetic disease. In ancient medicine, the 
physicians also tasted patients’ urine for sweetness, a clinical sign indicating diabetes.   
We see from this that the medical exploratory gaze operates within a fixed framework, 
systematizing, differentiating, and classifying information about the patient within a 
predefined schema. From the first moment the physician sets eyes on the patient the 
examination begins, registering body language, clothing and hygiene, stature, posture, and 
handshake. Conversation with the patient usually follows an “anamnestic roadmap,” and 
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there is often little time or opportunity to deviate from this map. If the patient does start to 
talk about something outside these parameters, the physician often has strategies for 
redirecting the patient in order to get a focused anamnesis and reach a conclusion for the 
consultation. The usual way of approaching patients in medicine leaves little room for 
perception understood as an “openness toward the world,” to paraphrase Martinsen. On the 
contrary, the interaction may often be fixed, following a scheduled plan, and the physician 
aims at “disciplining” the situation so as to be able to finish.  
If we return to a scene from the movie Wit, there is an encounter between Vivian and Dr. 
Jason Posner in which Vivian tries to approach Dr. Posner in a more personal way. They 
have known each other for some time while she has been at the hospital. Vivian has lost her 
hair as a side effect of her treatment, and struggles with anxiety and her fear of death. After 
Dr. Posner exchanges the usual phrases regarding her condition, referring to her blood tests 
and adjusting her drug dosage, Vivian addresses him for the first time by his first name, 
Jason, and asks him what he usually says to a patient who is apprehensive and frightened. 
“Of who?” the doctor replies, without perceiving her fear and apprehension. He seems not 
to even understand the question. “Well, I just… Never mind,” Vivian whispers back. Dr. 
Posner hesitates for a moment, then asks the patient if she knows the name of the president 
of the United States. He apparently interprets the situation as if Vivian has become 
confused, or at least he pretends to. So he starts to evaluate her level of consciousness by 
asking some standard competence questions. Vivian answers that she is fine. “Are you 
sure?” he asks. “I could order a test.” “No, I am fine, just a little tired,” Vivian replies. 
“Okay,” Dr. Posner says. “Listen. I have to go. Keep pushing the fluids. Try for 2000 a day. 
Okay?” “Okay,” Vivian whispers. By then the doctor is on his way out of the door. 
Even though the scene might seem a bit exaggerated, it nevertheless points to some central 
features of a recording eye in medicine. First, it is clear that the medical world of Dr. Posner 
does not contain fear and anxiety. Occupied with details regarding the blood tests and 
tolerance of treatment, he fails to capture Vivian’s apprehension, instead interpreting it as a 
possible reduction of her level of consciousness. His recording eye may not have room for 
apprehension and fear. Instead he reaches out for a screening instrument and proposes to 
order some tests. 
This is just a scene from a play and a movie. But recent empirical research also documents 
the role of this way of seeing in medicine. In their study “Clinical Essentialising: A 
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Qualitative Study of Doctors’ Medical and Moral Practice,” Kari Milch Agledahl and her 
colleagues recognize the uniformity of physicians’ ways of seeing patients, pointing to how 
physicians actually “essentialize” the patients’ stories by breaking them down into concrete 
complaints and categorizing the symptoms in medical terms (Agledahl, Førde, & Wifstad, 
2010). In another study, Agledahl et al. (2011) show how the doctors being studied by 
observation actively direct the focus away from the patient’s existential concerns onto 
medical facts and rarely address the personal aspects of a patient’s condition. They conclude 
that the main failing of patient-doctor encounters is not a lack of courtesy, but the moral 
offense patients experience when existential concerns are ignored: 
The doctor avoids obvious existential concerns; when the patient talks about the 
tumour, the doctor does not address the underlying fear but asks about symptoms. 
Likewise, when the patient’s increasing tiredness is brought up, he is made to 
quantify his activity levels. Explicit worries are met with medical answers, and the 
patient’s dying process is even described as “a catabolic condition.” The tacit 
existential dimension appears uncomfortably present at the end, when the fears that 
are unaddressed seem to prevent the patient from leaving. (Agledahl et al., 2011, p. 
652) 
The description that Agledahl et al. offer here may be said to be consistent with the 
description of the recording eye, as outlined by Martinsen, where tiredness is met with a 
quantitative measure of activity and conceived of as a catabolic condition. It illustrates how 
physicians confine themselves to their medical repertoire in meeting with their patients’ 
suffering. The physicians continue recording in meeting with the patients’ conditions, and 
by the process of “essentializing” and by actively directing their focus away from the 
patients’ existential concerns, they never get into “the perceiving range of life” (Martinsen, 
2006).  
It may be relevant to ask whether this ignorance of existential matters is due to indifference. 
Is the recording eye an indifferent eye? According to the Norwegian philosopher Arne 
Johan Vetlesen (1994), indifference and distance are the prime threats to morality: “Given a 
detached attitude, there is a danger that I shall remain blind to the human reality of the 
situation in front of me, that it will awaken no engagement on my part but will instead leave 
me indifferent. And indifference is a prime threat to morality, even more destructive to it 
than hatred or resentment” (Vetlesen, 1994, p. 10). In my view, emotional indifference may 


be one part of the process of recording, related to the loss of perception and lack of a 
“seeing emotion,” to paraphrase Martinsen. However, the process of recording involves 
something more than the loss of perception and a lack of emotional involvement. It also 
relates to the tradition of medicine and its ideals of professionalism and objectivity in the 
wake of the processes that Foucault points to in his analyses of the medical gaze. To this, 
we may add the influential professional ideal of detachment in medicine (Halpern, 2001), 
which I will enlarge upon later in the thesis. Kari Martinsen does not speak of detachment 
in elaborating her conception of the recording eye. But the lack of connectedness between 
professional and patient is obvious when she describes how the professional, displaying a 
recording gaze, “does not present himself as a person in relation to the patient” (Martinsen, 
2006, p. 108), and how “the professional is withdrawn and closed in relation to the other,” 
offering “nothing of himself in the relation” (Martinsen, 2006, p. 108). 
4.2.2 The perceiving eye 
As a response to my claim that the main gaze in medicine is the recording gaze, I argue in 
favor of implementing a perceiving eye in medicine. In the following I will outline some 
ethical implications of this way of seeing patients in medicine, as well as enlarging on what 
I call as the epistemic potential of care, that is, the epistemological implications of seeing 
patients with a perceiving eye.  
The recording eye is powerful in its objectification of the other. Through a recording eye, 
we may see a person as an object, and this may threaten the person’s integrity. The idea that 
individuals are not reducible to objects, but are intrinsically valuable, constitutes the core of 
the conception of morality, human dignity, and integrity (Kant, 1997). Integrity means that 
which must not be hurt, damaged, or altered, but which should be respected and protected 
(Kemp, 2000), and for a person to be seen as an object may be both painful and damaging. 
In paper 1 I offer the example of a woman suffering from self-mutilation and suicidal 
thoughts (Ribe, 2009) who precisely delineates the damaging effects of a recording eye, 
describing how she feels like “a scrap, a nothing” when treated by a doctor who just sutures 
her wounds in a professional manner, without even talking to her (Ribe, 2009). We see how 
Vivian Bearing collapses and withdraws as she experiences that Dr. Posner does not 
manage to treat her as anything but a medical case, even when she directly approaches him. 
Dr. Posner not only allows for the objectification of his patient, he also fails to strengthen 
the patient’s courage in suffering. Being able to see the patient with a perceiving eye may 
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contribute to bringing forward the patient’s courage to live (Anvik, 2004). “We must be 
able to both see and express the appeal for help to strengthen the life courage in suffering,” 
says Martinsen (1993, p. 9). If we manage to see the patient’s need, and express the 
impression that the patient makes on us in terms of a word, a gesture, or a practical action, 
we may contribute to strengthening the patient’s courage to further endure his or her 
disease. The woman suffering from self-inflicted wounds in paper 1 noticed that a 
physician’s hands were trembling while he was suturing her wounds. This expressed 
emotion on the part of the physician indicated to her that she was not just pure routine for 
him, but actually moved him—something that “was very good to feel, to take with me 
outside” (Ribe, 2009, p. 780).  
A caring approach may sometimes be epistemically essential in the clinical encounter. In 
paper 1 I illustrate this potential of the perceiving eye for gaining clinically relevant 
information by using an example from general practice, a patient who seeks the physician 
because of the relatively simple condition of impacted earwax. But the whole consultation 
ends in a personal disclosure by the patient, who tells about a childhood filled with violence 
and abuse. In his appointment with this patient the physician is moved by what seems an 
extra weight in the patient’s step, or something in the patient’s eyes. By being aware of his 
own “seeing emotions” in meeting with the patient, the physician is able to capture some 
important information regarding the patient’s clinical situation. By being open and non-
judgmental, having an attitude of reserve and receptivity, the physician manages to uncover 
the underlying worry of the patient. Instead of rapidly closing the consultation once its 
initial purpose is resolved, the physician remains, being receptive to the patient, thus 
managing to capture the patient’s appeal for help. This way of seeing involves not only an 
openness to the patient’s vulnerability, but also an openness toward the physician’s own
vulnerability. It requires the development of an awareness in the doctor toward his own 
feelings. Such an openness to affective cues in the clinical encounter may represent a 
precondition for a complete understanding of clinical realities, contributing to “sharpening” 
that clinical intuition, which is necessary for competent medical treatment and care 
(Nortvedt, 2008a).  
Of course, interpreting the physician in the case above as an example of openness and 
sensibility to affective cues may be just poor speculation. Maybe the physician simply asked 
the patient one more time how he was doing out of an old habit, or as a pure reflex, or out of 
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politeness. What was really going on we cannot know for sure. Let me therefore offer one 
more example from the doctor’s examining room that illustrates this way of seeing patients 
in more detail. In this case the physician tells the story herself. 
In one of her books Eli Berg describes a patient consultation where she manages to see and 
perceive a patient in a different light than in her previous consultations with him, and tells 
how this leads to a different understanding of the patient as well (Berg, 2005). The patient is 
well known to Berg. He is a carpenter who has had problems with his back for many years. 
Berg now suspects that he is trying to get sick leave from his regular job in order to work in 
the “black market.” Berg has known this patient for 15 years, and does not like him very 
much. She knows he has problems with alcohol and aggression. “There is always a coldness 
following Nilsen,” Berg writes (Berg, 2005, p. 105). This time his back pain seems even 
worse. He hobbles around with his face wreathed in pain. “You are acting well today,” Berg 
silently resonates (Berg, 2005, p. 105). When the patient is finally seated in the examination 
room, his hair is wet from sweat, and his face and neck are flushed. Once again he 
complains about his “damn back.”  
I look at him, and suddenly it is as if I see past him, that his face in a way becomes 
transparent. I perceive a lived life. I think of his childhood; maybe he was not 
wanted when he arrived in this world. Maybe nobody had showed him how valuable 
he was, given him courage and a joy for life. … Suddenly, I perceive a human being 
thrown into the world without having asked for it. Like we all are. … I feel hit by a 
consciousness of how vulnerable we are as human beings. … In a short second this 
stands for me as an appeal, as a cry from time immemorial: Do you see me? Do you 
hear me? Without a reply we cannot live. (Berg, 2005, pp. 106–107)43
                                                                                                                                                                            
Berg describes how the man’s unsympathetic traits are brushed aside, and how she relates 
herself to a lived life, a person, a human being. For the first time the patient has eye contact 
with her, and he cries. Then it is silent for a long time before he tells her that on the 

43 “Jeg ser på ham—og med ett er det som jeg ser forbi ham, at ansiktet på en måte blir transparent. Jeg 
fornemmer et levd liv. Jeg får tanker om at han kanskje ikke var ønsket da han kom til verden. Kanskje hadde 
ingen vist ham hvor verdifull han var, gitt ham livsmot og livsglede. … Med ett aner jeg et menneske, kastet 
inn i verden uten å ha bedt om det selv. Som vi alle. … Jeg føler meg truffet av en bevissthet om hvor sårbare 
vi mennesker er, … I et lite sekund står dette for meg som en bønn, et rop fra uminnelige tider: Ser du meg? 
Hører du meg? Uten gjensvar kan vi ikke leve” (Berg, 2005, pp. 106-107). 
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previous weekend he beat up and almost killed his girlfriend, with whom he had been 
living. He now lives alone; his now ex-girlfriend owns the apartment, and he has lost his job 
because of alcohol. And his aching back torments him. Berg reflects on the radical change 
that she experiences in her meeting with the patient. “To like or not like, that is not what it 
is about for me this day,” she writes. “I am taken by surprise by something I cannot put in 
words” (Berg, 2005, p. 107). She puzzles, “how could I be so moved by this patient, whom 
I have tried to avoid for years?” (Berg, 2005, p. 108). 
What Berg offers here is a description of how perception may open the way for a more 
comprehensive understanding of the patient. As Martinsen would express it: By being 
perceptually open in meeting with this patient, the perception is condensed to an 
impression, which again is expressed in tone and gesture toward the patient. Berg is “in the 
situation with her whole strength in order to express the impression” (Martinsen, 2003b, p. 
139), and through this she gains new knowledge regarding the patient and his condition. 
This kind of knowledge is different from the conceptual knowledge she usually relies on in 
dealing with patients’ aching backs, which is to focus on whether the pain relies on muscle 
tension, or nerve compression, or some kind of internal pathology. According to the 
biomedical model we trace different differential diagnostic paths in order to find the right 
diagnostic category. Following the biopsychosocial model, we might also consider possible 
psychological or social factors. However, the insight Berg gains in this new perception of 
the patient is of a different kind than just reflecting over possible causes of the patient’s 
pains. Entering into “the perceiving range of life,” Berg describes how she is struck by the 
patient and the situation he is in, regardless of her previous dislike of him. She receives an 
impression from the patient, and reacts to it by looking into his eyes for the first time. As 
Martinsen points out, we may express our impressions by a “good gaze,” or a warm tone, or 
by careful hands. And this expression of care establishes a new contact between Berg and 
the patient: They have eye contact for the first time, and the patient reveals additional useful 
information about his situation.  
4.2.3 An ambivalent eye?
 Of course it is not always that simple to either perceive or record in meetings with patients. 
If we return to the movie Wit and the scene between Dr. Jason Posner and his patient Vivian 
Bearing, we sense an ambivalence in Dr. Posner’s behavior when Vivian addresses him in a 
personal way. He hesitates, he seems a little confused, before he continues with his 
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schemes, his phrases, and his tests. Even though he is practiced at the recording gaze, he 
seems to be uncertain when confronted with his patient’s more personal request. “It is 
difficult to be recording only,” says Martinsen (2006, p. 83). She relates this difficulty to the 
behavior of the Priest and the Levite in the story of the Good Samaritan. Before they 
retreated to the safety of the recording gaze, a struggle may have taken place in them, she 
suggests. She refers to the Danish translation of the Bible, where it is written that both the 
Priest and the Levite saw the man and “went around.” The suffering of the half dead man 
must in some way or other have moved them, as they walked around and not right past: “It 
thus seems to have been a struggle in their eyes between seeing participatingly and seeing 
recordingly, and that it is difficult to be recording only” (Martinsen, 2006, p. 83). Such a 
struggle we may also perceive in the eyes of Dr. Jason Posner in the scene where he finishes 
his first pelvic examination of Vivian Bearing. It is obvious that he is overwhelmed by what 
he has found in the examination; he seems excited, worried, and uncertain at the same time. 
However, instead of approaching the patient in pain, he quickly leaves the room. May this 
sort of incoherent behavior represent an expression of a struggle inside him between 
perceiving and recording, between seeing the patient with her pelvis full of tumorous 
masses recordingly, and seeing her with perceiving eyes, thus facing her serious condition 
and the fact that she will soon die?  
From where may this ambivalent struggle originate? So far, I have pointed to the underlying 
attitude of “weg damit” in today’s medicine and the process of recording, as representing 
possible obstacles for caring in medicine. In the next section I will address this ambivalence 
in connection with the model of the moral actor in medicine and medical ethics, and the 
way that care is traditionally conceived of in medicine. 
4.3 The moral agent in medical ethics: Autonomous and alone? 
Based on my work so far, I suggest that medicine and medical ethics conceive of the moral 
agent as being a detached and separate self (Martinsen, E. H., 2011b). To substantiate this 
claim, I will elaborate further on how this ideal of the moral agent may be traced in some of 
the ethical discourse in medicine. Here I rely on Jodi Halpern and her analysis of what she 
denotes as the modern ideal of detachment in medicine (Halpern, 2001), and I draw as well 
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on the care critiques of autonomy (Verkerk, 2001; MacKenzie & Stoljar, 2000; Donchin, 
2000, 2001). 
Halpern sees the ideal of detachment as originating from the development and cultivation of 
the tradition of detached concern and objectivity in medicine, represented by scholars like 
Howard Lief and Reneè Fox (1963), Charles Aring (1958), and Herrman L. Blumgart 
(1964). Lief and Fox first introduced the term of “detached concern” in a study, where they 
describe the program or process that medical students are taught to go through in order to 
detach themselves from emotional involvement with patients (Lief & Fox, 1963). They 
argue that detached concern and empathy are, in fact, synergistic, and that the physician is 
better able to be empathic when he suppresses or avoids emotional involvement with 
patients. In another study, Charles Aring (1958) proposes a conception of empathy that is 
detached from sympathy. In his view, what is at stake for the physician is to avoid 
becoming incapacitated by the problems arising from a patient’s emotional state. On the 
contrary, the physician must remain separate from these problems to be effective in treating 
the patient. Blumgart (1964) proposes what he calls “neutral empathy,” in which 
detachment and cognitive skills are considered mandatory to understand a patient’s 
emotional state. The development of emotionally detached concern may also be a response 
or reaction to the value of sympathy in medicine, as suggested in the works of Worthington 
Hooker (Halpern, 2001; Marcum, 2008). At the beginning of the 20th century, to be 
sympathetic was considered to be unscientific, and “emotionally detached concern was 
heralded as a critical component of medicine’s social structure, especially in terms of the 
patient-physician relationship” (Marcum, 2008, p. 260). The two main assumptions of 
detached concern in medicine are thus objectivity and neutrality, toward the patients’ 
emotions as well as toward one’s own emotional state as a physician. 
The importance of maintaining a neutral emotional state as a physician was also emphasized 
by Sir William Osler. Osler is well known for his humanistic and caring approaches toward 
patients. At the same time, he elaborates on the virtues of imperturbability and equanimity, 
presenting an ideal of the physician as cool, maintaining presence of mind “under all 
circumstances.” The first virtue is imperturbability, which refers to “coolness and presence 
of mind under all circumstances, calmness amid storm, clearness of judgment in moments 
of grave peril” (Osler, 2010, p. 2). Such poker-faced composure, Osler claims, is essential to 
instill confidence in impressionable or frightened patients. An important companion to 
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imperturbability is equanimity. Equanimity, or “aequanimitas” in Latin (a word derived 
from aequo animo, “with even mind,”), represents the mental equivalent of 
imperturbability, an ideal state of the physician, representing objectivity in the interaction 
with patients even when it comes to the patients’ emotions. To reach the state of 
equanimity, the physician must detach from his own emotional response to the patient, 
including bodily emotions and reactions; this is important in order to be able to “see into” 
the patient’s “inner life.” Thus Osler extends the ideal of “objectivity,” which had already 
shown its utility in the understanding of disease processes, to physicians’ observations of 
patients’ emotional lives (Halpern, 2001). To get access to the patient’s emotional life, he 
encourages us to see with an eye detached from our own emotions. This element of 
equanimity has been the subject of some debate among Osler scholars: While some have 
interpreted it as apathy, as the absence of emotions, others have read it as “metriopatheia,” 
measured or moderated emotions (Sokol, 2007).  
In his plea for detachment, both physiologically, as expressed by the virtue of 
imperturbability, as well as emotionally and mentally through the virtue of equanimity, 
Osler reinforces an ideal in medicine of the neutral physician’s perspective, being “free of 
bias, that is, free of his situatedness” (Halpern, 2001, p. 23). In a recent edition of Principles 
of Biomedical Ethics by Beauchamp and Childress (2009), the importance of cultivating 
detachment alongside compassion in the education of health care personnel is also 
emphasized: “The language of detached concern and compassionate detachment
appropriately appears in health care ethics expressly to identify a complex characteristic of 
the good physician or good nurse” (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009, p. 40).  
The assumption that the physician needs to be “free of his situatedness” to be able to 
objectively obtain access to the emotional lives of patients provides us with some further 
clues to understanding the moral self in medicine. In following the ideal of detached 
concern and equanimity, the physician must endeavor to remain separate from personal, 
situational, and relational clues when interacting with patients. Consequently, in a model of 
detached concern, patients and professionals remain two “separate parties” (More, 1994), 
emerging as separate selves.  
The understanding of the agent as a separate self also needs to be discussed in relation to the 
prominent role attributed to autonomy in medicine, and may be considered as a possible 
“adverse effect” of the current emphasis on autonomy in medicine and medical ethics. 
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Respect for patient autonomy has been the cornerstone of medical ethics for several 
decades, thus “liberating the self” from paternalistic medical structures (Solbakk, 2011), and 
it came into medicine primarily as protection against abuse in the name of science. In the 
aftermath of World War II and the disclosure of human exploitation in medical 
experimentation, there was a call for greater protection of research participants, and the 
Nuremberg Code of 1947 declared that the voluntary consent of the human subject is 
absolutely essential. The idea of patient autonomy was also carried over to clinical 
medicine, and subsequently developed as a response and a correction to the practice of 
medical paternalism, where physicians “knew best” and often treated patients without the 
patients’ knowledge about and consent to what was happening. The word autonomy is 
derived from the Greek autos (“self”) and nomos (“rule,” “governance,” or “law”). Personal 
autonomy encompasses, at a minimum, “self-rule that is free from both controlling 
interference by others and from certain limitations such as an inadequate understanding that 
prevents meaningful choice” (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009, p. 99). Virtually all theories 
of autonomy incorporate the two conditions of liberty (independence from controlling 
influences) and agency (capacity for intentional action) as essential.  
One of the most influential theoretical frameworks in (bio)medical ethics is the four 
principles approach of Beauchamp and Childress (2009). Their formulation of the principle 
of autonomy as respecting autonomous choice, and the specification of it in the form of 
informed consent, has had a great impact within academic medical ethics, medical 
education, and clinical practice. The principal mechanism for respecting and safeguarding 
patient autonomy in clinical settings is the process of informed consent, whereby the 
competent patient agrees to a proposed therapy after having received clear and adequate 
information. The patient’s decision is supposed to be made voluntarily, free of external 
coercion or distraction. For this reason, the discussion regarding autonomy, or self-
determination, often focuses on two dimensions: the decisional capacity of the patient and 
freedom from external coercion. 
Jodi Halpern describes how physicians, in order to respect patient autonomy and the 
patient’s right to freedom from external coercion, may be guided by a norm of negative 
autonomy, which is understood as “constraint from interfering with a patient’s self-
determination” (Halpern, 2001, p. 102). Autonomy may thereby be interpreted in a negative 
sense, understood as freedom from interference. Beauchamp and Childress refer in this 
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connection to autonomy as a negative obligation: “Autonomous actions should not be 
subjected to controlling constraints by others” (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009, p. 104). A 
practical consequence for medicine of such an understanding of autonomy may be that 
patients risk being left alone when they have to deal with difficult decisions. That is, the 
fear of interfering or of representing a controlling constraint on the patient may be perceived 
as greater by the physician than the danger of leaving the patient alone. In such a climate we 
can trace the idea of an independent, separate self that is free from constraints from others’ 
interference and connectedness: We can trace the idea of a self that is autonomous and 
alone. The traditional ideals of autonomy thus give normative primacy to independence, 
self-sufficiency, and separation from others, at the expense of a recognition of the value of 
relations of dependency and interconnection (MacKenzie & Stoljar, 2000). In response to 
this, both feminist ethicists and care ethicists have criticized the idea of autonomy as 
neglectful and as lacking an appreciation of the social and relational basis of human agency 
and health values:  
Western philosophy, ever since the Cartesian turn, has been captivated by a 
paradigm of personal agency that incorporates two dubious assumptions: that 
individuals are isolated ahistorical monads and that the choices available to them are 
extracted from a fixed and immutable set of options. According to the conception of 
personal autonomy implicit in this model of agency, individuals are separated from 
one another by sharp boundaries that can be justifiably breached only by the consent 
of self-determining subjects. This contract-like picture of human relations has come 
under increasing scrutiny in recent years, but it still operates as the leading 
paradigm structuring professional-client relations, particularly between healthcare 
providers and patients. (Donchin, 2000, pp. 187–188, my italics)  
Versions of feminist ethics and care ethics have sought to revise this individualistic and 
atomistic conception of autonomy through the conception of relational autonomy that 
centers on the conviction that persons are socially embedded and that agents’ identities are 
formed within the context of social relationships (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000; Donchin, 
2001; Verkerk, 2001; Sherwin & Winsby, 2010). The care critique of autonomy thus points 
to how the idea of a self as free and independent may have led to the values of trust, care, 
and responsibility being neglected in moral discourse. These critics argue that we instead 
should promote the ideal of interdependency and reciprocity, where the individual’s 
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autonomy cannot be viewed in isolation from other people but must be viewed in relation to 
others (Verkerk, 2001).  
From this we see how an understanding of autonomy as freedom from interference conflicts 
with the moral injunction of care ethics of “not turning away from someone in need” and 
may lead to situations in medicine where patients are left too much to themselves when 
facing difficult situations. Halpern recognizes this tendency as she points to how seeing 
autonomy as freedom from interference may lead to a practice in which physicians tend to 
leave patients alone, often without social supports, to face difficult medical decisions 
(Halpern, 2001). According to the care critique of autonomy, the danger of abandoning 
people, thus possibly inflicting relational harm in order to respect autonomy, represents an 
important objection to the overall dominance or overemphasis on autonomy in Western 
ethics (Verkerk, 2001). This is a critique that is seldom focused on in medical ethics.
I have previously pointed out that one implication of the relational ontology of an ethics of 
care is an accentuation of features different than those most salient in ethical theories that 
conceive of the self as free and separate from others. The possibility of relational harm, as 
well as agents’ vulnerability and dependency, are important implications of a relational 
ontology. That these differences in the understanding of the moral agent may lead to 
different attitudes and practices in relation to care seems obvious. This is one of the reasons 
I consider the underlying understanding of the moral agent as “autonomous and alone” in 
medicine and medical ethics to represent an additional reason for medicine’s ambivalence 
toward care.   
Another reason, which I will elaborate upon below, may be in the way care has traditionally 
been conceived of in medicine. In the following section I trace care in medicine, focusing 
on its understanding of care in terms of the virtue of compassion, as well as in terms of its 
ideal of beneficence.44

44 There are of course other areas that should have been elucidated in relation to this aim of tracing medical 
expressions of care, and among them is the empathy discourse in medicine, as well as the notion of medicine 
as an art. In this thesis these two areas are treated only briefly. However, the understanding of empathy in 
medicine and the characterization of medicine as an art represent interesting areas for further research in order 
to develop and further refine a care perspective in medicine. 
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4.4 The medical man of virtue
By motivating the sensitivities of individual medical practitioners, both sympathy and 
compassion have exerted a strong influence on caring for the sick in times past. Codes and 
oaths throughout the ages have exhorted us to care for the sick from motives of compassion 
and sympathy (Reich, 1995b). We may follow the tradition of sympathy in medicine back to 
the Hippocratic period, when the physician’s capacity to heal sufferers was conceived of as 
deriving from a specific philia that the physician developed for the patient (Halpern, 2001). 
John Gregory (1724–1773) spoke of “the sensibility of heart that makes us feel for the sick 
and arouses in us the desire to relieve their distresses” (Reich, 1995b, p. 332), and 
Worthington Hooker claimed in 1849 that the physician influences patients therapeutically 
by interacting emotionally with them (Halpern, 2001).  
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, however, there was a shift in attitudes toward 
caring in health care. This shift may be related to the rise of allopathic medicine and its 
emphasis on the natural sciences, as well as to medical advances like the development of 
anesthetics, the discovery of micro organisms, and the development of antibiotics and 
insulin (Howell, 2001). These changes led the physician away from the patient’s bedside 
and into the laboratory or the operating theater, and humanistically oriented “caring for” 
was pushed to the periphery of medicine for the benefit of an ethic of competence, and an 
attitude of “taking care of” (Reich, 1995b). The “caring for” received an impetus, though, 
during the 1920s, first and foremost through the work of the physician Francis Peabody. 
Peabody wrote an essay about the nature of care in medicine, arguing in favor of “caring 
for” the patient as essential to the practice of medicine, as a response to the fast-developing 
technical art of medicine (Peabody, 1927; Marcum, 2011). Peabody argues that physicians 
must not know only about disease mechanisms. It is equally important that the physician 
also know what the disease means to patients in terms of their illness experience and life 
story. Here Peabody argues in line with von Weizsäcker and his call for a medicine that also 
teaches the ill person. It is interesting that they wrote their articles just one year apart: 
Peabody published his article in 1927, and von Weizsäcker wrote his essay “Der Arzt und 
der Kranke” in 1926. Following Peabody’s plea for care, there have been scattered 
contributions advocating a caring perspective in professional attitudes, practices, and moral 
analysis of medicine (Menninger, 1975; Benfield, 1979). Among the most influential are the 
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works of Edmund D. Pellegrino and David C. Thomasma on medical virtues and 
beneficence in medicine (Pellegrino & Thomasma, 1988, 1993).  
4.4.1 Care as a virtue of compassion? 
Pellegrino and Thomasma’s interest in virtue ethics stems from a desire to enrich principle-
based ethics, pointing among other things to how this form of ethics fails to take into 
sufficient account the character of the agent (Pellegrino & Thomasma, 1993). According to 
Pellegrino and Thomasma, virtue is an irreducible element in medical ethics, and they opt 
for the classical definitions by Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas when it comes to defining the 
concept.45 In their analyses of the virtues of medical practice, Pellegrino and Thomasma 
discuss fidelity to trust, phronesis, justice, fortitude, temperance, integrity, and self-
effacement, as well as compassion (Pellegrino & Thomasma, 1993). Here I will focus only 
on the virtue of compassion because of its relevance to care. Pellegrino and Thomasma 
understand compassion as a moral virtue in the classical sense of the word, that is, as “a 
habitual disposition, to act in a certain way” (Pellegrino & Thomasma, 1993, p. 79), and 
they connect it to what they call the “caring bond,” which includes healing, caring, and 
curing. “Compassion is the character trait that shapes the cognitive aspect of healing to fit 
the unique predicament of this patient” (Pellegrino & Thomasma, 1993, p. 79). According 
to Pellegrino and Thomasma, compassion is an essential virtue of medical practice. They 
point to how the call for compassion in medicine and health care goes directly to their own 
central concern, “the character of the physician” (Pellegrino & Thomasma, 1993, p. 19). 
The very etymology of the term strongly suggests the idea of co-suffering: “To be 
compassionate is to be disposed to see, as well as feel, what a trial, tribulation, or illness has 
wrought in the life of this person’s here-and-now suffering” (Pellegrino & Thomasma, 
1993, p. 80). They see compassion as a compound of affect, attitude, word, gesture, and 
language, but they also conceive of compassion as a virtue in the classical sense, which 
means that it includes both a moral and an intellectual component. It is also related to 
emotional states. Where the moral aspect of compassion relates to the fact that compassion 
may be indispensable to attaining the end of medicine, which is to heal, help, and cure, the 
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45 Aristotle defines virtue as a “state of character” that “brings into good condition the thing of which it is the 
excellence and makes the work of that thing to be done well” (Aristotle cited in Pellegrino and Thomasma, 
1993, p. 5). In equating virtue with character, Aristotle was being faithful to the Greek meaning of the word 
ethikè, which means “character” (Pellegrino and Thomasma, 1993).
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intellectual aspect relates to a disposition to comprehend, assess, and weigh the patient’s 
predicament in relation to the end of healing, helping, and curing.
Pellegrino and Thomasma distinguish compassion from empathy, mercy, sympathy, and 
pity, even though these affective states may be more or less closely related. Compassion 
focuses on co-experiencing another’s suffering; “it includes an ability to objectify what 
another person is feeling in symbolic form, that is, in our speech, our body language, and in 
our participation in the ‘story’ of the other’s illness” (Pellegrino and Thomasma, 1993, p. 
82).  
4.4.2 Care as beneficence? 
Beneficence applies to the practice of good deeds, and, understood as a principle, 
beneficence has marked the ethical codes of physicians since antiquity. As a principle that 
guides decisions, it should be distinguished from the virtue of benevolence, or kindly 
feeling, that motivates actors. In medical ethics beneficence is part of the four-principles 
approach of Beauchamp and Childress. They use the term to cover beneficent action more 
broadly, so that it “includes all forms of action intended to benefit other persons” 
(Beauchamp & Childress, 2009, p. 197). This implies an active contribution to the welfare 
of others; agents must take positive steps to help others, not merely refrain from harmful 
acts. For Beauchamp and Childress there are two aspects of beneficence: positive 
beneficence that requires agents to provide benefits to others, and utility that implies a 
balancing of benefits, risks, and costs (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009). They furthermore 
distinguish between obligatory beneficence and ideal beneficence, and point in this 
connection to the parable of the Good Samaritan: “Common interpretations of the parable 
suggest that positive beneficence is more an ideal than an obligation, because the 
Samaritan’s act seems to exceed ordinary morality” (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009, p. 
198). They refer to the consciousness of limit that is inherent in the common morality in 
relation to beneficent acts: “Virtually everyone agrees that the common morality does not 
contain a principle of beneficence that requires severe sacrifice and extreme altruism” 
(Beauchamp & Childress, 2009, p. 198). And they continue: “Everyone agrees that only 
ideals of beneficence incorporate such extreme generosity. Likewise, we are not morally 
required to benefit persons on all occasions, even if we are in positions to do so” 
(Beauchamp & Childress, 2009, p. 198). We see from this that beneficent conduct in the 
generous sense of the word constitutes an ideal rather than obligation. Beauchamp and 
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Childress refer here to common morality as a source for limiting the scope of beneficence in 
order not to end in self sacrifice and extreme altruism.  
Pellegrino and Thomasma present a different approach to beneficence in medicine and 
medical ethics, one in which they aim to redefine, and refine, the notion of beneficence as a 
reaction to the two major ethical theories that are “vying for dominance in medical ethics,” 
namely, the deontological and the utilitarian approaches (Pellegrino & Thomasma, 1988, p. 
3).46 They argue that such a “third theory” based on beneficence and virtue in contrast to the 
prevailing focus on principles is more appropriate to the special context of the medical 
encounter today. In their book they contend that beneficence remains the central moral 
principle in the ethics of medicine. It entails more than the negative principle of primum non 
nocere, including positive enhancement of the components packed into the notion of the 
patient’s good. Patients seek not only to be protected from harm, they argue, but also “to be 
healed and to have health restored or improved, pain and anxiety relieved, disability 
lessened” (Pellegrino & Thomasma, 1988, pp. vii–viii). Central to their understanding of 
beneficence is the notion of “the patient’s good,” and in this connection they highlight the 
process of healing and the healing relationship between patient and physician, defining the 
end of medicine as a right and good healing action for each particular patient.  
4.4.3 A gentleman’s care?
Care in medicine is thus related to the altruistic virtue of compassion and the principle of 
beneficence. So, why bother with introducing care and care ethics into medicine, instead of 
focusing on compassion or beneficence? What may a care perspective add to medicine? I 
indicate some possible advantages in paper 2, where I point to how the traditional 
understanding of care in medicine, seeing care as a virtue or as a principle of beneficence, 
misses important dimensions of care emphasized by “modern” care ethics, especially its 
relational understanding of care. In the following section I further enlarge upon this claim.  
One objection to the potential of the principle of beneficence for encompassing care relates 
to its utilitarian and deontological heritage. An injunction to produce the maximum good 
runs the risk of harming a minority for the sake of benefiting the majority. So the principle 

46
Pellegrino and Thomasma wrote this book in 1988. Since then the field of medical ethics has evolved to 
included a broader range of ethical perspectives, like casuistry, narrative ethics, the virtue ethics that 
Pellegrino and Thomasma themselves proposed, and also subsequent elaborations of an ethics of care.  
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of beneficence may be incompatible with an understanding of care and an ethics of care 
(Pettersen, 2008). Furthermore, because of that same utilitarian and deontological heritage, 
the principle of beneficence may have a tendency to promote an ideal of disinterested 
beneficent deliberation and action (Churchill, 1995). Such an ideal of disinterested 
beneficence differs from the basic requirements of care, of being connected, engaged, and 
present in the relation. It may also be argued that whereas a principle of beneficence 
identifies promoting the patient’s good as a requirement for right action, an ethics of care 
also suggests a feeling response directed to the object of care, as well as a personal 
commitment to the patient (Reich, 1995b).  
If we go to the work of Pellegrino and Thomasma, their emphasis on the healing 
relationship and the process of healing may be compatible with a care orientation’s 
emphasis on relation and on responsiveness to particular others (Sharpe, 1992). However, 
operating as they do within a framework of virtue ethics, they tend to concentrate on the 
disposition of the physician to act in a compassionate, caring way, instead of taking the 
healing relationship as their main point of departure. They do speak of the healing 
relationship; however, in their account of the virtue of compassion they do not focus on this 
relationship with its inherent practices, competencies, or potentials for harm, but rather 
highlight the moral, cognitive, and emotional aspects of the virtue in sole relation to the 
physician as an agent. Thus, they tend to define the relationship in terms of the physician’s 
character, dispositions, and competencies. Besides, in their account of the virtue of the 
physician and the end of medicine, they say little about the processes in between, or the 
relation between physician and patient. Instead of trying to comprehend what goes on in this 
healing practice, thus exploring the relation between the physician and the patient, they 
highlight the physician’s abilities and competencies. These two ways of approaching the 
relationship between physicians and patients thus reflect an important difference between an 
ethics of care and virtue ethics.  
Virginia Held warns against seeing compassion and caring as similar: “the caring promoted 
by the ethics of care is quite far from compassion,” says Held (2006, p. 34), thus denying 
that care is an altruistic disposition of individual and psychological motivations. “This 
misses the heart of what goes on in practices of caring and misses what is of most value in 
them, which is that they are caring relations” (Held, 2006, p. 35). Held is one of the critics 
of seeing care as entirely or primarily a matter of motive or virtue. In seeing care simply as 
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a virtue, we miss a central feature of care, namely, “its evaluations of and recommendations 
concerning relations between persons,” says Held (2006, p. 52). Where virtue theory 
focuses on the individual and her/his dispositions, care ethics focuses on relations between 
persons. To be a caring person requires more than the right motives and dispositions toward 
others: “It requires the ability to engage in the practice of care, and the exercise of this 
ability” (Held, 2006, p. 51). 
The understanding of virtue suggested by Held may be questioned, though. Virtues may be 
conceived of as relational in nature, comprising character traits that are admirable to others 
for a variety of reasons, including the extent to which those virtues produce good outcomes 
for others. That is, to seek to be virtuous is not to be concerned with oneself alone and with 
one’s own state of virtue; one is not virtuous for the sake of one’s self, but for the sake of 
others who are benefited by one’s virtue.47 In spite of this, I find the argument of Held to be 
of value as we ask whether care may be conceived of as a virtue in medicine and medical 
ethics.48 That is, even though a careful analysis of a given virtue may reveal some 
relationality, I do not share the view that emphasizing care as a virtue is able to capture the 
full depth of the relational dimension of care, and certainly not in medicine, where the ideal 
of detachment and non-interference has been dominant. By arguing that physicians should 
remain detached and “free of situatedness” in meeting with their patients, we miss important 
prerequisites for caring in the first place. Furthermore, focusing on the individual 
characteristics or attributes of the physician, and on their possible implications for the 
patient, may contribute to maintaining, rather than challenging, the ideal of a detached, 
separate self. In my view, part of the ambivalence that is to be found toward care in 
medicine today is due to this “gentleman’s-care” notion of care, of viewing care as a virtue 
of the detached and emotionally equable physician. By using the expression “gentleman’s 
care” I intend to suggest a kind of care void of the relational “in between,” where the carer 
may be conceived of as distant and polite rather than present in the relationship. I have 
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47 I thank Stan van Hooft, who reviewed an early draft of some parts of this work, for this comment.
48 Whereas Held does not approve of care ethics being associated with virtue ethics, others argue for 
categorizing care ethics as a species of virtue ethics, with care as a central virtue (Tong, 1998; Halwani, 2003; 
Curzer, 1993, 2002; Slote, 2007). Nursing theorist Patricia Benner argues in favor of a dialogue between care 
ethics and virtue ethics (Benner, 1997). Benner highlights the need to articulate and attend to the moral art of 
attentiveness and caring relationships in health care practices, which may protect patients in their vulnerability 
while fostering growth and limiting vulnerability. “This calls for bringing caring practices in from the margins 
of our thinking about practice and combining care and virtue ethics,” Benner (1997, p. 59) argues. 



difficulty seeing the relational qualities of a physician caring for a patient being fully 
present in the relation if at the same time the physician is striving for emotional and 
physical detachment. What is it to care for a patient, anyway, if we at the same time aim for 
separation, detachment, and non-interference? By losing the relational qualities of care, we 
also risk losing our curiosity about the patient, and we risk becoming preoccupied with our 
own agenda, driven by the recording eye, thus losing sight of the patient even though we are 
courteous and friendly during the consultation.  
Held points to the fact that virtue theory has until very recently not paid much attention to 
the practices of caring in which women have been so heavily engaged: “The traditional Man 
of Virtue may be almost as haunted by his patriarchal past as the Man of Reason. The work 
of care has certainly not been among the virtuous activities to which he has adequately 
attended” (Held, 2006, p. 20). I find this argument particularly relevant to the fields of 
medicine and medical ethics, in which the allied dichotomies of male/female, 
physician/nurse, curing/caring have been dominant, and in which the care work, for the 
most part, has been done by nurses. Furthermore, I believe it is appropriate to ask whether 
the understanding of care in medicine may have been influenced by the patriarchal heritage 
of “the medical Man of Virtue.” The history of medicine is full of examples of excellent 
clinicians, proficient medical doctors who managed as well to be “clinical artists” caring for 
their patients. Often when authors or practitioners are trying to embody the notion of the art 
of medicine, they draw on examples or anecdotes of excellent and extraordinary (male) 
physicians (Colgan, 2009), thus reinforcing this picture of the medical Man of Virtue. In the 
new situation of medicine today, when an increasing share of the physicians are female, I 
welcome a perspective on care that also draws on perspectives from feminism and nursing. 
To sum up, I have argued that understanding care as a virtue of compassion in medicine, 
combined with the ideal of a separate and detached self, may create an ambivalence toward 
care and serve as a possible obstacle to caring. Caring is impaired by the underlying demand 
of staying detached and separate from the patient, constituting what I denote as a 
“gentleman’s” kind of care. That is, when the relational “in between” is not in focus, the 
ability to reach out toward the patient may be reduced or lost. Likewise, both the pervading 
attitude of “weg damit” in medicine, as well as its recording gaze, may contribute to 
inhibiting care and caring activities. So we have a situation in medicine and medical ethics 
where underlying structures related to the understanding of care as an attribute of the 
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emotionally detached and separate moral agent may contribute to impairing the actual 
exercise of care.  
As a remedy, I suggest that medicine and medical ethics may profit from incorporating the 
theoretical insights from an ethics of care to a greater extent than is the case today. This 
involves both a relational understanding of care and a relational understanding of moral 
agency. Even though I do not fully engage with the question of whether care ethics should 
be associated with virtue ethics or not, I nevertheless point to the need for understanding 
care as something more than a character trait and a disposition to act. In doing so I make use 
of the situation in medicine and medical ethics with their emphasis on detachment and 
autonomy as an example for why care needs to be conceived of as something more than a 
virtue in order to obtain its purpose of “reaching out to something other than the self,” as 
well as leading to some type of action (Tronto, 1993, p. 102).
4.5 Final discussion
4.5.1 Just a question of etiquette? 
Some scholars question the need of care in medicine in the first place, asking if patients 
might be satisfied with a physician who is simply well behaved (Kahn, 2008; Hem, 2009). 
Is it really necessary for physicians to care? Would it not be sufficient that physicians treat 
the patient with good manners? From his own experience of being hospitalized, psychiatrist 
Michael W. Kahn realizes that for him as a patient it did not matter so much whether the 
physician was caring as long as he operated in a professional and courteous way. This 
experience leads Kahn to believe that medical education and postgraduate training should 
place more emphasis on the etiquette-based aspects of medicine rather than attempting to 
foster care and compassion in clinicians (Kahn, 2008).  
However, from my previous analysis of the ethical challenge of harm in the absence of care 
in the medical encounter, in meeting a patient with courtesy but without approaching the 
patient’s existential and emotional burden connected to the disease and to the state of being 
ill—to see the patient without seeing—the physician may add injury to the patient’s 
situation. Kari Milch Agledahl points to such a tendency in her empirical research, 
describing how patients’ personal worries were systematically ignored by the physicians, 
and how the physicians in the course of helping their patients through their biomedical 
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knowledge of anatomy and bodily processes actually ended up treating their patients as 
objects. Agledahl furthermore illustrates how the doctors, who often used an appropriate 
tone in the consultation, did not appear to recognize their concurrent moral offense. Based 
on her research, Agledahl suggests that moral infringements like these might be 
unavoidable in medical work, but that doctors, nonetheless, ought to be aware of the distress 
they cause and think about how they can reduce it (Agledahl, 2011). 
I agree that such infringements might be difficult to eliminate completely in medical 
practice, and that being able to capture the patient’s burdens or needs may be hard to attain 
during a single consultation. Nevertheless, it should be a central ambition for medical 
practitioners to diminish such infringements. In my view, the moral offenses that Agledahl 
here identifies breach the moral injunction of not turning away from someone in need. That 
is, by not recognizing or relating to the patient’s existential burdens, the physicians inflict 
harm on the patient; they turn away from the patient’s need. A possible solution to this 
ethical challenge in medicine will not be training in etiquette and good manners by way of 
checklists and simple rules for communication, but rather aiming for an increased 
understanding of the ethical significance of the relational processes between physician and 
patient, with a goal to expand the repertoire that physicians inherit for handling this kind of 
situation in medicine. It is essential that the ethical framework that physicians rely on in 
their medical work be analytically equipped to deal with questions related to the ethical 
challenges of preventing relational harm. 
It is not that I envision a situation where physicians’ work consists entirely of situations like 
these. As I have previously argued in connection with the critique of Kari Martinsen, most 
of the patients a physician deals with during the day require no more than “ordinary” 
medical care. However, some patients carry heavy burdens, and in order to avoid the 
infliction of harm on these patients, it is important, as I see it, that physicians be able to 
recognize the needs of these patients and to act accordingly.  
Even though I do not agree with Kahn’s conclusion, his article points to an important part of 
the task of exploring care in medicine, that of investigating the patients’ experiences in 
relation to whether a physician is caring or not. This is an empirical research question in 
need of further research.  
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4.5.2 The caring doctor—an oxymoron?
Some opponents of care in medicine claim that caring interferes with the doctor’s ability to 
process information in order to reach a decision. Caring inhibits the doctor from doing her 
real job, which, according to one author, is to reach a decision and act by initiating some 
kind of medical activity. It impairs the intellectual and impedes the most important part of 
being a doctor: “knowing what is wrong with patients” (Mackenzie, 1997, p. 687). As 
expressed by Graeme M. Mackenzie: 
I have recently decided that being a doctor is a lot less about being caring and a lot 
more about the hard headed organisation of information with a view to making a 
decision. Overegging the caring pudding of general practice interferes with the 
process of decision making, with inherent dangers that the wrong decision is made 
or perhaps the more likely outcome that no decision is made. (Mackenzie, 1997, p. 
687) 
I think this author is wrong in two respects: 
1. That caring inhibits or interferes with the organization of information and the 
process of decision making, and that caring and “knowing what is wrong with 
patients” are contradictory. 
2. That the doctor’s success is equivalent to reaching a decision and initiating action.   
In this thesis I have aimed at illustrating what I have termed the epistemic potential of care: 
that the display of a perceiving eye contribute to enhancing the diagnostic process by 
facilitating the physician’s ability to capture important diagnostic clues in the patient. The 
idea that caring interferes with proper medical treatment is a frequent objection (Curzer, 
1993). In choosing between a caring doctor and a doctor saving your life, everyone chooses 
the lifesaver. But to put the problem in this way represents an oversimplification of the 
situation. As we have seen from my analysis, care is not equivalent to merely feeling sorry 
without initiating proper action. On the contrary, care is characterized as practical action 
and as work. A physician who holds your hand and soothes you instead of initiating the 
treatment necessary for your heart attack does not provide proper care. To be caring instead 
of initiating a proper medical treatment is not consistent with good caring, but is more like 
what Martinsen calls sentimental care (Martinsen, 2003a, 2003b).  
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My second objection to Dr. Mackenzie relates to his assumption that the doctor’s main task 
is to know what is wrong with the patient, to reach a decision, and to initiate action. Seen in 
the light of what I have previously written about the “weg damit” attitude in medicine and 
its imperative of action, Mackenzie also seems to be subject to these imperatives. Further, 
just striving for an ideal of making diagnoses and decisions may generate disappointments 
and disillusion among physicians, as well as among the patients. Often the doctor does not 
know what is wrong, and the most appropriate thing to do may be to wait and see. Such an 
approach in this situation may express the attitude of reserve and receptivity that Martinsen 
advocates, and contribute to improving our sensitivity toward the patient. Sometimes a 
consultation may profit from a more reserved attitude on the part of the doctor, withholding 
interventions of medicine, referrals to specialists, offers of sick leave. We are trained to act 
and to initiate some kind of intervention, but in some situations that may instead just add 
insult to injury. Hence, to initiate action may not always be the best way to help the patient. 
As I see it, the “weg damit” attitude of medicine has gone too far when we chase the 
disease, while we at the same time risk “conquering” the patient at the expense of caring for 
him or her.  
A possible objection to my work in this thesis raises the question of whether my reliance on 
care and the pathosophic lessons of von Weizsäcker actually implies a regression. Do I by 
this inquiry glorify the state of being ill, and underestimate the importance of recovery? Is 
not the success story of modern medicine connected to its potential for making people 
healthy, and do we not risk minimizing the successes of medicine by emphasizing reticence 
rather than active doing? Do we really want physicians to be passive, simply receptive to 
the patient’s suffering instead of acting to suppress it? The development of antibiotics, 
insulin, anesthesia, and surgery represents, of course, a huge advance for our society, and 
returning to old medicine is not a realistic option. However, we should also be able to hold 
two thoughts at the same time, acknowledging the advances of modern medicine while 
simultaneously critically assessing some of the drawbacks of this development. 
During the course of this thesis I have dealt with different pairs of concepts that reflect a 
tension in the field: the attitude of reserve (“ja, aber nicht so”) versus the attitude of action 
(“weg damit”); caring versus curing; perceiving versus recording; interfering versus 
abandonment. These paired oppositions cover the span in the field of medicine, including its 
different practices and actors. They also reflect the dualities and ambivalences within which 
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medical practitioners navigate: between the biomedical demands and the humanistic ideals 
of medicine; between being professional and being personal; between a disease perspective 
that requires a recording eye to get an overview of the patient’s disease and an illness 
perspective that requires a perceiving eye and an attitude of reserve to be able to see the 
patient’s need and thus be able to care for him or her.  
As I see it, an ethics of care provides a potential for dealing with some of this ambivalence. 
For instance, as we have seen from our discussion of the epistemological aspects of care, 
the situation in clinical medicine is not so clear cut that clinical diagnostics require only a 
recording eye. On the contrary, approaching patients with a perceiving eye, a relational 
awareness, and an openness toward the patient’s as well as one’s own emotional responses 
also may contribute to furthering the clinical proficiency of the medical practitioner. This is 
interesting, since it illustrates how the care perspective here crosses the traditional divide 
between curing and caring, pointing to how care as a way of seeing and comprehending the 
patient also contributes to the curing of the patient by refining and facilitating the diagnostic 
process. Whether we find ourselves in the role of physician, nurse, supervisor, moral 
philosopher, colleague, friend, or mother, by focusing on interpersonal relations and 
relational care and not on the practices related to the specific roles we inhabit, an ethics of 
care also manages to break with the traditional distinction between the personal and the 
professional, between the private and the public (Pettersen, 2006, 2008). Care may be 
relevant in relational processes at any level, between people on the macro level as well as 
on the micro level.  
In my view, relating this capacity of care to the field of medicine and medical ethics may 
lead to a different dynamic in both the doctor-patient interaction and the interactions among 
the different health care professions. The traditional view of care in medicine as a virtue of 
a detached (male) physician is thus challenged by a relational understanding of care, and 
may also cut through the divide between the professions of nurses and physicians, as well as 
that between female and male. That is, by its capacity for breaking through the traditional 
dichotomies of moral theory such as the personal and the professional or the private and the 
public, an ethics of care may eventually be able to reconcile and combine the different 
dimensions of medical practice that I have been pointing to here—that is, caring versus 
curing, perceiving versus recording, a pat on the patient’s back (“ja, aber nict so”) versus 
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curative action (“weg damit”)—thus possibly becoming an ethics both of caring and curing 
(Paulsen, 2011). 
So, what about that oxymoron, then? As I have tried to argue, there is no contradiction here. 
Caring does not impair the important and most intellectual parts of being a doctor: knowing 
what is wrong with patients, organizing care at a practice level, and remaining enthusiastic. 
On the contrary, care may sharpen our diagnostic skill, as its situational grounding in 
practice secures a concrete and practical starting point for action. And, as current research 
reports indicate, being connected and involved with patients as health care personnel 
protects rather than exposes one to the risks of burnout and apathy (Deckard, Meterko, & 
Field, 1994; Halpern, 2001; Kearney et al., 2009). 
Before concluding this thesis I wish to reflect some more about the didactical challenges of 
the introduction of care in medicine, and to indicate as well some relevant areas for further 
research emanating from this work. 
4.5.3 Didactical challenges: Allowing for emotions and providing conceptual support 
At the ends of both paper 1 and paper 2, I address the question of the didactical challenges 
related to the task of encouraging care in medicine, asking how we may train and educate 
physicians in seeing with a perceiving eye (Martinsen, E. H., 2011a) and how we may 
facilitate an understanding of the related self and of relational care in medicine (Martinsen, 
E. H., 2011b).  
On the question of how to facilitate a perceiving eye in medicine, Martinsen does not offer 
any recipe. She does point out how the process of recording may impair our “seeing 
emotions.” In order to advance a perceiving eye in medicine, contributing to promote an 
openness toward the patient’s situation that reaches beyond the disease perspective captured 
by the recording eye, I think we need to encourage an openness toward the physician’s own 
emotions in meeting with patients. Instead of pushing away or “burying” our emotional 
responses in particular situations, we should deem these reactions valuable for the 
development and cultivation of an emotional awareness in the physician.  
For a medical teacher it may be pivotal to provide an atmosphere during teaching, first and 
foremost at the bedside, where the students are encouraged to reflect on their own emotions 
in relation to their encounters with patients. To actively counteract an educational process 
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that inculcates detachment, it is important to allow for emotional responses from the 
students during the variety of different situations and scenarios they encounter. Training in 
mindfulness meditation has been suggested as one possible way of working with emotions 
in medical education, helping students become familiar with emotions, both their own and 
those of their patients (Shapiro, 2011). Narrative medicine and the use of specific 
techniques like reflective writing may also encourage attention to the emotional dimension 
of the experience of both patient and physician (Charon, 2006; Wald & Reis, 2010; Shapiro, 
2011). Taking advantage of seminal events for creating an opportunity for reflection, 
making use of active learning methods that engage students in doing and discussing, and the 
use of effective role modeling represent some concrete and pragmatic teaching methods to 
deal with emotions in medical work, thus overcoming barriers to teaching “humanistic care” 
in clinical settings (Branch et al., 2001).  
A systematic assessment and evaluation of the efficacy of these different approaches in 
medical education remains to be carried out, though, and this constitutes an area for further 
research. To what extent do these approaches actually lead to a greater awareness of 
emotions among medical students?49 In what way, and to what extent, does a greater 
awareness of emotions influence their later interaction with patients? What is the pragmatic 
effect of this way of seeing and relating to patients in medicine?  
I have been emphasizing the importance of physicians allowing for an openness to their 
own emotions in meeting with patients. However, it is important at the same time to point 
out that this does not imply that emotions are always to be given priority over rationality or 
that patients should be overwhelmed with the physician’s own emotionality. A disclosure of 
emotions can also be inappropriate on the part of a physician. That is, when the physician’s 
emotions are exposed primarily in the service of the physician himself, it can represent a 
violation of appropriate boundaries, and can give the patient a feeling of not being taken 
care of. Here we should draw a distinction between what may be called self-disclosure 
through empathetic validation and self-protective self-disclosure (Malterud & Hollnagel, 
2007). Where the former may contribute to building a stronger doctor-patient relationship, 
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At the Norwegian Knowledge Center for the Health Services there is an ongoing randomized study that 
examines whether a group-based mindfulness program can reduce stress and promote the personal 
development of medicine and psychology students. Among the primary outcome variables are empathy and 
mindfulness, and two of the hypotheses to be tested in the study are that the program of Mindfulness-Based 
Stress Reduction increases students’ empathy and increases their mindfulness (de Vibe, 2009). 
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the latter may lead to the opposite. That is, self-disclosure as a way for the physician to deal 
with his own emotions may be both sentimental and “self-protective.” Kirsti Malterud and 
colleagues show that when a physician reveals his own feelings and experiences in an 
encounter with a patient, this could be appreciated by the patients and thus positively 
influence the doctor-patient relationship (Malterud & Hollnagel, 2005; Malterud, 
Fredriksen, & Gjerde, 2009). However, these studies also raise important questions with 
regard to when and the conditions under which emotional disclosures would be 
professionally useful and responsible. 
Even though we may have good intentions about implementing a care-oriented perspective 
in medical education, there are various barriers that may inhibit such an approach. So it is 
important to identify the informal and hidden curricula ubiquitous in hospitals and medical 
schools (Branch et al., 2001). The cultural mores exhibited by students, residents, teachers, 
and administrators at an institution transmit strong messages easily learned and internalized 
by novices. These messages may have more educational impact than the explicit lessons 
taught by the faculty in the formal curriculum.  
As I see it, the ideals of detachment and non-interference, in combination with the 
cultivation of a recording eye and an underlying “weg damit” attitude to disease, represent 
underlying attitudes in medicine that impair a learning climate that could foster care in 
medical education. For this reason, medicine is in need of an ethical framework that also 
provides “conceptual support” for caring in medicine. This plea for conceptual support also 
relates to our understanding of an illness perspective in medicine. Although it may be much 
to demand of medical students that they be familiar, for instance, with the field of the 
phenomenology of illness, I think it would be essential for students to know at least some 
parts of these different approaches to illness and ill-being. It is mandatory, as I see it, that 
physicians be familiar with these additional ways of understanding illness in medicine, and 
that they also take part in the development of this kind of theory, not leaving it only to 
philosophers.  
In addition to teaching such alternate perspectives in medicine, we may consider additional 
pedagogical “modalities,” such as the reading of fiction dealing with human ailment 
(Bondevik & Stene-Johansen, 2011) or the reading of pathographies, personal accounts of 
illness experiences (Hawkins, 1999). Another approach may be to make use of movies that 
deal with experiences of illness, like the movie Wit to which I previously referred (Colt, 
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Quadrelli, & Lester, 2011; Darbyshire & Baker, 2012). These ways of fleshing out a 
“bio(po)ethics,” 50 using different kinds of “poetic forms of storytelling” through novels, 
pathographies, or movies to teach about ill-being, thus represent an important field for 
further inquiry.  
4.5.4 Further research
I believe the research to this point has shed light on theoretical traditions that are seldom 
touched upon in medical ethics and has raised new questions of both a theoretical and an 
empirical kind. 
First, an interesting area for research emanating from this thesis is the further elaboration 
and discussion of the illness perspective of von Weizsäcker and its relation to similar 
perspectives within the field of the phenomenology of illness.  
Further, in order to develop and refine a care perspective in medicine there are several areas 
in need of more investigation. For instance, how do the prominent empathy discourse in 
medicine and the conceptualization of medicine as an art relate to the implementation of 
care ethics into medicine? While nursing has focused on the concept of care, medicine has 
kept its focus on empathy. The care perspective represents another way of conceiving of the 
challenges in the interaction between physician and patient. To explore the intersection 
between these two different fields of inquiry in the context of medicine may add interesting 
and important knowledge to the understanding of the doctor-patient relationship, as well as 
contributing to improve our understanding of caring in medicine.The characterization of 
medicine as an art is often referred to as medicine’s “humanistic alibi,” but it is seldom 
precisely defined or circumscribed. Terms such as “clinical judgment,” “empathy,” 
“compassion,” “trust,” “comfort,” “intuition,” “humor,” “physical touch,” and “body 
language” are often invoked in attempts to define it (Stolt, 1998). Further analyzing the 
intersection between a care perspective and the notion of medicine as an art represents an 
interesting area for further research. How does care ethics relate to the understanding of 
medicine as an art? What may a care perspective add to this perspective?  
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I have also pointed to the importance of investigating the patients’ experiences in relation to 
whether or not a physician is caring. How do the patients conceive of a caring physician? 
What aspects of the physician’s behavior do they emphasize? It may also be interesting to 
ask the same question of the physician: How does the physician experience her work when 
she emphasizes elements of care and emotional attentiveness in the clinical encounter, 
compared to situations when she does not focus on these aspects? And were there any 
differences in patient outcome that can be traced to whether or not the physician was 
caring? 
5. Conclusion
The point of departure for this thesis has been my desire to expand the scope for physicians’ 
interaction with their patients to include more than a biomedical approach subject to the sole 
imperative of curing. In contemporary medicine, biomedical demands and the disease 
dimension of human ailments focusing on curing have been dominant. In this thesis I try to 
develop a theoretical space for other dimensions of medicine focusing on ill-being and care. 
I have taken as my point of departure von Weizsäcker’s understanding of the pathic: ill-
being conceived of as pathic being and expressed through the pathic modals of will, may, 
shall, can, and must. Being curious about the patient’s ill-being as a medical helper may 
expand the physician’s understanding of the patient, improving the physician’s ability to 
capture the patient’s need. However, to capture the “metaphysics” of being ill requires more 
of us than a theory-based reflection on ill-being. In the words of von Weizsäcker, we must 
also be able to see, or hear, the patient’s need. By pointing to the importance of hearing the 
patient’s “plea for help,” von Weizsäcker put into words an important insight: that an illness 
perspective that aims to embrace the metaphysics of the ill also requires a perceiving eye. 
This way of seeing patients in medicine is important for capturing the patient’s ill-being, 
and is an important prerequisite for care. 
Care ethics challenges medicine’s “eye” and can help us to see in ways other than the 
recording eye that is trained to look for relevant findings and to listen for relevant 
information as part of a targeted anamnesis. To see with what Kari Martinsen calls a 


perceiving eye is to see unreservedly and receptively, thus allowing for sensation and 
emotions to work together. The perceiving eye opens for “a seeing emotion” that can help 
us to take better care of the patient as well as improving our clinical “nose” and ability to 
diagnose. I refer to the last-mentioned aspect as the epistemic potential of care. 
Further, the understanding of the self in an ethics of care as essentially relational represents 
an important supplement to the understanding of the self as independent and separate from 
others. In this thesis I argue that medicine and medical ethics operate with an understanding 
of the moral agent as separate and disconnected and that such an underlying understanding 
of the self can promote distance rather than contact in the clinical encounter, thus 
preventing the development of a caring relationship. Situations in which harm is caused by 
a lack of care in the relationship, a harm captured in the prohibition against turning away 
from someone in need, represents the main ethical concern of an ethics of care, a concern 
that is rarely addressed in today’s medical ethics. Neither the principle of beneficence nor 
virtue ethics, with its focus on the individual character of the medical helper, are able to 
capture this kind of relational awareness in medicine. For this reason I argue in favor of a 
more thorough incorporation of an ethics of care in medical ethics, focusing on relatedness 
rather than separation, and promoting the development of a perceiving eye aimed at 
facilitating an emotional awareness among physicians.  
By combining these insights of caring in medicine with a perspective on ill-being as 
conceived within the pathic modes of will, shall, can, must, and may, we may acquire a 
more nuanced arena within which to act to help patients in situations where both care and 
more strictly medical interventions can work in mutual collaboration. When illness is not 
only considered as something to get rid of (“weg damit”) but as something basic and 
constitutive of our existence—for our way of being human—the illness dimension of 
human ailment, as well as caring approaches, may be given more room to develop in 
medicine. 

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Abstract In this paper I introduce a theoretical framework on care developed by
the Norwegian nurse and philosopher Kari Martinsen, and I argue that this approach
has relevance not only within nursing, but also within clinical medicine. I try to
substantiate this claim by analysing some of the key concepts in this approach, and I
illustrate the potential clinical relevance of this approach by applying it in relation to
two care scenarios. Finally, I discuss some of the concerns that have been raised in
relation to the aim of highlighting care in medicine.
Keywords Care  Doctor–patient relationship  Ethics of care  Kari Martinsen 
Medical ethics  Nursing ethics
Introduction
Most of us agree that the assumption that ‘‘nurses care’’ and ‘‘doctors cure’’ is too
simplistic, and that it is not uncommon for many nurses not to care very much at all,
and for some doctors to care a great deal. However, in spite of this, there still is a
theoretical discrepancy between nursing and medicine in relation to how care is
handled; while care may be said to constitute an important part of professional self-
understanding in nursing1 [7, 27, 28, 38, 39], it still may be said to be situated in the
margins of the ethical thinking in medicine [9, 42, 51, 52], and seldom applied to
E. H. Martinsen (&)
Section for Medical Ethics, Institute of Health and Society, Faculty of Medicine,
University of Oslo, PO BOX 1130 Blindern, 0318 Oslo, Norway
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1 However, this does not mean that there is agreement on how care is to be understood in relation to
nursing. On the contrary, the concept of care in nursing may be understood in different ways and relates to
different theoretical traditions.
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medical education [8]. Nursing and the nursing profession may be criticized for
monopolizing the concept of care [49].
In light of this theoretical discrepancy and the fact that many patients complain
about a lack of care when meeting with their doctors, and experiencing ignorance,
insensitivity or degrading behaviour [24, 26, 35], this urges a further analysis of the
relevance of the care discourse in medicine. Implementing nursing care perspectives
in medicine is controversial for a number of reasons, and may be why it has not been
explored thoroughly. However, this is not a reason to avoid the topic. On the
contrary, there may be powerful perspectives that have not been considered because
of prejudice.
Therefore, in this paper I attempt to bring some of this knowledge from nursing
into the ﬁeld of medicine, taking the inﬂuential scholarly works on care by
Norwegian nursing scientist and philosopher Kari Martinsen as my point of
departure.2 Kari Martinsen’s work has inﬂuenced the current understanding of care
in nursing in Scandinavian countries, and she belongs to a different theoretical
tradition than the Gilligan’s Anglo-American. Investigating Martinsen in the context
of medicine will be interesting because it will represent an attempt to bridge the gap
between related research traditions in medicine and nursing, and it will represent an
attempt to relate the Scandinavian nursing debate on care inspired by phenome-
nology to the Anglo-American tradition of care ethics.
Interestingly, Søren Holm asks a similar question in his article, ‘‘What should
other healthcare professions learn from nursing ethics?’’ [21]. However, Holm and I
reach different conclusions: while Holm rejects the inﬂuence and importance of
ethics of care in relation to nursing ethics and health care ethics in general,3 I
welcome these perspectives, also in medicine.
In this paper I focus my attention on Martinsen’s analysis of the different clinical
gazes [41], and I will explore how this perspective may represent a proliﬁc approach
towards care in medicine. Care, by deﬁnition, ‘‘requires the recognition of a need’’
[57], so focusing on the way physicians see may represent an advantageous way of
approaching care in medicine. The dominating gaze in medicine, however, is often
referred to as powerful, objectifying and dehumanizing [14, 22, 24]. Therefore, I
argue with Kari Martinsen that medicine needs to encourage and develop a
‘‘perceiving eye’’ [41]. The fostering of such an eye, or gaze,4 may facilitate care in
each medical encounter, as well as reﬁning clinical proﬁciency. In support of this
claim, I ﬁrst draw on some of the main features in Martinsen’s care theory, trying to
make her thinking comprehensible for readers outside Nordic countries as well.
Subsequently, I analyse Martinsen’s essay Seeing with the Heart’s Eye, focusing on
2 Even though Kari Martinsen’s point of departure is the philosophy of nursing, her analysis focuses
more on the relationship between the patient and health care professional in general than on the particular
relationship between patient and nurse. Therefore I ﬁnd her analyses also relevant in relation to medicine.
3 Holm concludes that other healthcare ethics should learn from the resistance of nursing ethics to
analytic reductionism, however, he does not ascribe this resistance to inﬂuences from an ethics of care
[21]. Instead, he points to other theoretical positions such as some feminist ethicists (however, not the
feminist ethicists dealing with care) and modern particularists emphasizing the situational importance of
ethical decision making, as well as inﬂuences from various schools of continental philosophy.
4 I use the terms ‘eye’ and ‘gaze’ interchangeably throughout in the text.
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her analysis of what seeing means in health care (ibid.). By using examples, I aim to
illustrate how the development of a sensous and perceiving eye in medicine may be
of ethical as well as epistemological importance for the clinical encounter. Finally, I
will discuss different objections to focusing on care in medicine, in relation to the
perspective developed above.
Kari Martinsen’s Philosophy of Caring
Inﬂuenced by phenomenology and the historic roots of caring in nursing, Kari
Martinsen has approached the concept of care through different levels of analysis. I
rely for the most part in this paper on her later works in which she ‘‘is thinking
with,’’ to use her own expression, the Danish philosopher and theologian Knud E.
Løgstrup by analysing care phenomenologically [39–41].
Martinsen emphasizes care as being basic to human existence. She argues that as
human beings we are basically social and dependent on other people and relies here
on Løgstrup’s view of human life as a life in interdependence5 [39, 40]. The
assumption that human beings are interconnected and dependent upon each other
thus represents a central ontological feature of Martinsen’s theory. Thus, care
constitutes a fundamental precondition of our lives: As human beings, we are
basically dependent, and this dependency requires a human response in the form of
care.
Martinsen always interprets a situation of care as being contextual, emotionally
laden and particularistic in nature: ‘‘Care is to be concrete and present in a
relationship by our senses and our bodies. It is always to be in a movement away
from ourselves and towards the other,’’ she writes [36, p. 11]. Care is to relate to the
other in an unconditional and spontaneous way as a response to the concrete
situation of the other. Nevertheless, in order to accomplish this, we must be able to
recognize his or her needs in the ﬁrst place. Therefore, noticing the need to care may
be conceived of as a basic element of care [57].6 Similarly, Martinsen argues that in
order to care for the patient, ‘‘we must both be able to see and express the [patient’s]
appeal for help in order to strengthen the [patient’s] life courage in the suffering’’
[37, p. 9]. She thus highlights the importance of noticing the need to care (to see), at
the same time as focusing on the importance of practical action in care (to express).
She also indicates an important ethical implication: namely, the strengthening of a
patient’s life courage. Consequently, care is not only about being empathic or being
emotionally attached. The essential element, however, is to be able to recognize the
need of the other and to act accordingly. For that reason, practical action represents
an important dimension in Martinsen’s care approach, together with a relational and
5 Through phenomenological investigations, Løgstrup came up with some basic phenomena which
govern human interaction, and in his later writings he calls these modes of reaction ‘‘spontaneous
manifestations of life’’ or ‘‘spontaneous utterances of life.’’ Løgstrup argues that phenomena such as trust,
hope, compassion and the openness of speech are pre-cultural characteristics of our existence, and
ontologically express the basic entanglement of individual human beings [29, 30].
6 According to Tronto, the three other elements of care are: to take care of, care-giving and care-
receiving [57].
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a moral dimension. Care is thus a trinity: ‘‘relational, practical and moral
simultaneously’’ [3, 38].
Perceiving and Recording
A central feature of the care philosophy of Martinsen is her emphasis on perception
in our interaction with others, as well as in clinical situations, and she considers
perception to constitute an important part of clinical judgment.7 In the essay Seeing
with the Heart’s EyeMartinsen explores different dimensions of the clinician’s gaze
[41]. She starts by drawing a distinction between ‘‘perceiving’’ and ‘‘recording’’:
‘‘By recording is meant the putting of oneself in an outside position, classifying,’’
she argues (p. 72). When we record, we systematize and differentiate, albeit within
the frameworks of an already existing conceptual system. The recording eye is
reductionistic and neutral; it may reduce living characteristics, such as a laughing
face, to clinical signs, characteristics and marks. It is the eye of the disinterested
observer, in which the other, as a person, may become indifferent to us. In her
description of the recording eye, Martinsen is also inspired by and refers to
Løgstrup’s conception of the ‘‘eye of the epoch’’ [31] and to Michel Foucault’s
well-known analyses of ‘‘the classifying gaze’’ and ‘‘the examining gaze’’ in
medicine [14].
In contrast the perceiving eye is characterized by openness towards the world,
where sensation and emotions are working together, says Martinsen. The perceiving
eye opens for ‘‘a seeing emotion,’’ in which we are touched and emotionally
involved before we understand the needs of the other. Martinsen refers in this
connection to the story of the Good Samaritan: The Samaritan saw the half-dead
stranger and ‘‘was moved with compassion’’ [55]. He did not record ﬁrst; instead, he
was struck, pained by the wounded stranger. Martinsen refers here to the Greek
word in the text, esplanknistae, which is ‘‘a verb made from a noun, meaning
something to do with guts, stomach, abdomen, in other words an incredible physical
pain’’ (Johannes Møllehave, cited in [41]). He was ‘‘pained in the gut,’’ meaning
that ‘‘he saw with his whole body, which was touched’’ (p. 84). The Samaritan’s
understanding of the situation was thus led by his senses, by his sensuous and
perceiving eye.
So, why does Martinsen bring the story of the Good Samaritan into an essay on
seeing in health care?8 The story illustrates how the perceiving eye may facilitate
care. In the story, the priest, the Levite and the Samaritan all saw the half-dead man,
although they saw him in different ways. Signiﬁcantly, the way they saw him had a
major impact on the way they acted: the well-established and theoretically educated
men, the priest and the Levite, saw the half-dead man and passed him by. Did they
7 Here Martinsen is inﬂuenced by Løgstrup and his position of ‘‘phenomenology of creation.’’ To be
perceptive and open reﬂects thus the attitude of the phenomenology of creation, of being reticent and of
receiving the other as a gift [39, 40].
8 The story of the Good Samaritan is regarded as an exemplary story in the Nordic tradition within care
ethics and nursing ethics, and its intrinsic value of charity is also considered as part of the basic values in
the Norwegian health care system [54, 48].
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not trust their eyes? Did they have recording eyes and not perceiving eyes? Was the
ailing man recorded as a stranger and therefore not of their concern, based on theory
and culture? The Samaritan, on the other hand, got within the ‘‘perceiving range of
life’’ [41]. He did not record ﬁrst; instead, he was struck, pained by the wounded
stranger.
What Gaze is at Work in Medicine?
How can we further transfer these theoretical insights to medicine? What gaze is at
work here? As physicians we are trained to create a thorough medical history and
make a clinical examination in order to give a proper diagnosis. The process of
interviewing and examining the patient operates within a ﬁxed framework, and even
though we are encouraged to ask open-ended questions, the medical interview
follows a standard scheme, investigating the patient’s heredity, social history,
education, employment history, drug history, tobacco and alcohol consumption,
home circumstances, and the history of the present complaint(s). Likewise, the
physical examination of the patient operates within the same framework, leading us
towards a possible diagnosis of the patient. This perspective is evident if we go to a
recenty updated text book in clinical examination for medical students [13]: ‘‘The
examination really begins from the moments you set eyes on the patient,’’ Epstein
et al. write (p. 20). ‘‘As the patient approaches you in the consulting or examination
room, observe the posture, gait and character of the stride,’’ and when making your
initial acquaintance with the patient, ‘‘the grip of the handshake usually provides
some useful information’’ (p. 20–21). Thus, the ﬁrst step of the examination is the
inspection, during which we initially try to create a general impression of the
patient: does she look well, or not? Is there any striking physical abnormality? Then
we inspect the patient more speciﬁcally in relation to our examination of the
different body systems, looking for signs and stigmata before we continue with
palpation and auscultation of the heart and lungs. The medical exploring gaze thus
operates within a ﬁxed framework by systematizing, differentiating and classifying
the information from the patient within a ﬁxed totality. At the same time, physicians
aim at remaining ‘‘professional’’ in meetings with patients. We usually understand
the word professional to mean ‘‘keeping sufﬁcient distance, not being overly
involved (restraining emotions) and being objective and a matter of fact in one’s
speech’’ [41]. In light of this, I will argue that the dominant gaze of medical practice
is a recording gaze, focusing too heavily on diagnoses and diseases alone and
leaving out the sensitive openness to the patient’s particular situation.9 This is also
underscored by recent empirical ﬁndings, pointing to how physicians actually
‘‘essentialise’’ the patients’ stories by breaking them down into concrete complaints
and categorising the symptoms into medical sense [1], as well as studies pointing to
9 Even so, there are different attempts to include the patient’s perspective to a greater extent into medical
practice. Patient-centred medicine represents one example of such an approach, in which the importance
of pursuing both the patient’s and the physician’s agenda is emphasized [4, 44]. The works on clinical
empathy in medicine by Halpern [15, 16] represents another example, as well as the works of the Nordic
general practitioners Malterud and Hollnagel [33, 34].
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how the professional gaze actually may lead to humiliation and shame on part of the
patient [35]. A possible consequence of such a recording gaze in medicine may be
that physicians do not always ‘‘trust their own eyes’’ when meeting with patients
who suffer. Let me offer an example:
Do We Not Trust Our Eyes?
In an article in the Journal of the Norwegian Medical Association, Kristin Ribe, who
has suffered for several years from self-injury and suicidal thoughts, describes her
meeting with health personnel (ﬁrst and foremost physicians) at the emergency
ward, arriving with self-inﬂicted bleeding wounds again and again [53]. She
describes anger or indifference by the doctors who meet her with expressions such
as ‘‘Are you here again, pull yourself together!’’ or ‘‘Now you must stop being
silly!’’ or ‘‘We can’t use all our time on you. Don’t you see how many people are in
the waiting room?’’ ‘‘One doctor did not even say hello to me,’’ she writes. ‘‘He just
equipped himself and talked over an hour with the nurse about his cottage, while I
was only something lying there, a scrap, a nothing’’ (ibid.).
It is tempting and may be relevant to draw a parallel here between the doctors’
behaviour and that of the priest and the Levite in the story of the Good Samaritan.
Like the priest and the Levite, these doctors might not believe their own eyes. A
young woman arrives at the emergency unit with bleeding wounds, and they meet
her with ignorance, blame or anger. Did they not believe their eyes? They probably
saw her with a recording gaze, founded on their medical knowledge and the medical
culture. Among many health professionals, there has been a widespread tendency to
think and talk about self-injuring patients as manipulative [43]. Did the doctors
record the patient as manipulative and therefore outside of their moral concern—just
like the priest and the Levite, who recorded the injured man as a stranger and as
someone they were not obliged to help, based on their culture and their laws?
The recording gaze is powerful in its objectiﬁcation of the other. Through a
recording eye, we may see a person as an object or a completed fact, and this may
threaten the person’s integrity. Integrity means that which must not be hurt,
damaged or altered, but which should be respected and protected [23], and for a
person who is seen as an object, it may be both painful and damaging. The self-
injuring girl precisely delineates the damaging effects of a recording eye when she
says she felt like ‘‘a scrap, a nothing’’ when treated by the doctor who ignored her.
Through this type of objectifying behaviour, the doctor threatened her integrity. As
a consequence, we see how the recording activity of the professionally trained eye
may be damaging to the patient. However, this kind of viewing of the patient is also
necessary in order to understand the patient’s medical condition and to reach a
diagnosis. Thus, in order to care for the patient in a broader sense than just making a
diagnosis and initiating treatment, we must strive to integrate and combine the two
modes of seeing the patient: to see with openness and ease, such as seeing with the
perceiving eye, while also seeing in an academic, exploring and evaluating way.
Besides the protection of patient integrity, Martinsen points to another important
ethical implication of displaying a perceiving gaze in medicine, namely, the
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strengthening of patients’ life courage. This aspect of the perceiving gaze is also
illustrated in the article by Ribe, in which she describes physicians who actually saw
her, receiving her appeal for help, rather than abandoning it. She describes the good
in a physician who saw her scars and said: ‘‘I see you have had a difﬁcult time,’’ and
she describes the positive potential in such a response from another person, as
something that was ‘‘very good to feel’’ and to take with her when she returned
outside again [53]. ‘‘I need the physician at the emergency ward, whose hands
trembled while he was suturing,’’ she writes. ‘‘For him I was not routine. My wound,
my pain moved him. And that was very good to feel, to take with me outside’’ (ibid.).
The Epistemic Potential of Care
Care may also be epistemologically essential in the clinical encounter, and in the
following example I try to illustrate how seeing patients with a perceiving eye also
may contribute to reﬁning the clinical abilities of the physician:
Earwax is the problem for the next patient on the list, and the doctor envisages
a short consultation, hoping to catch up with some work that is behind. After
examining the patient’s ears, the physician conﬁrms the diagnosis and orders
the appropriate treatment. The consultation is over with in ﬁve minutes, and
the patient is supposed to leave. The doctor knows the patient from previous
consultations; he is a middle-aged man, well-ordered and with no medical
history. Still, today the physician becomes aware that something is different.
Maybe it is something in the way the patient walks, or talks that makes it
difﬁcult for the physician to end the consultation as planned. Maybe it is
something in the patient’s eyes that touches the physician, so that instead of
turning to his computer, he asks the patient one more time how he is doing. ‘‘I
do not sleep,’’ the patient answers. ‘‘Well, for how long a time have you not
been sleeping?’’ the physician asks. ‘‘Since I was twelve years old,’’ answers
the patient, who then he loses his well-ordered appearance and tells a history
of many years of child abuse in his childhood home, terrorized by a violent
father. The patient is upset and starts to cry, and the consultation turns into
something quite different from the treatment of bilateral earwax.
As I see it, this example illustrates the epistemic potential in holding on to the
concreteness in the situation by displaying the sensuous and perceiving eye instead
of immediately starting a process of abstraction. The physician could have
disciplined the situation by following his plan for an efﬁcient consultation and doing
a proper job treating the patient’s earwax. And many physicians do end their
consultations just like this. But an extra weight in the patient’s steps or something in
the patient’s eyes moved the physician, and by being aware of his own ‘‘seeing
emotions’’ in meeting with the patient, he captured some important information
regarding the patient’s clinical situation. This is important both in regard to the
medical state of the patient, by initializing further examination and treatment of his
insomnia, but also in relation to bringing forward the courage to live, as Martinsen
expresses it.
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To Care or Not to Care?
So far, I have discussed central conceptions in the care philosophy of Kari
Martinsen in relation to medicine, focusing on her discussion of seeing in health
care and her conceptions of the perceiving and the recording eye. I have asserted
that seeing in medicine is dominated by a recording gaze and that the development
of a sensuous and perceiving gaze is important in order to facilitate care and reﬁne
clinical proﬁciency.
There are many aspects to discuss here, and I will not discuss Martinsen’s
theoretical perspective in this context more,10 but I will discuss the possible
drawbacks of highlighting such a perspective in medicine. In this connection, it is
important to point out that even though care has been a marginalized area of inquiry
within the philosophy of medicine and medical ethics, there is an ongoing transition
in the medical ethical landscape by which the feasibility of ethics of care in relation
to medicine is being recognized within philosophy of medicine [10, 11, 42, 58],
medical education [8], feminist ethics [56] and medical anthropology [25].
There are, of course, many worries that might be raised for a care orientation in
the context of medicine and medical ethics. In the following section I will deal with
some of the arguments related to the assertion that a care perspective in medicine
will likely bring about bad consequences for patients and physicians. By this, I limit
my discussion to exclude critical arguments trying to assert that the notion of care
itself is problematic and unnecessary [2, 12, 19]. Let us look at some of the
objections that are particularly germane to the present discussion:
First, it might be said that caring interferes with proper medical practice by
inhibiting the doctor’s organization of information, in addition to the decision-
making process [32]. Beauchamp and Childress, discussing the virtue of compassion
in medicine, point to this connection in how compassion ‘‘can blind reason and
impartial reﬂection’’ [5]. ‘‘Constant contact with suffering can overwhelm and even
paralyze a compassionate physician and nurse,’’ they write (p. 40). In response to
this worry, it is important to point out that there is nothing intrinsic to the care
perspective that excludes appropriately detached forms of concern and compassion,
to paraphrase Carse [9]. ‘‘A good health care professional should be able to summon
the appropriate degree of emotional detachment, or equanimity, when this is crucial
to serving the well-being of the patient,’’ Carse argues (p. 23).
If we relate this objection to Martinsen’s perspective, we may ask whether the
display of a perceiving gaze in medicine may inhibit rather than facilitate medical
practice. First, according to Martinsen, proper care is not concordant with actions
that disrupt the necessary medical work. Here, I rely on her emphasis on
professional reﬂection in relation to the clinical encounter. In Martinsen’s view,
clinical judgment depends on professional knowledge to structure and organize the
10 Martinsen’s perspective has been debated widely. She has been criticized for pursuing an altruistic
notion of care [18, 50], and for emphasizing ‘‘samaritanism’’ as an ethical ideal in relation to the ethics of
care [50], as well as for romanticizing nursing practice [17]. She has been criticized for toning down the
importance of research and the need for scientiﬁc knowledge in nursing [46]. The use of Løgstrup’s ethics
and phenomenology as the main source for health care ethics also has been criticized [20]. A more
substantial elaboration of this critique is found in my forthcoming PhD thesis.
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information, as well as an ability to be open and sensitive toward the patient.
Because of this, comforting the patient instead of initiating proper medical treatment
is not consistent with good care, but is more like what Martinsen denotes as
sentimental care. According to Martinsen, sentimental care is care in which the
caregiver’s participation in the other person’s suffering is limited to the caregiver’s
self-centred emotions [38]. When the caregiver conﬁnes him or herself to pitying
the patient and refrains from helping the patient in a professional manner, the care
becomes sentimental. Second, as we experienced in the example with the patient
with earwax and insomnia, care may be epistemologically essential in the clinical
encounter because caring attitudes and sensitivities may allow access to important
knowledge about the patient’s subjective experiences of illness, which may be
crucial in acquiring a proper understanding of the patient’s condition.11 Accord-
ingly, from my point of view, the understanding of care as an inhibitor of medical
practice may be due to an inadequate conception of care as well as a failure to
recognize how care may contribute to reﬁning clinical proﬁciency by being
epistemologically relevant.
Second, it might be argued that caring for a patient may lead to difﬁculties for the
physician with regard to causing the patient therapeutically necessary pain or
breaking bad news to the patient [12]. As I see it, such a worry is based on an
inadequate conception of care and I refer to Martinsen’s conception of sentimental
care; according to Martinsen, care is more than feeling sorry for, having a liking for,
or being emotionally attached to someone. Care also involves a practical
participation in the other person’s suffering and concrete action based on
professional judgement. Therefore, to leave out a painful but important procedure
for the patient because of one’s caring for that patient is not concordant with proper
care.
Third, it might be said that there are important moral issues that may fall outside
the reach of an ethics of care. One main worry is that an ethic of care will have
nothing to say about certain forms of injustice [45]. Will physicians be inclined to
favour their patients over other physicians’ patients or the need of the community?
In this regard it is important to point out that the partialistic feature of an ethic of
care does not afﬂict the caring agent with ‘‘tunnel vision’’ [42]. This point is also
evident in Martinsen’s perspective that, besides emphasizing a spontaneous care
response towards the other, mediated through a perceiving eye, also emphasizes the
importance of professional judgment and reﬂection in the clinical encounter [39].
Accordingly, the professional may not have the opportunity to focus his or her
attention on the care of one person or group of persons to the complete exclusion of
the wants and needs of others. It is also important to point out that what is in
question in the care perspective is not necessarily to question the importance of
justice, but pointing to additional ways of moral reasoning [9]. Therefore, ‘‘an
11 The epistemic potential of care also is underscored by the conception of sensibility as explicated by
Nortvedt [47]. Nortvedt argues that sensibility, understood as the affective part of moral sensitivity, has
signiﬁcance for the health care workers’ moral motivation and clinical understanding: ‘‘To be emotionally
affected by the expressions of illness, of bodily weakness and pain, opens up for a medical gaze that both
can capture clinical signs of pathology while at the same time being able to care for the human condition
of the patient and sick individual,’’ he argues (p. 218).
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adequate moral theoretical approach may well involve an integration of the justice
and care orientations so as to retain their respective strengths through rehabilitated
notions of ‘justice’ and ‘care’’’ [9].
The fourth difﬁculty relates to the previous objection and concerns the possible
tendency of an ethics of care to allow favouritism. ‘‘It would require a saint to care
for some really disgusting patients,’’ says Curzer [12], referring to a claim that it is
not possible to care equally for all patients. This is one of the reasons I consider
Ribes’s article (2009) to be both interesting and relevant. There has been an
understanding among doctors that self-injuring patients are difﬁcult, demanding and
manipulative [6, 43]. At the same time, recent research has found that good care
from doctors and health personnel is important for these patients to recover [43]. So,
how do we manage to care for ‘‘difﬁcult’’ and ‘‘demanding’’ patients? I do not have
a simple answer to this question. Yet, I consider Martinsen’s understanding of care
as being able ‘‘to see and express the [patient’s] appeal for help,’’ involving an
emotional awareness and a relational and a practical competence to represent a more
feasible approach to the problem than an understanding of care, meaning to ‘‘have a
liking for,’’ which involves emotional attachment. The latter refers to the
understanding of care that Curzer refers and criticizes in his article [12]. Following
Martinsen, the important task is not whether we like the patient or whether we feel
attached to the patient as a friend, but whether we are able to see, or become aware
of the person’s suffering and express it independent of his or her sympathetic or
unsympathetic traits.
Burnout on the part of the physician also is identiﬁed as a possible drawback to
caring in medicine. A usual way of approaching this issue in medicine has been to
argue in favour of a detached model of care in which the physician remains
professional, i.e., cool and undisturbed by the patient’s situation. On the contrary,
the American physician and philosopher Jodi Halpern argues convincingly against
such an ideal of detachment in medicine, pointing to empirical studies indicating an
increased risk of burnout in relation to a medical practice characterized by
detachment, as well as pointing out how an empathic communication with patients
‘‘makes being a physician more meaningful and satisfying’’ [15, 16]. Kari Martinsen
also has been criticized in a similar manner for pursuing an altruistic concept of
care, allowing for self-sacriﬁce on the part of the health care professional [18, 50]. I
do not agree that Martinsen’s care perspective is altruistic in the sense that it implies
self-sacriﬁce. As I see it, these critics make their claim without taking into
consideration the consciousness of limit inherent in the professional reﬂection that
Martinsen emphasizes in relation to practical care work.
Conclusion
In this paper I have argued that the development of a sensous and perceiving gaze is
important in medicine in order to facilitate care and reﬁne clinical proﬁciency.
Relying on the care philosophy of Kari Martinsen, I suggest that an understanding of
care as being able ‘‘to see and express the [patient’s] appeal for help’’ may represent
a fruitful way of dealing with care in medicine. By this, both the importance of
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attentiveness as conceptualized by the perceiving eye, as well as the relational and
practical dimension of care, are emphasized. Such an approach may further
contribute to protecting the integrity of patients, in addition to contributing to
reﬁning the clinical abilities of physicians in the clinical encounter. Possible
problems have been addressed, while some questions are also left open for further
inquiry: For instance, how do we train and educate physicians in this way of seeing
in medicine?
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